Trump announces first U.S. nuclear weapons testing since 1992 to match China and Russia.

President Donald Trump confirmed plans for the United States to restart nuclear weapons testing, ending a three-decade moratorium that began in 1992, in order to ensure a strategic parity with China and Russia.

On October 30, 2025, President Donald Trump announced that the United States would resume nuclear weapons testing for the first time since 1992, directing the Department of War to begin preparations. Ending a three-decade moratorium, Trump stated that the order aims to ensure strategic parity with China and Russia but did not outline a specific timeline or test site. The decision, announced ahead of his meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping in South Korea, leaves unspecified whether the planned activities will include explosive or non-yield tests.
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The most powerful nuclear weapon ever tested by the United States was the Castle Bravo, detonated on 1 March 1954 with a yield of about 15 megatons of TNT, significantly exceeding its originally predicted yield of around 6 megatons. (Picture source: US Department of Energy)

Donald Trump directed the United States to resume nuclear weapons testing for the first time since 1992, a decision he announced on social media shortly before meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping in South Korea. He stated that he had ordered the Department of War to “begin testing on an equal basis” with other nuclear powers and later told reporters aboard Air Force One that the specific test sites would be determined later. The announcement did not clarify whether this referred to a full-scale nuclear explosive test or to testing of delivery systems and related components, and no official timeline or implementation plan has been disclosed. The order immediately raised questions in the U.S. about its intent, legality, and implications for arms control, given that the United States has upheld a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing for over three decades.

The decision drew immediate scrutiny in Washington and internationally, since the last U.S. nuclear explosive test (known as Divider) took place underground at the Nevada Test Site on 23 September 1992. President Trump argued that the United States must maintain parity with Russia and China in all nuclear activities, asserting that Washington possesses the largest nuclear stockpile, although public estimates place Russia slightly ahead in total warhead numbers. Moscow denied conducting any recent nuclear explosive tests and said its demonstrations of new systems, including the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and Poseidon underwater drone, did not involve nuclear detonations. China called on the United States to respect its international commitments and to uphold the stability established by past arms-control treaties. Within the United States, members of Congress from Nevada pledged to oppose any move to restart testing at the Nevada National Security Site, citing environmental and political concerns.

Experts noted that reestablishing underground testing capabilities would require years of technical preparation, site rehabilitation, and environmental reviews. The White House has not provided any details on the testing scale or objectives, leaving ambiguity over whether this would involve subcritical experiments, simulation validation, or full-yield detonations. Nuclear weapons testing historically served multiple purposes, including the validation of new warhead designs, assessment of weapon effects, and collection of data for defense planning and scientific understanding. Between 1945 and the late 1990s, more than 2,000 nuclear tests were conducted worldwide across atmospheric, underwater, high-altitude, and underground environments, each contributing to technical data but also causing radioactive fallout and global concern. The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibited testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater, forcing nuclear powers to conduct tests underground.

This transition required deep drilling, containment measures, and extensive instrumentation to capture high-speed measurements, but some underground tests still caused accidental venting or subsidence craters. These environmental effects, coupled with health concerns in testing regions, contributed to growing political opposition and international agreements to limit nuclear detonations. The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty introduced a zero-yield standard and established a global monitoring system, though it has not yet entered into legal force. Nonetheless, it created a near-universal norm against explosive testing, with North Korea being the only country to conduct nuclear tests in the 21st century, the last in September 2017. The United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom all shifted toward subcritical experiments and non-yield simulations to preserve confidence in warhead reliability and safety.

Subcritical tests involve using fissile materials and chemical explosives without reaching a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction, allowing scientists to study plutonium behavior under extreme conditions. Combined with hydrodynamic experiments, radiographic imaging, and high-energy laser simulations, these methods have been integrated into stockpile stewardship programs designed to sustain existing weapons without explosive detonations. Facilities such as the U.S. National Ignition Facility and France’s Laser Mégajoule have become key elements of these efforts, generating precise physics data to calibrate computational models. Proponents argue that these techniques maintain deterrent reliability while respecting non-proliferation norms, whereas critics warn that without explosive verification, uncertainties could accumulate over time. Nonetheless, such experiments have become the foundation of post–Cold War nuclear maintenance, supporting international efforts to verify compliance and monitor global seismic activity.

