Ukraine brings U.S. Abrams tanks back to combat against Russia with new drone tactics.

On October 11, 2026, Ukraine's 475th Separate Assault Regiment CODE 9.2 returned M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks and M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles to direct-fire frontline operations in Kharkiv Oblast. The deployment near Vilkhuvatka follows structural modifications including heavy anti-drone cage armor, protective hull enclosures, and integrated airborne FPV interceptor escorts designed to counter Russian drone strikes. This tactical integration restores heavy armor direct-fire capabilities against fortified positions while mitigating high-density loitering munition threats along the front line.

Ukraine is bringing Abrams tanks back into combat by combining reinforced anti-drone armor with Mavic reconnaissance drones that detect Russian threats, FPV interceptors that destroy incoming attack drones, and Vampire bomber drones in support. (Picture source: CODE 9.2)

On October 11, 2026, Ukraine's 475th Separate Assault Regiment, known as CODE 9.2, returned the M1A1 Abrams tank to frontline combat operations alongside the M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, but heavily protected by reconnaissance drones, FPV interceptors, and anti-drone armor. The operation followed a September 30 assault near Vilkhuvatka in Kharkiv Oblast, where the same regiment used heavily protected tanks to attack Russian infantry occupying buildings. Both engagements demonstrated how Ukraine is adapting its armored vehicles with metal cages, additional protective barriers, reconnaissance drones, and FPV interceptors to counter Russian drone attacks. The renewed use of Abrams tanks is particularly significant because Ukraine had restricted their frontline deployment since April 2024 after losing several of the 31 tanks supplied by the United States, largely due to Russian reconnaissance and strike drones.

Since then, Australia has delivered another 49 M1A1 Abrams, and, during the latest attack, a Ukrainian FPV interceptor destroyed an incoming Russian drone before it reached the tank, while both armored vehicles completed their firing missions and withdrew. The first operation, conducted on September 30, 2026, near Vilkhuvatka, a settlement in Kupiansk district situated 9 km from the Russian border, involved two heavily protected tanks from the 475th Separate Assault Regiment advancing against Russian infantry occupying buildings. The vehicles, equipped with large protective enclosures that covered much of their hulls and turrets, crossed light mines without being immobilized and opened direct fire on Russian positions, while several FPV drones, a Vampire heavy bomber, and a Mavic reconnaissance quadcopter compensated for the crews' restricted visibility through the protective structures.

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In a second operation publicized on October 11, CODE 9.2 deployed an Abrams tank again alongside an American-supplied M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, both fitted with additional metal barriers against drone attacks. The vehicles approached Russian positions under aerial surveillance and fired directly at their targets, while a Ukrainian FPV interceptor destroyed an incoming Russian drone before it could reach the tank. Together, the two operations show how CODE 9.2 combined tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, reconnaissance drones, and aerial interceptors again to conduct short armored attacks despite the threat from Russian FPV drones. CODE 9.2, the regiment conducting these attacks, developed from a reconnaissance platoon established in 2022 within Ukraine's 92nd Mechanized Brigade, became an attack-drone company in 2024, expanded into the 475th Separate Assault Battalion in January 2025, and into an independent regiment in August 2025.

Its commander, Oleksandr "Flint" Nastenko, has organized the formation around three assault companies supported by tanks, artillery, short-range air defense, engineers, electronic warfare personnel, reconnaissance UAVs, attack drones, and unmanned ground vehicles. The regiment's planned observation and strike capabilities extend to 120 km, while its FPV drones provide short-range attack and interception capabilities during ground operations. Nastenko has also proposed assigning robotic systems up to 70% of certain battlefield tasks, particularly those that would otherwise expose infantry to mines, artillery, or Russian drones. When Russian jamming disrupts a drone's radio link, the unit's programmers, electronics engineers, mechanics, and communications specialists can examine its frequencies, antennas, navigation software, and flight parameters, then introduce modifications directly into subsequent missions.

The same command can therefore reduce the delay between identifying a problem and testing a solution. The return of heavily protected Abrams tanks to direct-fire operations must be considered against the deterioration of their survivability during the first months of their Ukrainian deployment. Ukraine originally received 31 M1A1 Abrams from the U.S. in autumn 2023, equivalent to a Ukrainian tank battalion, but five had already been lost by April 2024, prompting Ukrainian commanders to restrict their employment in areas saturated with Russian surveillance and FPV drones. Australia then announced another 49 M1A1 AIM SA tanks on October 17, 2024, valued at A$245 million, delivering 37 in July 2025 and the remaining 12 in December. The M1A1's principal advantage remains the ability to deliver repeated direct fire engagements against buildings, fortified positions, and armored vehicles while protecting its crew.

