China expands nuclear missile silos and triad forces to challenge US deterrence.

According to information collected by Reuters on August 20, 2025, China is pressing ahead with a sweeping modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal, a move closely tied to President Xi Jinping’s order to prepare the People’s Liberation Army for a potential confrontation over Taiwan by 2027. U.S. Strategic Command and international arms control experts have voiced growing concern that Beijing’s nuclear ambitions are no longer limited to deterrence but are transforming into a force capable of challenging American dominance across all three legs of the nuclear triad: land-based missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and long-range strategic bombers.
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China’s DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile on a mobile launcher during a military parade, symbolizing the rapid expansion of the PLA Rocket Force and its role in Beijing’s push to establish a modern nuclear triad (Picture source: PLA).

While Beijing reiterated its “no first use” nuclear pledge in its 2023 defense white paper, the Pentagon warns that Chinese doctrine is shifting toward ambiguity. According to the U.S. Department of Defense’s latest assessment, China may contemplate a first nuclear strike if conventional defeat threatens the survival of the Communist Party regime or the credibility of its deterrent. This doctrinal uncertainty adds new urgency to U.S. planning for a Taiwan conflict, where escalation thresholds may prove dangerously unpredictable.

China’s land-based nuclear forces are undergoing their most dramatic expansion in history. The DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile is the centerpiece of this modernization, with a range of over 12,000 km and the ability to carry up to ten multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Its solid-fuel, road-mobile design gives the PLA Rocket Force a highly survivable capability that complicates U.S. targeting. The DF-31AG, an improved version of the DF-31A, extends strike reach to 11,200 km and is mounted on an off-road transporter erector launcher, enhancing flexibility and survivability. At the heavy end, the silo-based DF-5C remains China’s largest ICBM, a liquid-fueled missile capable of carrying ten warheads with ranges up to 15,000 km, giving it intercontinental reach against hardened U.S. targets. Complementing these are dual-capable systems such as the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile, often dubbed the “Guam Killer,” which has a 4,000 km range and can carry either conventional or nuclear payloads, providing Beijing with a versatile theater-level strike option.

At sea, China is consolidating its nuclear deterrent with the Type 094A Jin-class ballistic missile submarines. Each boat carries 12 JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, with a range of approximately 7,200 km, allowing strikes against U.S. bases in Hawaii and Guam. The JL-2 is a three-stage, solid-fuel missile with a single warhead, but China is testing its successor, the JL-3, which is projected to exceed 10,000 km in range and may carry multiple warheads. Once deployed aboard the next-generation Type 096 submarines, the JL-3 will give China the ability to hold the U.S. mainland at risk without leaving its bastions in the South China Sea, marking a major leap in second-strike survivability.

In the air domain, the PLA Air Force is modernizing its strategic bomber fleet with the H-6N, a derivative of the H-6K capable of aerial refueling and equipped to carry the CJ-20 air-launched cruise missile, which has a 2,000 km range and may be nuclear-capable. This reintroduces the bomber leg into China’s nuclear force for the first time since the Cold War. Development of the H-20 stealth bomber is ongoing, with estimates suggesting it will carry both nuclear and conventional payloads with a combat radius exceeding 8,000 km, placing U.S. bases across the Pacific within striking range. The H-20 is expected to feature advanced stealth shaping, long endurance, and possibly supersonic penetration capabilities, giving Beijing a credible long-range air-delivered nuclear strike platform.

China’s arsenal also includes tactical and regional nuclear systems designed to complicate U.S. and allied planning. These may include nuclear-configured variants of the DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle, which combines high maneuverability with speeds exceeding Mach 5, making interception by existing missile defense systems highly challenging. Such systems expand China’s deterrence envelope beyond strategic strikes, introducing escalation risks in any regional conflict.

Geopolitically, China’s nuclear buildup reflects a broader effort to secure great power status and strategic parity with the United States. Beijing’s official narrative portrays its arsenal as a “minimum deterrent,” but the scale of silo construction, MIRV deployment, and diversification of platforms reveals an ambition to dissuade U.S. intervention over Taiwan or the South China Sea by making the costs of escalation unacceptable. This expansion also serves a diplomatic function, signaling to regional powers such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia that reliance on U.S. extended deterrence carries greater risk as China gains the ability to hold multiple cities and military installations at risk simultaneously. By building a robust triad, China ensures both regime survival and the ability to project power beyond Asia, aligning its nuclear doctrine with its broader geopolitical strategy of challenging U.S. dominance in the Indo-Pacific and securing a seat as a peer competitor on the global stage.

Beijing has rejected Western allegations of a nuclear breakout, insisting that its modernization drive is defensive and accusing the United States of inflating the Chinese threat to justify its own strategic deployments. Yet the scale, speed, and secrecy of the buildup are reshaping the regional security balance and prompting recalibration among U.S. allies such as Japan and South Korea, where debates over nuclear sharing and indigenous deterrent options are intensifying. For Washington, the race is no longer about monitoring China’s nuclear trajectory but about preparing for a future where Beijing wields a peer-level arsenal in a contested Indo-Pacific.