Algeria Deploys Chinese CHL-906 Electronic Warfare System 6 km from Morocco Border.

An OSINT analyst claims Algeria has positioned a Chinese-made CHL-906 electronic warfare system about 6 km from the Moroccan border, though no official confirmation or verified imagery has emerged. If accurate, the move would signal a deliberate effort by Algiers to project electronic dominance along one of North Africa’s most volatile frontiers.

An OSINT claim circulating on X since 12 February 2026 alleges that the Algerian Armed Forces have positioned a Chinese-made CHL-906 electronic warfare system roughly 6 km from the Moroccan border. The source, the analyst known as Visioner, frames the move as a sign of heightened readiness and potential escalation, but the report remains unproven: there has been no official Algerian confirmation, no independently verified geolocation, and no publicly available satellite or ground imagery set that conclusively anchors the system at the stated site. Even so, the scenario is operationally credible and, if accurate, would amount to a deliberate decision by Algiers to project an electromagnetic presence directly along one of North Africa’s most politically charged frontiers.
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The Chinese CHL-906 is a mobile electronic warfare radar-ELINT suite that passively detects and classifies enemy radar emissions across a wide frequency range, then disrupts airborne radars, drone datalinks, communications, and satellite navigation to degrade ISR and targeting near the frontline (Picture source: Visioner on X).

The CHL-906 is a mobile, integrated electronic reconnaissance and electronic attack package designed to shape an air battle before the first missile is fired. Algeria’s acquisition of CHL-906 has been reported previously after the country’s Ministry of National Defence released imagery that analysts assessed as showing CHL-906-associated vehicles during an exercise in the 3rd Military Region, headquartered at Béchar, itself strategically positioned in Algeria’s southwest. The CHL-906 suite is understood to include an ELINT station able to intercept and track radar emissions across 0.1-40 GHz and a multifunction radar-jamming element assessed capable of disrupting airborne radars to around 250 km, with other optional modules potentially covering long-range radar jamming and millimetre-wave threats.

Open-source technical descriptions add color, albeit with the usual caveat that export brochures tend to be optimistic. The CHL-906 is described as an integrated EW system providing reconnaissance, interference, and warning functions, and is credited with effects that include disrupting communications and interfering with satellite navigation services. Reported specifications cite wide-area detection of radio and radar emissions out to 600 km and interference effects reaching roughly 300 km, alongside frequency coverage up to 40 GHz and claims of GNSS denial against multiple constellations. Those figures should be treated as manufacturer-leaning claims until demonstrated in a real operational environment, but they indicate the kind of envelope Algeria likely wants: a forward-deployable electromagnetic bubble that can degrade Moroccan ISR and precision engagement chains well before aircraft or drones cross a notional line.

Tactically, a system like CHL-906 can be seen as an enabler for air defence and border security rather than as a standalone weapon. Its ELINT function can passively map an opponent’s radar order of battle by detecting, classifying, and geolocating emitters, which is especially valuable along a tense border where both sides routinely exercise and patrol. Its jamming modules can then apply selective pressure: noise jamming to raise the radar’s detection threshold, deceptive techniques to create false targets, or targeted disruption of data links that keep drones stable and controllable. Even limited, intermittent jamming can force an adversary to adapt tactics, change waveforms, or rely on alternate sensors, all of which consume time and bandwidth. Placed close to the frontier, the system could also support a peacetime electromagnetic surveillance posture, collecting signatures that become decisive in a crisis.

This is where Algeria’s radar ecosystem comes into play, because electronic warfare is most effective when it complements a layered sensor and shooter network. Algeria operates Russian long-range air defence systems such as the S-300PMU2, which in Algerian service has been publicly displayed with its associated radar architecture, including the 64N6E2 acquisition radar cited with a maximum detection range of 300 km and the 30N6E2 engagement radar used for tracking and guidance. In practical terms, CHL-906-style support can help protect these radars by covering their operating environment, complicating anti-radiation targeting and reducing the quality of an attacker’s radar picture.

Algeria has also shown interest in passive detection concepts, which are particularly relevant against modern low-observable tactics and against opponents who try to find and target active radars. China’s DWL-002 passive detection system, cited in open-source reporting as part of Algeria’s broader EW strengthening, is often described as a multi-station emitter-locating architecture that can detect and track aircraft by exploiting existing electromagnetic energy rather than transmitting a conventional radar signal. Analyses of DWL-002 have commonly placed its detection potential in the several-hundred-kilometer class and emphasize its use of multiple stations to improve geolocation. In a border scenario, the logic is clear: passive sensors and ELINT help you see without revealing yourself, while active jamming selectively blinds or confuses the other side at the moments that matter.

Why deploy so close to Morocco now, if the report is accurate? The most compelling military explanation is deterrence through readiness. A forward EW deployment signals that Algeria is prepared to contest the air and drone domain immediately, not after a mobilization cycle. It also reflects the way North African militaries increasingly view drones, stand-off munitions, and airborne ISR as the opening moves of any escalation. Algeria has watched Morocco expand its unmanned and precision toolkit in recent years, and a mobile jammer placed near the border is a comparatively economical way to complicate that advantage without matching platform-for-platform.

The geopolitical driver is the Algeria-Morocco rivalry itself: a closed land border since 1994 and a relationship that plunged further after Algeria severed diplomatic ties in August 2021, amid a cascade of accusations and retaliatory measures that hardened military postures on both sides. The Western Sahara dispute remains the core strategic fault line, with Algeria backing the Polisario Front and Morocco treating the territory as a central national cause. The international context has also shifted in ways Algiers reads as unfavorable: the United States’ December 2020 policy shift linking Morocco-Israel normalization to U.S. recognition of Moroccan sovereignty claims over Western Sahara, followed by continued Western diplomatic momentum behind Rabat’s autonomy plan, has deepened Algerian threat perceptions.

Overlaying all of this is a widening procurement divergence. Algeria remains heavily supplied by Russian-origin combat aircraft and air defence, while also absorbing Chinese electronic warfare and sensing solutions that can be fielded quickly and scaled. Morocco, by contrast, has leaned into Western acquisition pathways: the long-running modernization of its F-16 fleet toward the F-16V configuration, and the publicly confirmed AH-64E Apache purchase, illustrate a deepening interoperability track with Washington and NATO partners. In that light, a reported Algerian CHL-906 move would fit a familiar pattern: using electronic warfare to offset an opponent’s edge in networked sensors, Western avionics, and precision strike integration.

For now, the CHL-906 border deployment remains an OSINT claim, not an established fact. But it is the kind of claim worth watching because it aligns with confirmed Algerian acquisitions, known doctrine for protecting long-range air defences, and the steady militarization of the Algeria-Morocco competition. If additional imagery emerges, the key indicators will be vehicle configuration, proximity to established air defence sites, and signs of persistent operation such as support vehicles and hardened positions.