U.S. Army analysis reveals Ukrainian drone unit caused 70% of simulated brigade casualties in German exercise.

A new U.S. Army analysis revealed that Ukrainian drone operators from the 412th Separate Brigade Nemesis inflicted over 70% of the initial simulated casualties on the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, during Combined Resolve 26-07 in Hohenfels, Germany. The Joint Multinational Readiness Center exercise evaluated mechanized vulnerability under continuous unmanned aerial surveillance and strike contacts across a 378 square kilometer operational area. Adapted tactical fieldcraft, signal reduction, and sequential electronic warfare adjustments enabled U.S. armored forces to reduce drone-attributed casualties below 30% by the third day.

A new U.S. Army analysis revealed that Ukraine’s 412th Nemesis drone brigade inflicted 70% of simulated losses on the 1st Cavalry Division during Combined Resolve 26-07 in Germany, driving rapid shifts in electronic warfare, concealment, and tactical dispersion. (Picture source: 412usf)

An analysis of the U.S. Army published on October 7, 2026, revealed that Ukrainian drone operators from the 412th Nemesis formation had contributed to more than 70% of the simulated casualties suffered by the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, during the opening three days of Combined Resolve 26-07 in Hohenfels, Germany. Commanded by Colonel Michael Ziegelhofer, the Greywolf brigade confronted an opposing force reinforced by Ukrainian personnel with combat experience against Russian armored units, artillery positions, and logistics networks. During the ten-day exercise in April-May 2026, opposing drones initiated more than 750 contacts with the U.S. brigade across a 14 by 27 km training area, equivalent to more than 75 daily contacts over 378 km².

For instance, Ukrainian operators already observed an American mechanized company as its vehicles passed through the training area's single entrance, before its vehicles could disperse. By the third day, the drone-related share had fallen below 30% following U.S. changes to concealment, movement, and electronic warfare procedures. The initial 70% represented a proportion of simulated casualties, not the percentage of American tanks or personnel destroyed. The Nemesis drone unit originated in autumn 2023, conducted its first combat flight on February 8, 2024, joined Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces on August 18, and incorporated the Asgard FPV unit on November 28. It became a separate regiment on December 18, 2024, before expanding into the 412th Separate Brigade on November 1, 2025.

Related topic: Ukraine brings U.S. Abrams tanks back to combat against Russia with new drone tactics

By March 26, 2025, Nemesis had conducted 10,000 combat sorties and more than 1,000 reconnaissance sorties, claiming over 1,000 destroyed targets and 5,500 additional targets damaged or struck. Its engagements included 2,188 artillery systems, over 750 logistics targets, 105 tanks, and 37 air defense systems, with artillery engagements outnumbering tank engagements by 20.8 to 1. By April 9, 2025, it claimed 100 destroyed Russian tanks, including 28 in the Starobilsk sector, representing $200 million to $430 million in indicative equipment value. These figures remain unit claims, and repeated attacks do not necessarily represent separate vehicle losses. Nemesis also employed heavy multicopters carrying adapted TM-62 anti-tank mines at distances reaching 20 km, and subsequently diversified into FPV strikes, attacks against Russian air defense systems, and aerial interception.

Its first reported Shahed-type drone interception occurred on February 21, 2025, preceding the development of its Darknode interception element. During Russia's February-April 2022 offensives toward Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy, Ukraine's anti-tank defenses relied on infantry missiles, artillery, mines, and reconnaissance against armored columns concentrated along roads and wooded approaches. Russia initially possessed an estimated 2,433 barrel artillery systems against Ukraine's 1,176, a 2.07-to-1 ratio, and 3,547 multiple launch rocket systems against 1,680 Ukrainian launchers, a 2.11-to-1 ratio. Ukrainian troops engaged armored columns with Stugna-P missiles with remotely operated laser-beam-riding guidance, FGM-148 Javelins with imaging-infrared top-attack capability, and NLAWs using predicted-line-of-sight guidance and overfly top-attack engagement. Leleka-100, Furia, commercial quadcopters, and Bayraktar TB2 drones also supported artillery correction, reconnaissance, and direct strikes.

Russian losses also reflected fuel shortages, inadequate infantry protection, and poor logistical coordination, rather than anti-tank weapons alone. However, Ukrainian engagement capacity remained constrained by missile stocks, artillery ammunition, available launchers, and suitable firing positions. The subsequent introduction of FPV drones allowed smaller units to attack vehicles beyond direct ground-level visibility without depending on a separate missile team or artillery battery for every engagement. The expansion of FPV warfare accelerated during Russia's offensive against Avdiivka in late 2023 and early 2024, as Ukrainian brigades established their first unmanned assault companies, and the Unmanned Systems Forces were created in June 2024. FPV drones costing $500 to $2,000 could engage Russian tanks valued at $2.5 million to $ 4.5 million, a nominal cost ratio of 1,250 to 9,000 to 1, although repeated attacks, reconnaissance, and failed sorties reduced the actual economic advantage.

