Saudi Arabia Places Itself Under Pakistan’s Nuclear Umbrella Amid Regional Tensions.

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact on Sept. 17, 2025, extending Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella to Riyadh.

According to Reuters, on September 17, 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, a Muslim state armed with nuclear weapons, signed a mutual defense agreement stipulating that any aggression against one of the two countries would be considered an attack against both. This commitment, which formalizes several decades of military and financial cooperation, effectively provides Riyadh with extended protection under Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella. It represents a major shift, as Saudi Arabia has long maintained that it would not tolerate a strategic imbalance in which Iran possessed nuclear capabilities while it remained exposed. The pact concluded with Islamabad gives concrete form to this red line, at a time when the Iranian nuclear issue remains uncertain despite Israeli and American strikes on Fordo.
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The core remains its land-based missile force, with medium-range ballistic systems such as the Shaheen-III (2,750 km) and the Ababeel (2,200 km, equipped with MIRV warheads) (Picture source: CSIS )

This strategic choice is rooted in a long-standing relationship. Since the Quincy Pact of 1945, Riyadh has relied on the United States for its defense, but repeated regional crises and growing doubts about Washington’s long-term commitment have pushed the kingdom to seek other partners. Pakistan has emerged as a natural choice, not only because of its historic ties with the kingdom, but also because Saudi Arabia financially supported the Pakistani nuclear program when Islamabad was under international sanctions. The signing of this text is therefore not an improvised response to recent developments, but the outcome of years of discussions, as a senior Saudi official reminded in comments reported by Reuters.

The question quickly arose whether this agreement implied the extension of Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia. The ambiguity did not last. On September 18, Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif stated that “our capabilities will be absolutely available within this pact,” confirming that the nuclear dimension was an integral part of the agreement. For Islamabad, this means that any potential aggressor, regardless of its nature, must now factor in the possibility of a joint nuclear response. On the Saudi side, analysts close to the government emphasized that the kingdom had substantially contributed to the development of Pakistan’s arsenal, making it logical for this strategic cooperation to be formalized.

Pakistan currently possesses an arsenal estimated at around 170 nuclear warheads according to SIPRI, structured around an incomplete but steadily modernizing triad. The core remains its land-based missile force, with medium-range ballistic systems such as the Shaheen-III (2,750 km) and the Ababeel (2,200 km, equipped with MIRV warheads). These mobile launch platforms enhance survivability in the event of a preemptive strike. Pakistan also retains shorter-range systems, including the Nasr (Hatf-IX), intended for tactical use against Indian forces. The air component relies on JF-17 Thunder and F-16 squadrons capable of deploying the Ra’ad cruise missile, with a range of 350 km, which provides additional operational flexibility. Islamabad is also developing a nascent naval capability with the Babur III, a submarine-launched cruise missile (450 km), designed to arm Chinese-built Hangor-class submarines and establish a credible second-strike capacity.

This capability rests on a deliberately ambiguous doctrine. Unlike India, which has adopted a formal no-first-use policy, Pakistan maintains the option of early nuclear use to compensate for its conventional inferiority and territorial vulnerability. This posture, originally designed for South Asia’s strategic balance, now extends to Saudi Arabia if the pact’s provisions are taken at face value. In other words, any aggression against Riyadh could, under extreme circumstances, trigger a Pakistani nuclear response.

The implications for the region are considerable. For more than a decade, numerous reports suggested the existence of a secret arrangement allowing Saudi Arabia to access Pakistani nuclear weapons in a crisis. In 2013, Gary Samore, former adviser to President Obama, stated publicly that the Saudis already had such an option. That same year, Jane’s identified a missile base at al-Watah, 200 kilometers southwest of Riyadh, equipped with Chinese DF-3 launchers, reinforcing the hypothesis. The September 17 treaty now institutionalizes this relationship.

Four months before this signing, a border clash between India and Pakistan highlighted the fragility of South Asia’s balance. At the same time, despite the strikes on Fordo, Iran retains the expertise and technological capacity to revive its nuclear program. For Riyadh, relying exclusively on American protection appeared increasingly risky in a context where Washington is focusing more of its strategic attention on the Indo-Pacific.

Operationally, integration into Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella addresses a gap that Patriot and THAAD batteries could not close. No missile defense system can guarantee total protection against a nuclear strike. Saudi Arabia can now confront its adversaries with the prospect of a nuclear response, fundamentally altering the strategic calculus of Tehran but also of New Delhi, which must account for the risk of active Saudi support for Pakistan in a crisis scenario.

The pact between Riyadh and Islamabad is therefore not only a deterrent tool but also a marker of strategic realignment in the Middle East. For Iran, it signals that the Saudi monarchy will not stand alone in the face of its nuclear ambitions. For the United States, it demonstrates Riyadh’s growing determination to diversify its security options beyond the Quincy Pact. And for the wider region, it reflects the extension of South Asia’s nuclear deterrence into the heart of the Gulf.