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Russia Strengthens Precision Strike Operations With Latest Krasnopol-M2 Guided Artillery Supply.
Russia confirmed on 7 November 2025 that its forces have received new batches of Krasnopol-M2 laser-guided artillery shells from Rostec’s High Precision Systems. The move highlights Moscow’s growing focus on precision firepower to offset Ukrainian counter-battery threats and electronic warfare.
On 7 November 2025, Russia confirmed fresh deliveries of Krasnopol-M2 guided artillery shells to frontline units, as reported by TASS. The batches, shipped by High Precision Systems (Rostec), arrive amid sustained demand for point-strike munitions on the Ukrainian front. Moscow’s stated objective is to accelerate precision effects while conserving stockpiles and compressing the sensor-to-shooter loop. The announcement matters because it indicates a deliberate push toward precision artillery as a counter to increasingly lethal counter-battery duels and electronic warfare. Rostec’s arms cluster director Bekhan Ozdoyev underscored that such high-precision munitions are “highly needed” today.
The Krasnopol-M2 is a semi-active laser-guided 155 mm artillery shell capable of engaging point targets at ranges around 20-25 km with highly improved accuracy compared with unguided rounds (Picture Source: Vitaly Kuzmin)
The Krasnopol family is Russia’s long-serving precision artillery line, produced by KBP within Rostec’s High Precision Systems. The M2 variant is a laser-guided 152 mm projectile designed for semi-active laser homing in the terminal phase. Operational employment in Ukraine with forward observers and UAVs providing real-time designation has enabled Russian batteries to pair precision effects with 'shoot-and-scoot' survivability. The integration across a broad set of firing platforms, from legacy 2S3 Akatsiya and 2A65 Msta-B to 2S19 Msta-S and newer systems like the 2S43 Malva and 2A36 Giatsint-B, reflects how Russia is normalizing guided fires across its gun park rather than confining them to a niche capability.
On performance, Russian expert commentary claims a precision regime with CEP measured in low single digits and ranges that can extend to the mid-30s to 40 km when fired from long-barrel guns such as Giatsint or Malva, while more common systems like Msta-S/Msta-B are associated with shorter envelopes in the 20–25 km band. The latest 52-caliber guns like 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV could, in ideal conditions, push the projectile to even greater distances. These figures reflect Russian claims and should be treated as dependent on gun system, propellant, atmospheric conditions, and designation quality; the core guidance method remains semi-active laser homing, not satellite navigation.
Operationally, Krasnopol-M2’s utility in Ukraine hinges on the maturation of the find-fix-finish cycle at battalion and brigade level. Drones or forward observers lase from standoff ranges, while gunlines conduct short, timed missions, often targeting artillery positions, armor in defilade, command posts, and hardened strongpoints. The result is a lower rounds-per-effect ratio relative to unguided HE, a tighter counter-battery window for Ukrainian forces, and a better fit with Russia’s emphasis on rapid displacement after firing. The synergy between laser-guided shells and UAV-enabled reconnaissance is often highlighted, with the system described as playing a key role in counter-battery engagements and in striking high-value targets with fewer shots.
Against a peer adversary under heavy electronic warfare, the M2’s main advantage is its independence from GNSS in the terminal phase. Reports throughout 2024–2025 described degraded performance for GPS/INS-guided rounds like M982 Excalibur under Russian jamming; by contrast, a laser-homing round does not need satellite updates to finish the engagement, mitigating one major failure mode. The tradeoffs remain clear: line-of-sight is mandatory, atmospheric conditions and smoke can attenuate or break illumination, and the kill chain is vulnerable if the designator, often a small UAV, can be jammed, dazzled, or shot down. Ukrainian countermeasures are often described in terms of rapid mobility, decoying, and electronic warfare, all intended to complicate target acquisition and terminal designation.
The industrial signal embedded in these deliveries is equally important. TASS’s readout presents the Krasnopol-M2 consignments alongside other guided weapons in ongoing batches, pointing to sustained output under the state defense order and an intent to routinize guided artillery use rather than treat it as episodic. In practical terms, more frequent precision salvos reduce the logistical burden per effect, shorten missions, and increase the penalty for signature exposure even several kilometers behind the line, particularly for guns, vehicles, small bridges, and makeshift command nodes that would otherwise require multiple unguided volleys.
In comparative terms, Excalibur retains a stand-off advantage when fired from 52-caliber 155 mm guns at 40+ km, and it does not require a designator, which simplifies employment and reduces exposure of spotters. But where GNSS denial is acute and UAVs remain survivable in the near-front airspace, Krasnopol-type solutions can deliver repeatable point effects at typical gun-howitzer ranges with less vulnerability to jamming. An overview of platform compatibility and observed use in Ukraine helps explain why Russia is leaning into this family: it offers a doctrinally comfortable way to raise baseline lethality across legacy formations without waiting for wholesale re-equipment.
Strategically, these deliveries fit a broader Russian shift toward precision artillery inside a fires-dominant doctrine adapted to dense EW and pervasive ISR. By leaning on laser-guided shells that are less susceptible to GNSS interference, pairing them with ubiquitous small UAVs for designation, and feeding batteries from an expanded state defense order, Moscow aims to elevate the routine lethality of battalion- and brigade-level fire missions while husbanding rocket artillery for deeper or time-sensitive targets. If production pace and forward survivability of spotters and drones hold, Ukrainian units should expect a denser pattern of point strikes against guns, vehicles, command posts, and bridges, forcing greater dispersion, deception, and rapid displacement to survive the first minutes after detection. The latest Krasnopol-M2 shipments, as confirmed on November 7, are therefore best read not as a one-off headline but as evidence that precision artillery has become a daily instrument of attrition.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.