However, the original Cold War-era armor arrangement cannot provide equivalent protection against attacks directed at the turret roof, engine compartment, or rear hull. The April 2024 restrictions therefore reflected a change in the conditions under which Abrams could operate, not the permanent withdrawal of every Ukrainian Abrams from combat. The modifications brought by Ukrainian crews illustrate how drones are changing the century-long Iron Triangle, a design balance between firepower, mobility, and survivability. Survivability is now being prioritized over some combat capabilities. In September, the two tanks carried hangar-style enclosures that restricted turret traverse, requiring crews to align their hulls with targets, while a Mavic reconnaissance drone compensated for reduced visibility. In October, the tank and Bradley carried elaborate anti-drone structures intended to disrupt Russian FPV attacks before their warheads reached the vehicle armor.

Originally, the Bradley's 25 mm M242 Bushmaster cannon provides sustained fire against infantry and light vehicles, while its TOW missiles can engage armored targets; the Abrams' 120 mm cannon delivers heavier direct fire. However, these protective additions increase vehicle dimensions, obstruct crew observation and maintenance access, complicate movement through narrow routes, and interfere with weapon movement. CODE 9.2's solution therefore combines passive barriers with airborne interception, illustrated by the destruction of a Russian FPV drone during the October operation. Nevertheless, both vehicles depend increasingly on reconnaissance and protection drones before they can exploit their capabilities. CODE 9.2's September engagement provides a concrete example: the Mavic monitored the route and target area because the tanks' protective enclosures reduced crew visibility, while other drones accompanied the vehicles to respond to Russian threats.

This creates a division of responsibilities in which unmanned aircraft perform much of the observation and immediate aerial protection previously dependent on vehicle crews, accompanying infantry, or dedicated reconnaissance formations. The regiment's armored vehicles consequently function as mobile direct-fire assets within a broader network rather than as independent assault elements. This arrangement also creates vulnerabilities because losing reconnaissance coverage, communications, or FPV interceptors can leave the vehicles exposed despite their additional armor. The number of drones required per armored mission, their loss rate, and the time needed to replace exhausted interceptors will therefore influence how frequently such operations can be repeated. CODE 9.2's earlier operations demonstrate the personnel and equipment required to sustain this approach.

In May 2024, a detachment operating 6.4 km from Russia deployed two Vampire multicopters, a Starlink terminal, a long-range antenna, and dozens of batteries within 30 minutes. Russian Orlan reconnaissance drones repeatedly interrupted preparations, while GPS interference temporarily disrupted a Vampire carrying two mines into Russia. The crew restored control and released both mines onto a road, later claiming that they damaged one armored and one unarmored vehicle. The detachment also claimed a maximum of 24 Vampire sorties during one night. The same requirements may apply to armored escorts, which need surveillance and interception coverage during their approach, firing mission, and withdrawal. Consequently, Ukraine's ambition to manufacture more than seven million drones in 2026 corresponds to 19,178 units per day, while projected expenditure of 9,000 daily would consume 3.285 million annually.

Manufacturers reportedly revise drone hardware and software three or four times yearly, with frontline workshops introducing more frequent changes as Russian forces adapt their jamming equipment and interception methods. The resulting competition affects both armies because a drone effective in one sector can become unreliable elsewhere when operating frequencies, electronic warfare coverage, or enemy defensive measures differ. The broader implication is that surviving a short armored assault and sustaining a mechanized offensive in Ukraine now require different levels of support. CODE 9.2 demonstrated that two tanks, or an Abrams and a Bradley, could reach Russian positions and withdraw under drone escort, but neither engagement establishes the feasibility of advancing a complete tank battalion through successive defensive lines.

A larger attack would require simultaneous protection of assault vehicles, engineers, ammunition carriers, recovery equipment, and evacuation routes, multiplying demand for reconnaissance and interceptor drones. Concentrating armor increases available firepower but exposes more vehicles again to Russian surveillance and artillery; dispersing it reduces exposure while limiting the firepower needed for a breakthrough. The industrial consequences are equally important because tanks require substantial repair capacity and long replacement cycles, while FPV interceptors and reconnaissance drones may be consumed or technologically superseded within weeks or months. The decisive measure of success is not whether a protected tank survives one mission, but whether a mechanized formation can now repeatedly advance under the threat of FPV drones, occupy positions, maintain supply routes, and resist counterattacks without exhausting its equipment or losing operational momentum.

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Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.