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US Army and Auriga Space to develop low-cost electromagnetic weapons against drone swarms.


On July 15, 2026, Auriga Space and the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Armaments Center signed a three-year Cooperative Research and Development Agreement to evaluate electromagnetic launchers for counter-drone operations. The joint initiative integrates Auriga's existing electromagnetic accelerator infrastructure with the military's weapon qualification and range-testing facilities at Picatinny Arsenal. This research framework aims to determine if electrically accelerated projectiles can reliably defeat repeated waves of small, low-altitude unmanned aerial systems at a significantly lower cost per target than traditional missile-based air defense networks.

The three-year technical evaluation focuses on assessing component service life, recharge times, and thermal recovery profiles to establish whether a transportable, containerized electromagnetic platform can achieve the repeatable velocities required for tactical engagements. By utilizing magnetic levitation to eliminate standard chemical propellant bore wear, the research aims to deliver a high-cadence magazine capacity capable of connecting directly with active U.S. Army battle management networks.

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In conventional guns, the expanding gas creates enough pressure behind a projectile to force it through a barrel, while the electromagnetic accelerator uses controlled magnetic forces to accelerate a projectile along the launcher. (Picture source: Auriga Space)

In conventional guns, the expanding gas creates enough pressure behind a projectile to force it through a barrel, while the electromagnetic accelerator uses controlled magnetic forces to accelerate a projectile along the launcher. (Picture source: Auriga Space)


On July 15, 2026, Auriga Space and the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Armaments Center (DEVCOM AC) signed a three-year Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) to evaluate electromagnetic launchers to shoot down drones. The CRADA brings DEVCOM AC into an electromagnetic accelerator program that Auriga is already testing under U.S. Department of War contracts, but does not authorize procurement, production, or formation of an operational U.S. Army unit. The agreement covers research, engineering data exchange, capability assessment, and development planning to determine whether electrically accelerated projectiles can engage repeated waves of small drones at a lower cost per target and with a larger ready magazine than missile defenses.

Auriga is also applying the same propulsion architecture to high-cadence hypersonic testing, precision launch work, missile defense concepts, responsive space launch and lunar mass drivers. The research framework combines Auriga's existing electromagnetic accelerator with the US Army's institutional capacity for weapons qualification, ammunition engineering, range testing and integration. DEVCOM AC, headquartered at Picatinny Arsenal in New Jersey, is the organization responsible for developing and assessing armaments and munitions, including weapon mechanisms, projectiles, energetic materials, fire control, lethality, and compatibility with service networks.

Under the agreement, the two entities can exchange design information, compare test results, identify failure modes, and define the engineering thresholds required before a deployable prototype could enter operational experimentation. The assessment must establish repeatable projectile velocity, launch-energy consistency, component service life, recharge time, thermal recovery time, dispersion, interceptor guidance compatibility, and performance after extended firing sequences. It must also determine whether the launcher can connect to US Army radar tracks, electro-optical sensors, identification systems, and battle management software quickly enough to engage several targets within a compressed attack window.

A launcher that performs adequately during isolated laboratory firings would still be unsuitable for counter-UAS operations if its capacitors, coils, switching devices or cooling equipment require lengthy recovery after each shot. Auriga's launcher replaces the chemical combustion used in guns and rocket motors with electrical energy released through an electromagnetic acceleration system. In a conventional cannon, propellant gases exert pressure on the projectile while it travels through the barrel, producing friction, thermal loading, and progressive erosion of the chamber and bore. An electromagnetic accelerator instead uses magnetic levitation to prevent the direct contact between the projectile and the launch surface during acceleration, reducing mechanical friction and removing conventional bore wear from the launch cycle.

Software controls the acceleration profile, allowing engineers to alter the force applied over time according to projectile mass, structural strength, and the desired exit velocity. This matters because a guided interceptor containing electronics, batteries, and control actuators cannot tolerate the same acceleration pulse as a solid inert test body. The launcher could theoretically fire both unguided kinetic projectiles and guided interceptors, but these would produce different requirements for stabilization, navigation, terminal guidance, and lethality. Auriga has not disclosed whether its accelerator uses sequential electromagnetic coils, another induction arrangement, or a different accelerator configuration, and it has not released the number of acceleration stages, launcher length, peak current, or efficiency between stored electrical energy and projectile kinetic energy.



The main engineering constraint is not whether an electromagnetic system can accelerate a mass, but whether a transportable launcher can do so repeatedly at militarily useful energy levels. Projectile kinetic energy increases with the square of velocity, meaning that doubling muzzle velocity requires four times the kinetic energy for a projectile of unchanged mass. For instance, a 1 kg projectile traveling at 1,000 m/s carries 0.5 megajoule of kinetic energy, while the same projectile at 2,000 m/s carries 2 megajoules before accounting for electrical losses, auxiliary equipment, and energy retained in the launcher. If the complete system converted 20 percent of stored electrical energy into projectile motion, a 2-megajoule launch would require 10 megajoules from the energy storage system.

