Russia Increases BMP-3 IFV Production With New Drone and Mine Protection for Ukraine War.

Russia’s state defense conglomerate Rostec confirmed a January 28, 2026, shipment of upgraded BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles to the Russian Ministry of Defence, claiming production is running 40% above plan. The delivery underscores Moscow’s effort to offset battlefield attrition in Ukraine by hardening its only mass-produced tracked IFV against drones, mines, and artillery fragmentation.

Rostec, the Russian state-owned industrial conglomerate, has confirmed a fresh shipment of BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles to Russia’s Ministry of Defence, dated 28 January 2026, and framed the delivery as part of an accelerated production tempo, with January output reportedly running 40 percent above plan. The state conglomerate says these vehicles reflect direct battlefield feedback from Ukraine, integrating a newer onboard electronic warfare suite, strengthened underbody protection, and improved anti-fragment resistance to the hull’s front and rear arcs. In Rostec’s telling, the “standard configuration” now leaving the factory floor is no longer the pre-war BMP-3 baseline, but a wartime-evolved package shaped by four years of attrition, drones, mines, and artillery fragmentation.
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BMP-3 armament pairs a 100 mm gun-launcher firing HE rounds and guided missiles with a 30 mm autocannon and 7,62 mm machine guns, giving Russian crews a single platform for close infantry support, trench and strongpoint suppression, and rapid engagements of light armor and low-flying aerial threats (Picture source: Rostec).

While Rostec does not disclose the quantity in this shipment, the message is less about a single batch and more about a production rhythm: the BMP-3 remains the one tracked IFV platform Russia can still deliver in meaningful numbers as losses mount. A recent open-source industrial assessment described the BMP-3 as Russia’s only IFV in mass production and put new-build output at 463 vehicles in 2023, a figure that helps explain why the vehicle keeps reappearing in Russian unit re-equipment announcements. In parallel, Rostec’s earlier 2025 briefings framed the BMP-3 deliveries as including modern protection measures and an automated fire control system, signaling that the factory baseline has been progressively pulled forward toward what frontline crews had been improvising in the field.

The BMP-3’s battlefield value still begins with its gun package. The series combines a 100 mm 2A70 rifled gun-launcher, a 30 mm 2A72 automatic cannon, and three 7.62 mm machine guns, with the 100 mm system feeding from an autoloader and the 30 mm weapon optimized for both ground targets and low-flying aerial threats. The published loadout includes 22 HE-fragmentation rounds in the autoloader plus additional stowage, and eight guided missiles for the 100 mm launcher, alongside 500 rounds for the 30 mm cannon. Combat weight is about 18.7 tonnes, with a crew of three and capacity for seven infantry, road speed around 70 km/h, and amphibious mobility using waterjets for roughly 10 km/h afloat. For gunnery, the turret offers full 360-degree traverse and high elevation up to +60 degrees, a geometry that suits Ukraine’s close terrain where targets appear suddenly from tree lines, buildings, and elevated positions.

Rostec’s most important claim in this 2026 release is survivability adaptation. The corporation explicitly links upgrades to combat experience and highlights three themes: counter-drone and counter-guidance measures via electronic warfare, mine and blast resilience through reinforced underbody protection, and fragmentation protection for the hull’s front and rear. This tracks closely with what the Ukraine front has punished most severely since 2023: dense mine belts, persistent artillery fragmentation, and the rise of FPV drones and loitering munitions striking roofs, engine decks, and exposed troop compartments. Rostec also lists upper hemisphere protection kits, additional side screens and grille armor, and means of reducing signature, suggesting a standardized package of slat or cage structures and add-on panels designed to disrupt shaped-charge fuzing and mitigate overhead attack angles. Even without naming the EW model, the tactical intent is clear: vehicle-mounted jammers are increasingly used to disrupt drone control links and, in some cases, satellite navigation used for terminal guidance, forcing FPV pilots to close distance or switch tactics, buying seconds that matter during short, violent assault runs.

On the Ukrainian front, these upgraded BMP-3s are likely to be used in two dominant patterns that have emerged for Russian mechanized infantry. The first is the armored taxi plus direct-fire gun role: the vehicle delivers an assault team as near as survivability allows, then backs off to provide suppressive fires with 30 mm bursts and 100 mm HE-fragmentation against trench lines, strongpoints, and treelines. In this mode, reinforced belly protection matters because the BMP-3 must cross mined approaches and cratered lanes even when engineers have only partially cleared them. The second pattern is the mobile fire support node role, where BMP-3s operate from covered firing points, using their heavier 100 mm weapon to hit field fortifications and buildings at standoff while minimizing exposure to top-attack drones. The added rear and frontal anti-fragment measures that Rostec mentions fit this reality: many losses come not from single penetrations but from cumulative fragment damage, secondary fires, and crew incapacitation during artillery saturations.

The modernization also speaks to an uncomfortable arithmetic. Pre-war estimates commonly cited in open sources put Russia’s BMP-3 fleet at roughly 760 vehicles before February 2022, but the type has taken sustained attrition in Ukraine. Open-source visual-loss catalogues underline the scale, listing dozens of BMP-3 losses across several sub-variants alongside smaller counts for vehicles fitted with added protection packages. The implication for Russian commanders is that replenishment is not simply replacing like-for-like; it is a forced evolution toward a drone-hardened baseline because older, less protected BMP-3s are disproportionately vulnerable in today’s saturated reconnaissance-strike environment.

Compared with BMP-3s delivered before the war, Rostec’s description suggests a shift from a relatively clean amphibious IFV concept toward a heavier, more protected assault vehicle configuration. The classic BMP-3 selling points of speed and water-crossing remain on paper, but in Ukraine the vehicle’s survival hinges on layered add-on protection, disciplined exposure management, and electronic countermeasures that were not intrinsic to earlier production batches. In practical terms, crews will trade some amphibious readiness and ease of maintenance for a higher chance of surviving the first drone contact, the first mine strike, and the first artillery bracket. That is the hard logic of the current front: mobility is still decisive, but only if the vehicle can live long enough to use it.