Analysis | How far have US hypersonic weapon programs currently progressed compared to initial deployment plans?.

On May 5, 2025, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) published an updated report on hypersonic weapons to provide the US Congress with background and analysis amid continued U.S. efforts to develop such systems. The document was prepared in the context of increasing funding requests by the Department of Defense and ongoing prototype testing, in the absence of approved acquisition programs of record or finalized mission requirements. It reviews the current state of U.S. hypersonic weapon programs, related test infrastructure, and ongoing development activities in Russia and China. The report is intended to assist congressional evaluation of budget allocations, strategic implications, technological feasibility, and arms control considerations.
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Launched in FY2022, the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) program is now the US Air Force's primary focus. (Picture source: Army Recognition based on visuals from Raytheon Missiles & Defense)

The United States has pursued the development of hypersonic weapons (maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5) since the early 2000s as part of its Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) initiative. In recent years, this effort has shifted focus toward hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), which are launched from a rocket before gliding to a target, and hypersonic cruise missiles (HCMs), which are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines during flight. According to former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Hyten, these weapons may provide responsive, long-range strike options against defended or time-sensitive threats such as mobile missile launchers, particularly where conventional forces are unavailable or denied access. Critics of hypersonic weapons, however, have raised concerns about their undefined mission requirements, the lack of significant added value to U.S. military capabilities, and their necessity in a nuclear deterrence context. Hypersonic weapons in the U.S. are designed for conventional use, requiring higher precision compared to their nuclear-armed Russian and Chinese counterparts. This increases the technical challenges of their development and deployment. In contrast, both Russia and China are believed to have operational hypersonic glide vehicles, potentially capable of delivering nuclear payloads.

Despite earlier budgetary restraint, U.S. interest in hypersonic weapons has increased, driven in part by competitor advances. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 defense budget request includes $6.9 billion for hypersonic research, up from $4.7 billion in FY2023. For FY2024, while no hypersonic-specific line item was provided, the Department of Defense requested $11 billion for long-range fires, which includes hypersonic systems. The Missile Defense Agency’s FY2025 request includes $182.3 million for hypersonic defense, down from $190.6 million in FY2024 and $225.5 million in FY2023. The Department of Defense (DoD) has not yet approved formal acquisition programs of record for hypersonic weapons, suggesting that neither defined mission requirements nor sustained funding frameworks are in place. As noted by Mike White, the former Principal Director for Hypersonics, the Pentagon has not committed to acquiring hypersonic systems but is currently developing prototypes to explore their viability in potential mission sets.

As Congress assesses the Pentagon’s hypersonic programs, it faces questions related to operational utility, cost-effectiveness, integration into doctrine, strategic stability, and potential arms control implications. The FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act required a classified assessment of both U.S. and foreign hypersonic programs, covering spending levels, research quality, infrastructure, deployment timelines, and intent. A similar mandate required MDA to report on accelerating hypersonic missile defense. The U.S., Russia, and China are the three leading developers of hypersonic technology, with at least five other countries, Australia, India, France, Germany, and Japan, also engaged in some level of development.

The Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), also called Dark Eagle, is expected to reach over 1,725 miles in range as well as defeat anti-access/area-denial capabilities and suppress enemy long-range fires. (Picture source: US Army)

Hypersonic weapons travel at least five times the speed of sound and maneuver in flight, unlike traditional ballistic missiles. This combination of speed and agility complicates detection, particularly since terrestrial radar systems cannot detect these systems until late in their flight. According to James Acton, while point-defense systems like THAAD might be adapted for hypersonic threats, these are only suitable for localized protection and not the defense of larger areas like the continental United States. U.S. defense officials have stated that neither current ground-based nor space-based sensors are adequate for tracking hypersonic threats. These weapons are reportedly 10 to 20 times dimmer than typical satellite-tracked targets. The 2019 Missile Defense Review noted that a future space sensor layer may offer improved tracking capabilities when paired with advanced interceptors or directed energy weapons. Some analysts question the affordability and technical feasibility of such systems, arguing that existing command and control architectures may not be fast enough to respond effectively.

Currently, the U.S. armed forces are developing hypersonic systems under the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) program, the Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), and the Air Force’s Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM). These are intended for conventional use and will require high accuracy. According to expert testimony, nuclear-armed glide vehicles can afford to be 10 to 100 times less accurate than their conventional equivalents. The Navy's CPS program is intended to produce a Common Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB) derived from the Army’s Alternate Re-entry System. After initial test failures in 2022 and delays in 2023, successful end-to-end tests were conducted in June and December 2024 and again in April 2025. Despite early plans to deploy CPS on Zumwalt-class destroyers by the end of FY2025, the schedule has been delayed to 2027. Though there were earlier discussions about fitting Ohio- and Virginia-class submarines with CPS, these plans are not reflected in the current budget. The Navy requested $903.9 million for CPS RDT&E in FY2025 but no procurement funding. In FY2024, it had requested $304 million to procure eight All-Up Rounds. Zumwalt-class destroyers are expected to carry up to 12 such weapons. Additionally, the Navy had been working on the Hypersonic Air-Launched Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare Increment 2 (HALO) missile, intended for F/A-18 integration, with a $178.6 million FY2025 RDT&E request, but the program was cancelled in late 2024 due to cost constraints.

The Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), also called Dark Eagle, shares the C-HGB and booster combination with the Navy’s CPS. It is expected to reach over 1,725 miles in range and is designed to defeat anti-access/area-denial capabilities and suppress enemy long-range fires. Operational test data for the system remains limited. In FY2025, the Army requested $538 million for RDT&E and $744.2 million for procurement, including ground support equipment, eight All-Up Rounds, and canisters. While operational testing remains limited, the Army plans to field two additional LRHW batteries by FY2027. In fact, the December 2024 AUR test was the system's first live-fire event using the full ground launch apparatus.

Despite early plans to deploy Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) missiles on Zumwalt-class destroyers by the end of FY2025, the schedule has been delayed to 2027. (Picture source: Lockheed Martin)

The Air Force concluded the AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) program after mixed results, including three successful test flights in 2022 but failures in 2023 and an unrevealed outcome in March 2024. No funds were requested for ARRW in FY2025, and the program was labeled complete. ARRW was launched from a B-52 and intended to travel up to 1,000 miles at Mach 6.5 to 8. Another project, the Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon (HCSW), was cancelled in 2020. The Air Force prioritized ARRW over HCSW due to its smaller size and compatibility with multiple platforms, including potential deployment on the F-15 and the capacity to carry more missiles per bomber. Project Mayhem, another ongoing Air Force initiative, aims to develop a longer-range scramjet-powered vehicle potentially capable of ISR and strike roles at Mach 10. It may produce an uncrewed hypersonic bomber. The Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) program is now the Air Force's primary focus. Launched in FY2022, it may be deployed from both bombers and fighters, with integration on the F-15E prioritized. A B-52 may carry over 20 HACMs, and a B-1 potentially 36. HACM's FY2025 request is $517 million, up from $382 million in FY2024.

DARPA has completed several programs contributing to U.S. hypersonic capabilities. Tactical Boost Glide (TBG) developed a Mach 7+ glide vehicle and concluded by FY2025. Operational Fires (OpFires) aimed at a ground-launched tactical-range system and finished after its first test in July 2022. The Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) achieved successful flights in March and July 2022 and January 2023, and its successor, More Opportunities with HAWC (MOHAWC), also concluded by FY2025. HAWC was launched from a B-52 and emphasized affordability and seeker integration. DARPA’s current Glide Breaker program focuses on developing components to enable long-range interception of hypersonic threats, with $38 million requested in FY2025.

Defense against hypersonic weapons remains a central challenge. MDA’s earlier Hypersonic Defense Regional Glide Phase Weapons System was canceled in favor of Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), a sea-based solution. Initially targeted for deployment by 2034, Congress directed that initial and full operational capability be reached by 2029 and 2032, respectively. However, the FY2025 budget documents still list FY2035 as the goal. On May 15, 2024, the U.S. and Japan signed a cooperative agreement to co-develop GPI, with Japan leading propulsion development. MDA is also developing HBTSS satellites to enhance tracking, and a January 27, 2025 executive order titled “The Iron Dome for America” directed the acceleration of such efforts. MDA requested $76 million for HBTSS and $182.3 million for hypersonic defense in FY2025.

U.S. hypersonic testing infrastructure consists of 48 critical facilities as of a 2014 study, including DOD, NASA, DOE, and academic sites. Limitations remain, particularly for simulating Mach 8+ flight conditions. Since then, several institutions have expanded testing capabilities, including Purdue, Notre Dame, Texas A&M, and the University of Arizona. Some facilities have been decommissioned. Testing is also conducted internationally at Australia’s Woomera Test Range and Norway’s Andøya Rocket Range. A trilateral arrangement between the U.S., Australia, and the UK, the HyFliTE Project Arrangement, was signed in November 2024 to share facilities and technical data, with up to six flight tests planned by 2028 and a combined funding pool of $252 million. DOD spent $1.09 billion on hypersonic boost-glide testing and $221 million on cruise missile testing from FY2021 to FY2025. Reports by the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation emphasized the need for expanded infrastructure, noting that flight test schedules remain limited by available corridors and support assets. Congress appropriated $47.5 million in FY2022 for infrastructure, but further investment may be required.