Estimated drone accuracy increased from 30% in 2022 to 70% in 2024, while 60% to 80% of FPV attacks still failed to destroy targets, and electronic jamming reportedly neutralized up to 75% of drones under certain conditions. On March 30, 2024, Russia's 90th Tank Division committed 36 tanks and 12 infantry fighting vehicles for an assault near Tonenke, and reportedly lost 12 tanks and eight IFVs, or 41.7% of its armored force. These losses resulted from combined drone, artillery, mine, and anti-tank engagements, not drones alone. In another engagement, Ukrainian Shadow operators reportedly destroyed a T-90M by dropping a grenade from a Mavic quadcopter through an open turret hatch, but the distinction between a successful strike, vehicle immobilization, and confirmed destruction remains essential when measuring drone effectiveness. Ukraine's industrial expansion enabled it to continuously increase this drone warfare.

Domestic production reached an estimated 2.2 million drones in 2024, equivalent to an annualized average of 183,333 monthly, while projected 2025 production exceeding 4.5 million would correspond to 375,000 monthly. Newly registered aerospace businesses increased from 41 in 2022 to 132 in 2023 and 183 in 2024, followed by 107 during January-April 2025. However, the Unmanned Systems Forces operated more than 250 UAV models by October 2025, potentially complicating batteries, maintenance, spare parts, and operator training. Ukraine also introduced certification requirements in December 2024 and launched the DOT-Chain Defence in June 2025, allowing participating brigades to purchase approved drones directly from manufacturers. Foreign dependence persisted, with China supplying an estimated 98% of Ukrainian imports of drones weighing 7 kg or less during 2024.

For Ukrainian commanders, the practical constraint was not simply the number of drones manufactured, but how many could be delivered, maintained, controlled, and replaced at the rate demanded by combat operations. The cumulative effect of these developments changed Russian armored employment, with Ukrainian personnel reporting that tanks operating 3 km from the front during the early war increasingly remained between 10 and 15 km behind it in some sectors after 2024. For instance, Nemesis heavy bombers could engage targets at distances reaching 20 km and reportedly deployed more than 2,000 mines during their first 10,000 combat sorties. Ukraine's February 2025 Drone Line initiative also sought to coordinate surveillance and attacks across zones extending 10 to 15 km in depth, threatening Russian armored vehicles, artillery, and logistics before they reached forward positions.

More than 4,000 Russian tank losses have been visually recorded cumulatively, although artillery, mines, missiles, and drones contributed to this total; separate estimates attributing more than two-thirds of certain recent tank destructions to FPV drones concern narrower periods. Russian adaptations included cope cages, mesh armor, electronic warfare systems, and dispersed positions. Fiber-optic FPV drones complicated radio-frequency jamming by transmitting commands through physical cables, while immobilized tanks also remained vulnerable during recovery, making disruption of vehicle movement and maintenance an additional consequence beyond confirmed destruction. At Hohenfels, the U.S. brigade encountered these problems in a controlled exercise that exposed the limitations of its stationary counter-drone equipment during mechanized movement.

Its electronic warfare systems could establish protective areas extending up to 2 km from emplaced positions, corresponding to a theoretical circular area of 12.57 km² for a 2 km radius, but these systems had to be repositioned sequentially as the brigade advanced, leaving moving vehicles exposed, while Ukrainian fiber-optic drones were less affected by U.S. jamming attempts. More than half the brigade therefore heavily depended on overhead concealment, dispersion, smaller movement routes, and immediate reactions to drone detection. Greywolf's officers estimated that fieldcraft and battle drills accounted for roughly 60% of its effective counter-drone protection. Crews also disabled Blue Force Tracker connections, reduced radio transmissions, and sometimes disconnected Starshield satellite links to decrease electromagnetic signatures, but these measures also reduced friendly-force tracking, communications reach, and the ability to coordinate movements.

Resupply took twice the planned duration because logistics personnel had to prioritize greater concealment and less predictable routes. Greywolf's subsequent offensive operations integrated the 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, an experimental drone battalion, and employed more than 700 unmanned aircraft across platoon, battalion, and brigade levels. Relay drones extended most ranges to 25-40 km, covering the 378 km² exercise area, sufficient to cover the entire training area, but the volume of reconnaissance observations, target reports, and strike assessments overwhelmed conventional intelligence collection and airspace-management processes. Therefore, the brigade could not maintain a complete picture of airborne drones and instead delegated reconnaissance and strike priorities, including attacks against enemy ground-control stations, to subordinate commanders.

Moving the coordinated fire line forward of the cavalry squadron reduced additional clearance requirements beyond that boundary, while altitude separation and reserved corridors accommodated helicopters. Greywolf subsequently completed two simultaneous breaches through forested terrain 6 km apart, preventing the opposing force from identifying the principal attack and defeating its reserve before commitment. Its proposed organizational changes now include multifunctional strike troops with three UAV platoons for reconnaissance to at least 40 km, bomber drones carrying four to eight munitions, and relay-supported strike drones, alongside battalion-level armored strike platoons and a shared operational picture comparable to Ukraine's Delta system.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.