Lithuania to lift constitutional ban on NATO nuclear weapons and foreign military bases.

Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda and parliamentary leaders agreed to initiate a constitutional amendment removing Article 137, which has banned weapons of mass destruction and foreign military bases on national territory since 1992. The legislative adjustment aims to eliminate the absolute legal veto blocking future NATO nuclear deterrence integration, responding directly to the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and Iskander-M systems in neighboring Kaliningrad. The policy shift ensures Lithuania avoids becoming a strategic gray zone on the eastern flank by synchronizing its security posture with recent defensive policy alignments executed by Finland.

The proposed constitutional amendment submitted by 50 members of the Seimas seeks to entirely delete Article 137 to grant maximum legal flexibility for temporary allied military deployments, transits, and crisis-basing scenarios. The legislative execution requires a minimum 94-vote supermajority in two distinct parliamentary votes scheduled at least three months apart, preserving international Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations while establishing framework mechanisms for potential NATO deterrence configurations.

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Removing Article 137 would therefore give Vilnius the ability to consider U.S., French, or broader NATO nuclear options later, without committing Lithuania to any specific model, aircraft, weapon, storage site, or timetable now. (Picture source: US DoD)

On July 2, 2026, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda said the country’s senior political leadership had agreed to remove the Article 137 of the Constitution, which banned weapons of mass destruction and foreign military bases on Lithuanian territory since 1992, with approximately 50 members of the 141-seat Seimas registering the amendment on July 3. The change requires at least 94 votes in two separate parliamentary votes held no less than three months apart. It would not immediately place nuclear weapons in Lithuania, create foreign military bases or alter treaty obligations, but it would remove the constitutional veto that currently blocks future NATO nuclear deterrence options.

Nauseda and other Lithuanian officials tied this decision to Finland’s repeal of its own nuclear restrictions days earlier, Russia’s nuclear-capable Iskander systems in Kaliningrad, Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus since 2023 and wider NATO discussions on how to strengthen deterrence on the eastern flank. Lithuania's Article 137 was adopted in 1992, when the country was newly independent, militarily non-aligned and focused on preventing any return of Soviet-era foreign military presence. The wording bans both weapons of mass destruction and foreign military bases, reflecting a post-occupation priority rather than the conditions of NATO membership. Lithuania joined NATO in March 2004, and Allied military presence has since become part of the country’s defense posture.

The provision now creates a legal contradiction: Lithuania hosts NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence and is preparing for Germany’s permanent brigade of roughly 5,000 personnel, but its Constitution still contains an absolute ban that could prevent future Allied nuclear-related activity. The amendment process is deliberately difficult, requiring two votes separated by at least three months and a 94-vote majority each time, which makes early political consensus essential. The July 2 meeting showed broad agreement on the substance but not full agreement on procedure. Nauseda said nearly all parliamentary faction leaders supported deleting Article 137 rather than rewriting it, because exceptions could leave uncertainty over transit, temporary deployment, crisis basing or Allied nuclear arrangements.

Government leaders favor the parliamentary route because it is faster and already defined by constitutional rules. Some opposition figures, such as Saulius Skvernelis and the Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union, argue that removing a nuclear weapons ban should be decided by referendum, which would lengthen the timeline and increase political risk. Seimas Speaker Juozas Olekas wants the process completed before the end of the autumn parliamentary session, indicating that Vilnius wants the legal question resolved before a future crisis forces compressed decision-making. The dispute is therefore mainly about democratic procedure, not about Lithuania’s NATO alignment or assessment of Russia as the principal military threat.

The military rationale is concrete: Lithuania sits between Kaliningrad and Belarus, two areas central to Russia’s western military posture. Kaliningrad hosts nuclear-capable systems, including Iskander-M ballistic missiles, while Belarus has received Russian tactical nuclear weapons after Moscow’s 2023 decision to forward-deploy them there. Lithuania does not control nuclear weapons and is not seeking to acquire them, but its location makes it relevant to NATO reinforcement, air operations, dispersal planning and crisis signaling. Lithuanian government officials and defense policymakers argue that Lithuania is effectively the only NATO member whose Constitution could block future Allied nuclear deployments, even in a crisis or war. That matters because deterrence planning depends on options existing before escalation begins, not after a threat has already materialized.

From Vilnius’ view, Article 137 could force NATO planners to exclude Lithuanian territory from scenarios in which speed, basing flexibility and political signaling could be decisive. The geostrategic context has radically changed since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Finland, which joined NATO in 2023, has removed its national nuclear restrictions to ensure its laws do not prevent Allied nuclear movement, transit or future contingency arrangements. France has opened discussions on a larger European role for its nuclear deterrent, including the possible temporary presence of French strategic air forces in partner countries. The United States has also examined whether future nuclear deployments could extend to additional NATO countries if the security environment requires it.

Lithuania’s objective is not to choose between a U.S., French or broader NATO model now, but to ensure it is not legally excluded from any future arrangement before Alliance decisions are made. Deleting Article 137 would therefore expand Lithuania’s legal flexibility without committing it to nuclear storage, dual-capable aircraft, delivery systems or permanent basing. Lithuanian leaders have repeatedly said the amendment would not mean peacetime nuclear deployment. Nauseda has stated that Lithuania remains committed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and Olekas has said there is no plan to station nuclear weapons in Lithuania under normal conditions. Any future deployment would still require separate decisions by Lithuania and NATO, and additional Lithuanian legislation would be needed to regulate procedures, authorities and conditions.

Such legislation would have to define which institutions authorize nuclear-related activity, whether the rules apply only in crisis or war, how transit or temporary presence is handled, and what security, infrastructure and command arrangements would be required. The constitutional change therefore removes an absolute ban but does not create an automatic authorization mechanism. Operationally, the removal of Article 137 would affect NATO planning more than Lithuania’s current force posture. It would allow Lithuania to support temporary deployments, transit, aircraft recovery, refueling, dispersal, contingency basing or other crisis measures if NATO later decides they are necessary.

These options do not necessarily require permanent nuclear infrastructure, but they require national law not to prohibit them in advance. The change would also reduce asymmetry with Latvia, Estonia and Poland, which do not have the same constitutional restriction and are central to NATO’s northeastern defense plans. Lithuanian officials argue that a military crisis could unfold in days or weeks, while constitutional amendments take months. The proposal is therefore meant to move the legal decision ahead of time, so Lithuania is not forced to start a constitutional debate during an emergency. Strategically, the amendment reflects Lithuania’s shift from post-Cold War legal insulation to post-2022 deterrence integration.

The 1992 ban was designed for a state trying to keep foreign forces and strategic weapons out of its territory after Soviet occupation. The 2026 proposal is designed for a NATO member whose security depends on Allied presence, German reinforcement, U.S. extended deterrence, possible European nuclear coordination, and the credibility of NATO response options. No decision has been announced on nuclear storage sites, delivery systems, dual-capable aircraft, permanent deployment, or timelines. The immediate effect would be legal and political, not military. Lithuania would gain the ability to participate in future NATO nuclear deterrence arrangements if the Alliance later judges them necessary, while its current posture would remain unchanged until separate national and Allied decisions are taken.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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