Weapons-development tests confirmed warhead design performance and yield, while weapons-effects tests analyzed the impact of nuclear explosions on military structures, communications networks, and equipment survivability. Safety experiments studied the possibility of accidental detonation during transport or storage, leading to advancements in one-point safety standards and insensitive high-explosive formulations. Detection tests, on the other hand, supported national monitoring networks to identify and differentiate nuclear detonations from natural seismic events. During the Cold War, peaceful nuclear explosion programs explored civilian applications such as mining and canal construction under initiatives like Operation Plowshare and the Soviet PNE program, though these were eventually abandoned due to contamination and cost. By the 1980s, both the United States and the Soviet Union focused on underground testing within yield limits defined by the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which capped explosions at 150 kilotons.

Following the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons laboratories shifted resources toward modeling, aging studies, and materials science, effectively reducing reliance on full-scale detonations. As of 2025, independent assessments estimate that the world’s combined nuclear stockpile stands at approximately 12,300 warheads, of which around 3,900 are deployed for operational use and roughly 2,100 remain on high alert. Russia holds the largest total inventory with about 5,500 warheads, followed by the United States with approximately 5,200. China’s arsenal has expanded rapidly, doubling from about 300 to more than 600 warheads in the last decade and projected to exceed 1,000 by 2030, driven by new missile silos and sea-based deterrence programs. France maintains roughly 290 warheads and the United Kingdom about 225, both relying primarily on submarine-launched ballistic missile systems. India and Pakistan continue gradual expansions, estimated at 180 and 170 warheads respectively, each pursuing diversified delivery platforms.

Israel is believed to maintain a small, undeclared stockpile of around 90 warheads, while North Korea’s inventory may include up to 50 operational weapons, with further plutonium and enriched uranium reserves. This global distribution highlights a trend toward modernization rather than disarmament, with most nuclear states investing in new delivery systems, improved command-and-control networks, and advanced simulation infrastructure. However, strategic arms control frameworks have weakened in recent years, with the New START Treaty between the United States and Russia set to expire in February 2026 unless extended or replaced. The treaty currently limits each side to 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed delivery systems, but verification mechanisms have been strained since 2022 amid geopolitical tensions and suspended inspections. Both nations are continuing modernization programs encompassing intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and nuclear command architectures.

The resumption of U.S. testing could complicate efforts to negotiate future limitations and may prompt reciprocal measures from other nuclear powers. China, while maintaining a declared no-first-use policy, has accelerated the development of new delivery systems, including hypersonic glide vehicles and long-range ballistic missiles, expanding its strategic deterrent footprint. India and Pakistan’s nuclear policies remain tied to regional dynamics, with emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons and maritime deterrence. North Korea continues to refine its solid-fuel missile technology, signaling potential future test preparations. Furthermore, several countries also host foreign nuclear weapons on their territory, including NATO members such as Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Türkiye, as well as states like Belarus that recently accepted Russian nuclear deployments, while others, such as Brazil, Japan, and South Korea, are currently reassessing their longstanding non-nuclear policies.

Abroad, adversaries and allies alike could interpret any nuclear weapons testing made by the U.S. as a major strategic signal, potentially triggering new testing cycles or the revision of nuclear doctrines. The norm established by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has remained one of the strongest barriers to renewed arms racing, and breaking it would mark a turning point in global nuclear governance. In practical terms, the United States already possesses advanced stockpile stewardship capabilities that ensure the reliability of its arsenal without resorting to detonations. The choice between continuing this approach or resuming explosive testing will shape future policy on deterrence, transparency, and non-proliferation. The outcome will depend on whether the U.S. defines “testing on an equal basis” as maintaining scientific parity through simulation or as restoring physical readiness to conduct a nuclear explosion underground. Either interpretation will influence strategic perceptions in Moscow, Beijing, and allied capitals, defining the next phase of global nuclear competition.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.