Belgium fast-tracks counter-drone plan after Elsenborn military base overflights.

Belgium’s Defence Minister Theo Francken said in San Francisco on Oct. 6 that several counter-drone measures planned for 2026 will now be deployed this year after suspicious UAVs flew over the Elsenborn training area. The acceleration links civil and military air pictures via Skeydrone and a National Air Security Centre in Bevekom to cut decision time from detection to action.

Belga News Agency reported on Oct. 6 that Defence Minister Theo Francken, speaking during Belgium’s economic mission in San Francisco (Oct. 4–12), ordered the acceleration of the national plan to counter drones after overflights above the Elsenborn range last week. The package brings earlier-than-planned rollouts in 2025, tighter links with Skeydrone’s national detection network, and centralized tracking at the airspace center in Bevekom. It matters because coordinated, sub-threshold drone activity has increased across Europe, and Belgium aims to shorten the window between detection and decision without adding new 2025 spending.
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Hensoldt’s Xpeller system integrates multi-sensor detection and jamming for site and event protection. (Picture source: Hensoldt)

On the ground, the response combines sensors, data fusion, and faster procedures. Defence aims to improve incident reporting and strengthen cooperation with Skeydrone, a Skeyes subsidiary that already runs a national network near airports, energy facilities, prisons, and police zones. Similar systems will be installed on military sites to close gaps around ranges, depots, and air bases. All feeds will converge at a National Air Security Centre in Bevekom, the airspace counterpart to the maritime information hub. Centralising tracks may seem administrative, but it is useful when confirming weak signatures and cross-checking several indicators before making a judgment.

Regarding equipment, brands were not cited, but the building blocks to counter Class 1 and 2 threats, up to roughly 600 kg, are well known. Layered detection with short-range 3D radars capable of distinguishing low, slow targets, passive RF sensors capturing links and telemetry, and EO/IR cameras to classify once cued. Some sites add acoustic arrays for very short ranges. The key lies in fusion. If the Bevekom centre correlates radar plots, RF bearings, and ADS-B or U-space data, it reduces false positives and reaches a decision faster on intent.

Belgium gives priority to non-kinetic means first for scalability and rapid deployment. Man-portable or mounted jammers to cut control links, GNSS denial to push an aircraft into fail-safe, and protocol-based takeovers on some models. Hard-kill remains useful depending on sites and events, from net launchers and interceptor drones to very short-range air defence with proximity-fuzed munitions. There is no single solution. An open airport does not require the same choices as an urban barracks. And if a drone carries a payload, diverting it to a sterile area can be safer than breaking it up above a crowd.

Operationally, the ministry seeks to link civil and military air pictures and to rehearse decisions in advance. The Skeydrone grid provides alerts over critical areas, Defence sensors close the rings, and the Bevekom centre acts as dispatcher. In a live incident, the local commander does not improvise. They receive a track with provenance, know who else is observing, and which effector is authorised under pre-agreed rules of engagement. For events, quick-reaction C-UAS teams can be pre-positioned with a jammer and camera on a tripod, while a mobile radar monitors the approach. It is procedural by design. The point is to gain minutes between detection and decision.

There is also a personnel decision. Francken appointed Lieutenant General Michel Van Strythem as “drone general,” responsible for doctrine, training, and cross-service integration. Practically, that designates a single owner. Belgium has strengthened drone capabilities on the ISR side, with MQ-9B support, but counter-drone defence needs the same pace. An identified lead can impose useful standards: reporting formats, shared libraries of RF signatures, harmonised site surveys, and a common procurement path to avoid improvised mixes of equipment.

The regional context weighs on choices. Allies recently helped Poland counter a salvo of Russian drones, and Belgium contributed to the NATO setup. Across Europe, suspicious flights over military sites, refineries, and airports have risen since late September. Some incidents are tests, others map reaction times. This aligns with hybrid pressure below the escalation threshold. On budgets, Brussels has committed to increased defence spending through 2034 with emphasis on ground-based air defence. Counter-UAS is a logical component of that package.

Belgium’s response is to move quickly. More sensors, better fusion, clear playbooks, and a designated general to drive execution. If the Elsenborn episode sought to unsettle, the message is the opposite: the air picture will be hardened this year, in close coordination with civil aviation authorities and NATO partners.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Erwan Halna du Fretay is a graduate of a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience in the study of conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.