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North Korea Shows Hwasong-11Ma Hypersonic Warhead that Shrinks US Patriot and THAAD Intercept.
North Korea released KCNA photos, relayed by South Korean media, showing a Hwasong-11Ma (KN-23 family) short-range ballistic missile fitted with an apparent hypersonic glide vehicle at the “Defense Development-2025” expo in Pyongyang. If operational, a maneuvering glide warhead on an SRBM complicates interception and could threaten U.S. and allied bases across the region.
North Korea Agency, via coverage of North Korea’s “Defense Development-2025” exhibition in Pyongyang on Oct. 5, released images of a Hwasong-11Ma short-range ballistic missile displaying a lift-generating hypersonic glide body and small control surfaces. The Hwasong-11Ma is part of the KN-23/Hwasong-11 family, systems broadly likened in concept to Russia’s Iskander, and has been reported with ranges near the upper SRBM band around 600–800 km. The distinguishing feature is the apparent glide warhead, indicating a different flight regime and a harder target set for regional missile defenses.
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Hwasong-11Ma displayed at the Defense Development 2025 exhibition in Pyongyang, hypersonic glide-type warhead visible, photo KCNA, 5 October 2025. (Picture source: KCNA)
The system in the photos sits on a transporter-erector-launcher typical of KN-23 deployments. Solid propellant implies short preparation timelines and fewer signatures during countdown. In previous KN-23 trials, North Korea demonstrated a quasi-ballistic, low-apogee trajectory with pull-up maneuvering in the terminal phase designed to stress tracking radars. The Hwasong-11Ma configuration adds a glide body where the upper section would normally carry a blunt cone. The glide body shows a faceted nose and a body-lift planform closer to a wedge than a sharp cone, consistent with the aim of maintaining controlled lift at high dynamic pressure. Even minor platform tweaks matter, since lift-to-drag improvements translate into greater cross-range and more options to shape the terminal path. On the baseline missile, the airframe was already optimized for depressed profiles with modest lateral offsets; grafting a glider aims to extend those margins.
If the glide body separates cleanly near the top of the boost phase, it can pitch to a shallow angle and fly in denser air at hypersonic speeds while maneuvering laterally. Public commentary quickly applied the hypersonic label. In practice, this implies speeds above Mach 5 for at least part of the unpowered portion of flight. For defense, the key issue is less the peak speed than the combination of low altitude, energy management, and maneuver authority. A lower path reduces radar horizon and compresses reaction time. Gentle S-turns or altitude changes complicate prediction and degrade interceptor cueing. The observed shape appears to allow space for guidance and control, likely with an inertial core and, where feasible, satellite updates, though the latter depend on signal access and resistance to jamming. No terminal seeker is visible, and none was claimed in the released material, so any assumption about an optical or radar terminal sensor should be treated with caution.
Propulsion remains that of the KN-23 solid motor. Diameter and overall architecture seem consistent with earlier airframes, indicating a strategy of inserting a new front end without redesigning the entire stack. This reduces risk and leverages an industrial base already tooled for KN-23 variants. Within this family, the baseline KN-23 Hwasong-11Ga generally carries a warhead of about 500 kg, with conventional options and doctrines that mention other payload types. Published dimensions vary across sources. Some datasets cite a length near 7.3 meters, a diameter of about 0.9 meters, and a launch mass of around 3.4 tons. Other sheets mention up to 9.8 meters maximum length, which may reflect variant differences and measurement methods. Family range figures typically sit between 450 and 600 km, with estimates up to 600–700 km for extended versions. The advertised accuracy, with a CEP between 5 and 30 meters, places the system among modern guided SRBMs.
The road-mobile 8x8 launcher, about 13 meters long and 3.5 meters wide and high, with a mass near 40 tons and a crew of three, has often been shown with two launch canisters. A diesel rated around 500 hp provides a speed of roughly 70 km/h and a logistical operating range close to 1,000 km. Published mobility figures indicate gradients of 45 percent, side slopes of 30 percent, steps of 0.6 meters, trenches of 2 meters, and fording depths of 1.4 meters. In 2020, a tracked variant was presented, retaining the twin-canister layout. For a system intended to survive in contested areas, this mix of road and off-road mobility supports dispersal, launch, and quick relocation before counter-fire.
For guidance, an inertial suite remains the foundation. Satellite inputs are sometimes mentioned, at least for midcourse navigation when jamming allows. The operational value of the KN-23, with or without a glider, is consistent: fly low, limit apogee, and execute lateral deviations to degrade early-warning track quality and force interceptions on tighter timelines with less precise firing solutions. In that sense, a glide-type warhead on Hwasong-11Ma does not change the underlying physics but provides more latitude to shape the terminal phase and complicate short-range interception.
The overall concept aligns with tactical and operational employment. Typical targets include airfield runways, depots, command nodes, and critical batteries and sensors. Firing in pairs or tight salvos aims to pressure defensive layers. South Korea and the United States rely on a multilayered architecture combining Patriot PAC-3 for point defense, naval Aegis BMD in some scenarios, and THAAD at higher altitudes. A low-altitude gliding profile with lateral maneuvering can slip beneath some optimal engagement envelopes or impose earlier shots. This does not confer immunity, but it raises defensive demands and requires denser interceptor stocks and more persistent sensor tasking.
Finally, the industrial context and the segmentation of variants add depth to the program. Beyond the Hwasong-11Ga baseline, enlarged versions such as Hwasong-11Da have been described with higher payload capacity, while a submarine-related Hwasong-11S is regularly mentioned in local publications as a derivative for submerged launch. These branches should not obscure the core point. The Hwasong-11Ma shown in early October relies on the same technical backbone as the KN-23 and, through a gliding front section, seeks to further compress the defender’s engagement window. For regional planners, this implies adjusting early-warning sensors, revisiting interceptor sequencing, and anticipating coordinated salvos rather than isolated launches.