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North Korea's Hwasong-11 Short-Range Ballistic Missile Factory Reveals Two Active Variants.
North Korean state media released rare images from inside a ballistic missile factory, revealing active production of two Hwasong-11 short-range missile variants. The imagery suggests Pyongyang is sustaining both domestic stockpiles and missile exports linked to the war in Ukraine.
On 26 December 2025, North Korean state media released rare imagery from inside a ballistic-missile plant, showing long rows of Hwasong-11 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) under assembly as Kim Jong Un toured the facility, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). The photographs, mirrored on monitoring platforms such as KCNAWatch, provide an unusually detailed view of North Korea’s capacity to manufacture solid-fuel missiles. They also appear to confirm that at least two different Hwasong-11 configurations are being produced in parallel. At a time when Hwasong-11A (KN-23) and Hwasong-11B (KN-24) missiles are being exported to Russia and used in Ukraine, the images offer a rare open-source snapshot of how Pyongyang is sustaining both its own arsenal and a growing supply line to Moscow, making this development particularly relevant for Euro-Atlantic security stakeholders.
Rare state media imagery from inside a North Korean missile factory shows parallel production of two Hwasong-11 short-range ballistic missile variants, highlighting Pyongyang’s ability to sustain both domestic arsenals and overseas transfers (Picture Source: North Korean State Media Agency)
The production hall shown by KCNA is densely packed with bright green missile bodies laid horizontally in supporting cradles, extending in multiple rows across the factory floor. Most airframes share the same external length and the same pattern of external rings and joint lines, consistent with previously published imagery of the Hwasong-11A, the solid-fuel SRBM often compared in appearance and mission profile to Russia’s 9K720 Iskander. Serial markings visible on several bodies form tight numerical sequences indicating a batch on the order of several hundred missiles, rather than a small demonstration run. The facility itself corresponds to the February 11 Plant in Hamhung, a key node in the Ryongsong Machine Complex. In the associated report, KCNA stresses Kim Jong Un’s instructions to modernise “major munitions industrial enterprises” and to substantially increase missile and artillery output over the coming planning period, framing the visit as an inspection of a strategic asset rather than a symbolic factory tour.
Technically, the systems visible in the images belong to the broader Hwasong-11 family, which now encompasses several solid-fuel variants derived from a common industrial base. The best known, Hwasong-11A (KN-23), is a single-stage missile roughly 7.5–8.7 metres long with a diameter close to one metre and an estimated range of 400–800 kilometres depending on payload and trajectory. It carries a warhead of up to about one tonne, potentially including high-explosive, submunition or, in a nuclear configuration, low-yield devices.
The missile is launched from mobile transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) and follows a depressed, quasi-ballistic trajectory with a low apogee and terminal manoeuvres, reducing warning times and complicating interception by systems such as Patriot, THAAD or SAMP/T. Its counterpart Hwasong-11B (KN-24), externally reminiscent of the US ATACMS, trades some range for a compact, slab-sided design optimised for high-precision strikes against hardened, point-like targets. Other reported members of the family include a larger heavy-warhead model, shorter-range derivatives and a submarine-launched configuration, all illustrating a deliberate strategy to field a flexible SRBM toolkit around shared propulsion and guidance technologies.
A closer reading of the new factory imagery suggests that not all the missiles on the floor are identical. The majority of airframes show near-identical proportions and ring placement and are likely standard Hwasong-11A-type bodies. In contrast, a smaller subset stands out because certain external reinforcement or mounting rings are positioned at noticeably different points along the fuselage, even though the diameter appears the same. From an engineering perspective, such consistent changes in ring spacing usually signal a different internal layout and, often, a slightly extended overall length, associated with additional propellant volume, a modified propulsion section or a reconfigured guidance and payload bay.
On this basis, the photos point to the simultaneous production of at least two closely related Hwasong-11 variants: a baseline configuration that matches known Hwasong-11A characteristics, and a lengthened derivative whose precise designation and performance parameters cannot yet be confirmed in the absence of official data or flight-test disclosures. Rather than random assembly variation, the repetition of these differences across several missiles suggests a deliberate design branch within the Hwasong-11 programme, possibly oriented toward extended-range conventional missions, specialised warheads or more demanding manoeuvring profiles.
The tactical relevance of this missile family is already being demonstrated in Ukraine. Since late 2023, North Korea has supplied Russia with Hwasong-11A and Hwasong-11B missiles, which Moscow has employed against Ukrainian cities, infrastructure and military facilities. Ukrainian authorities, UN experts and independent technical groups have identified debris from multiple strikes as belonging to the Hwasong-11 series, based on characteristic aft-section structures, fin arrangements and serial markings corresponding to North Korean production patterns. Kyiv estimates that by early 2025 roughly 150 Hwasong-11A/11B missiles had been delivered, with a significant proportion already launched.
Initial salvos showed a relatively high rate of in-flight failure and substantial miss distances, but subsequent waves appear to have improved, with impact points reported within tens of metres of intended targets in some cases. This progression is consistent with iterative refinement of guidance, navigation and electronic-warfare resilience, informed by combat feedback. In practical terms, Russian operations provide North Korea with real-world performance data that would be impossible to obtain through peacetime testing alone, while Russia gains an additional stream of heavy, manoeuvrable SRBMs that complement its own Iskander inventory and partially offset stockpile attrition.
Strategically, the new factory images highlight three significant trends with direct implications for regional and global security. First, they confirm that North Korea is not merely fielding limited numbers of demonstration systems but investing in genuine mass production of modern solid-fuel SRBMs, with industrial batch sizes in the hundreds. This scale strengthens Pyongyang’s capacity to conduct sustained conventional or nuclear-capable missile campaigns against South Korea and Japan, and supports a doctrinal evolution from a minimal deterrent posture toward a more explicit war-fighting capability. Second, the apparent parallel manufacture of two Hwasong-11 configurations suggests that the programme is evolving beyond a single Iskander-like clone into a diversified family able to carry different payloads, ranges and operational roles, including variants that could be optimised for penetrating layered missile defences or delivering specialised munitions.
Third, the linkage between this factory and exports to Russia underscores how the DPRK–Russia partnership is eroding long-standing UN sanctions regimes and creating a pathway by which a heavily sanctioned state can both supply and learn from a nuclear-armed great power engaged in a high-intensity war in Europe. For NATO allies and partners, this dynamic blurs the line between regional and extra-regional threats: industrial capacity built for contingencies on the Korean Peninsula is now directly affecting the security environment on the Alliance’s eastern flank.
The KCNA release and the underlying imagery go well beyond domestic propaganda. They show a national leadership personally validating a large-scale production line that is already sustaining two intertwined strategic objectives: reinforcing North Korea’s long-term confrontation with the United States, South Korea and Japan, and supporting Russia’s campaign in Ukraine through a steady supply of modern SRBMs. The visual evidence of dual Hwasong-11 production streams, consistent serial numbering and dense factory layouts points to a missile programme that continues to expand in volume, diversity and sophistication. For governments and international organisations tasked with upholding non-proliferation norms and protecting their populations and deployed forces, these images serve as an early warning that the Hwasong-11 family is becoming both a central instrument of North Korea’s regional strategy and an exportable capability that can influence conflicts far beyond the Korean Peninsula.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.