U.S. Air Force Buys Chinese DJI Drones for Counter-Drone Training at Nuclear Missile Base.

The U.S. Air Force plans to acquire Chinese-made DJI commercial drones to give security forces at F.E. Warren Air Force Base realistic airborne targets for counter-drone training around the Minuteman III nuclear missile complex. The purchase would let defenders train against widely available commercial drones while sharpening detection, electronic warfare and defeat procedures used to protect one of America's three operational ICBM wings.

The DJI aircraft are intended for the 90th Missile Security Operations Squadron, which provides counter-small unmanned aircraft system support and helps secure F.E. Warren's sprawling missile field. The 90th Missile Wing oversees 150 Minuteman III launch facilities and 15 missile alert facilities spread across roughly 9,600 square miles in Wyoming, Nebraska, and Colorado. Using DJI drones as threat representatives is notable because Chinese-made unmanned aircraft face significant restrictions inside the U.S. military. The Pentagon has previously authorized Chinese drones under controlled conditions specifically as targets for counter-UAS testing, rather than for operational missions. For F.E. Warren, the requirement fits into a broader effort to strengthen defenses against small drones near strategic nuclear infrastructure. Air Force data published through the SBIR program described unauthorized UAS activity at ballistic missile bases as a growing concern and specifically identified the 90th Missile Security Operations Squadron's counter-UAS requirement.

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U.S. Soldiers assigned to the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, operate a DJI Mavic 3 during a live-fire exercise in Selija, Latvia, April 29, 2026. During the exercise, squads used drones for reconnaissance as teams bounded forward to attack simulated objectives. (Picture source: US DoD)

The requirement includes two refurbished DJI Mavic 2 Pro drones with Fly More kits, two DJI Mini 3 Pro aircraft with remote controllers, two DJI Avata 2 Fly More Combos, and six payload release devices. The contract is expected to be awarded on a firm-fixed-price basis to the lowest-priced technically acceptable offer. The procurement is reserved for small businesses, with several US-based resellers able to supply the requested aircraft despite the brand-specific DJI requirement.

The procurement, first highlighted by Defense Blog, appears in a solicitation published on August 14, 2026, on SAM.gov by F.E. Warren’s 90th Contracting Squadron. A brand-name justification signed on July 29 by contracting officer Chad A. Evans explains why the 90th Missile Security Operations Squadron requires DJI platforms rather than US-made drones with comparable performance. According to the document, DJI’s proprietary electronic protocols, radio-frequency signatures, and certain flight characteristics cannot be faithfully reproduced by aircraft from other manufacturers. The justification also estimates that DJI accounts for roughly 80 to 85 percent of the global commercial drone market.

This choice is directly linked to the threat profile the exercises are intended to reproduce. US officials consider that relying only on simulated data or domestically produced platforms would leave operators insufficiently prepared for the types of aircraft they are most likely to encounter around a military installation. The justification warns of a critical gap in site defense if crews are unable to test their systems against actual DJI emissions and communication protocols. It therefore links realistic threat replication to the nuclear security mission carried out by units at F.E. Warren.

The three selected models also provide different operational profiles. The Mavic 2 Pro is a folding quadcopter fitted with a three-axis stabilized camera and a one-inch CMOS sensor. The Mini 3 Pro belongs to the sub-250-gram category, with a compact configuration that facilitates transport and deployment from concealed positions. The DJI Avata 2 is more closely associated with first-person-view operations. Weighing about 377 grams, it can reach 27 m/s in manual mode and uses the DJI O4 transmission architecture across the 2.4 and 5 GHz bands. Its data-link range can reach 13 km under certain FCC conditions, although terrain, obstacles, and the electromagnetic environment can reduce that envelope in operational use.

These differences are directly relevant in a tactical scenario. An Avata 2 flying at low altitude can conduct a rapid approach with limited reaction time, while a Mavic or Mini can hold position, observe an installation, or conduct reconnaissance before withdrawing. Security teams can therefore expose their radars and RF detectors to several flight profiles, measure identification times, and determine at what distance jamming becomes effective. At F.E. Warren, where Minuteman III facilities are dispersed across a wide area, a commercial drone could also be used to observe security procedures, probe US responses, or carry a small payload. The payload release devices included in the procurement allow this last scenario to be incorporated into training.

The use of DJI equipment nevertheless raises a cybersecurity issue that the US Air Force is seeking to isolate from the rest of its architecture. Before operational use, the aircraft are expected to receive modified software called RIZER. The justification states that this configuration is intended to prevent telemetry or imagery from being transferred to foreign entities or to US military networks while preserving the electronic characteristics required for training. The document also indicates that Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana is pursuing a similar approach, which could lead to a more standardized method of threat replication across Air Force Global Strike Command.

This precaution is particularly relevant in light of recent difficulties encountered in the United Kingdom with the K3 Scout systems used by the Royal Navy. A cybersecurity assessment in August 2026 found that cameras integrated into these unmanned surface vessels were sending automated heartbeat communications to an internet address located in China. The UK Ministry of Defence stated that no sensitive data had been compromised and that internet connectivity for the affected cameras had been removed. The case nevertheless shows how a secondary component can introduce an external connection or dependency that may not be immediately apparent. In this context, the US interest in accessing genuine DJI RF signatures and protocols is operationally understandable, but it also raises a broader question about introducing Chinese-made equipment into the environment of a nuclear missile base. F.E. Warren’s approach therefore rests on a deliberate trade-off between realistic threat replication and technical risk control, with RIZER and system isolation intended to prevent the training platform itself from becoming a vulnerability.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.