Repeating that shot every five seconds would correspond to an average recharge requirement of 2 megawatts, excluding cooling, sensors, command equipment, and inefficiencies elsewhere in the power chain. These figures are illustrative engineering relationships rather than Auriga performance data, but they show why power capacity, conversion efficiency, and cooling determine launcher size and firing cadence. Counter-drone employment imposes a different set of requirements from long-range artillery or hypersonic testing because the weapon must defeat small, low-altitude and potentially maneuvering targets. A first-person-view drone may fly below tree level, change direction rapidly, and present only a small radar and infrared signature, leaving the engagement system little time to detect, classify, track, and fire.

Against a drone moving at 40 m/s, a projectile with a three-second time of flight must account for 120 meters of target movement before considering evasive action, wind, or tracking error. Increasing projectile velocity reduces this lead distance, but it also raises electrical demand, structural loads, and projectile heating. An unguided round would require sufficiently low dispersion and precise target-state data, while a guided round would need a seeker or command-guidance link able to survive electromagnetic launch forces. Terminal effect is another unresolved issue because a direct-hit kinetic projectile, a proximity-fuzed fragmentation round, and a guided interceptor with an explosive warhead have different costs and probabilities of kill.

The CRADA must therefore evaluate not only whether the launcher can fire rapidly, but how many projectiles are needed per destroyed drone and how engagement effectiveness changes with target size, speed, altitude, aspect, and electronic warfare. Missile launchers carry a limited number of ready interceptors because each round contains a rocket motor, guidance unit, control surfaces, warhead, fuze, and launch container. An electromagnetic weapon separates the reusable energy source from the expendable projectile, potentially allowing a firing unit to carry more rounds in the same transport volume. Removing propellant also reduces the need to move, store, and handle complete rocket motors or gun cartridges, although explosive or fragmenting projectiles would still require safety procedures.

The logistics burden instead shifts to generator fuel, energy storage, cooling equipment, high-voltage components, and specialized maintenance personnel. Auriga's roadmap includes a containerized and transportable launcher, but no container dimensions, vehicle type, gross weight, emplacement time, or crew size have been released. For expeditionary use, the complete unit would have to include the launcher, projectile handling equipment, power source, energy storage modules, cooling system, maintenance equipment, sensor connection, and communications suite. A containerized launcher that depends on several additional vehicles for power and cooling could have a much larger deployment footprint, much like the Patriot.



Electromagnetic launchers would not replace existing air defense systems because their likely strengths and limitations occupy a narrower engagement layer. For instance, Patriot and AMRAAM missiles are intended for aircraft, cruise missiles, and more demanding threats, while electromagnetic launchers would be better suited to repeated engagements against small drones within a shorter defensive perimeter. Electronic warfare can defeat radio-controlled or satellite-guided aircraft without firing ammunition, but it is less reliable against autonomous navigation, frequency-hopping links, hardened control channels, or drones programmed to continue after communications are lost.

Lasers offer low marginal firing costs but require target dwell, stable tracking, and a clear atmospheric path, while fog, dust, smoke, rain, and turbulence can reduce the energy reaching the target. Gun systems offer all-weather kinetic effects but consume multiple rounds, generate recoil and experience barrel wear during sustained firing. An electromagnetic launcher could combine physical target destruction with software-controlled launch energy and a deeper projectile inventory, but only if it achieves adequate accuracy without requiring excessive rounds per target. Its operational value will consequently depend on integration with sensors and fire control at least as much as on launcher velocity or firing cadence.

Cost comparison also explains the US Army's interest, but projectile price alone would not establish affordability. APKWS II guided rockets cost $25,000 to $40,000 per round, Coyote interceptors $100,000 to $125,000, FIM-92 Stinger missiles $430,000 to $480,000, AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles $1.3 million to $1.4 million, and Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptors $4.2 million. Programmable gun ammunition is cheaper, with 20 mm rounds costing $80, 30 mm rounds $200, and 35 mm AHEAD ammunition $1,000 to $1,500 per round, although a gun may expend a burst rather than one projectile during an engagement.

Electronic warfare can keep marginal engagement costs below $100 when disruption succeeds, while laser and microwave shots may consume $1 to $10 in electrical energy but require expensive generation, cooling, beam-control, and tracking equipment. The electromagnetic launcher must therefore be evaluated through cost per confirmed kill, not cost per shot. That calculation must include projectile price, the average number of shots fired per target, launcher acquisition cost, generator fuel, battery or capacitor replacement, component life, cooling-system maintenance, transport vehicles, crew size, and sensor integration.

If a $2,000 projectile requires five shots to achieve a kill, its ammunition cost becomes $10,000 before power, maintenance and system costs are included. The three-year Auriga and DEVCOM AC effort must therefore determine whether the completed weapon can retain a meaningful cost advantage after all of these factors are included while also meeting the U.S. Army requirements for range, accuracy, reliability, mobility and sustained firing.


Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.


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