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US to buy 850 F-35 stealth fighters from Lockheed Martin over 10 years as China expands J-20 and J-35 production.
The U.S. Department of War and Lockheed Martin established an initial ten-year framework agreement to manufacture at least 850 F-35 Lightning II fighter aircraft for the U.S. military. The framework spans production Lots 21 through 30, initial spare parts, modification kits, and long-term global fleet sustainment. This multi-year procurement signal aims to stabilize supply chain operations and restore fleet readiness rates, while linking aircraft production directly with long-term sustainment expenditure, as China accelerates production of its Chengdu J-20 and carrier-capable Shenyang J-35 fifth-generation stealth fighters to increase its presence in the Western Pacific.
The U.S. plans to buy at least 850 F-35 stealth fighter jets from Lockheed Martin over the next ten years as China increases production of its own J-20 and J-35 fighter jets. (Picture source: US DoD)
On October 22, 2026, the U.S. Department of War and Lockheed Martin reached an initial agreement to produce at least 850 F-35 stealth fighter jets for the U.S. military over the next ten years, including Lots 21 to 30, initial spares, modification kits, and global fleet sustainment. Lockheed Martin will invest at least $7 billion, while manufacturing remains at 156 aircraft annually, equivalent to 1,560 over ten years. The U.S. minimum represents 85 fighters annually, leaving 710 production slots for international customers or additional American purchases. Congressional authorization, appropriations, pricing, and delivery schedules remain outstanding.
The framework also links aircraft production with sustainment expenditure, an important change for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, which delivered 1,387 production F-35 fighters by September 27, 2026, but whose U.S. fleet mission-capable rate declined from 67% in fiscal 2021 to 44% in fiscal 2025. F-35 deliveries increased from nine aircraft in 2011 to 29 in 2012, 35 in 2013, 36 in 2014, 45 in 2015 and 46 in 2016, totaling 200 fighters over six years. Output subsequently reached 66 in 2017, 91 in 2018 and 134 in 2019, increasing monthly deliveries from 3.8 in 2016 to 11.2 in 2019. This expansion required coordinated increases for Lockheed Martin's Fort Worth assembly plant, Northrop Grumman's center fuselages, BAE Systems' aft fuselages and electronics, Pratt & Whitney's F135 engines, and final assembly facilities in Cameri, Italy, and Nagoya, Japan.
However, the industrial requirements differ by variant: the conventional F-35A uses a F135-PW-100 engine, the S/VTOL F-35B combines a F135-PW-600 engine with a shaft-driven lift fan and swiveling exhaust nozzle, and the carrier-based F-35C incorporates larger folding wings, reinforced landing gear, and carrier arresting equipment. The U.S. Marine Corps achieved initial operational capability in 2015 for the F-35B, the U.S. Air Force in 2016 for the F-35A, and the U.S. Navy in 2019 for the F-35C. By 2019, production was supporting operational squadrons across all three services while supplying Israel, Japan, Australia, Norway, the United Kingdom, and other customers. However, between 2020 and 2025, F-35 deliveries fluctuated substantially despite the expansion of manufacturing capacity. Lockheed Martin delivered 120 F-35s in 2020, a 10.4% decline from 2019, but this happened amid COVID-19 disruptions, followed by 142 in 2021 and 141 in 2022.
Deliveries then declined to 98 in 2023, recovered to 110 in 2024, and reached 191 in 2025, exceeding the previous record by 34.5%. However, approximately 93 fighters delivered in 2025 had been manufactured earlier and were awaiting acceptance, leaving approximately 98 associated with the regular delivery schedule. This distinction matters when assessing industrial capacity: annual deliveries measure aircraft accepted by customers, whereas manufacturing output measures aircraft physically completed, and the two figures diverged during the TR-3 interruption. The October 2026 agreement does not propose maintaining deliveries at 191 annually, but sustaining manufacturing at 156, equivalent to 780 F-35s over five years and 1,560 over ten years if production remains uninterrupted and demand fills every available position.
The principal interruption happened with the Technology Refresh 3 (TR-3) upgrade, whose processors, memory, and cockpit displays provided approximately 25 times the computing capability of the previous architecture. The Pentagon suspended acceptance of newly manufactured TR-3-equipped F-35s in July 2023 because of software instability, while Lockheed Martin continued assembly, accumulating more than 100 F-35s. Deliveries resumed in July 2024 under an interim configuration, with stored fighters requiring maintenance, software updates, and four inspection stages before acceptance. The TR-3 also forms the basis for Block 4 improvements involving the Electro-Optical Targeting System, Distributed Aperture System, electronic warfare capabilities, additional weapons, and increased cooling requirements.
Because all three variants share major computing systems, software delays can interrupt F-35A, F-35B and F-35C deliveries simultaneously, while fighters accepted under interim configurations may still lack some planned combat capabilities. Lockheed Martin delivered 94 F-35s through September 2026, comprising 32 in the first quarter, 19 in the second and 43 in the third, compared with 143 during the corresponding period of 2025, a 34.3% decline. By June, cumulative deliveries included 956 F-35As, 250 F-35Bs and 138 F-35Cs, totaling 1,344 before reaching 1,387 in September. Meanwhile, U.S. mission-capable rates declined from 67% in fiscal 2021 to 44% in fiscal 2025, while fully mission-capable rates fell from 38% to 25%. Applied to 600 fighters, these figures correspond to 264 mission-capable and 150 fully mission-capable aircraft; restoring 67% availability would provide 138 additional mission-capable fighters without new purchases.
Spare parts shortages, depot backlogs, and repair delays explain the framework's emphasis on replacement components, modification kits, and inventory management, while Congress is considering requirements for complete initial spare parts packages and demonstrated procurement savings of at least 5%. China's industry is expanding on a different trajectory, with Chengdu's estimated J-20 production increasing from 20 units annually in 2020 to 100-120 by late 2025, while China's estimated J-20 inventory expanded from 50 fighters in 2020 to 195 in May 2024, 300 by mid-2025 and potentially 500 cumulative deliveries by mid-2026. J-20 deployment also expanded from 12 PLAAF brigades in May 2024 to an estimated 14 frontline units and three training and test bases by mid-2026. Chengdu's manufacturing expansion included five estimated production lines and additional floor space of 74,300 m² in 2021, 232,300 m² in 2022, and 46,450 m² in 2024. Producing 120 J-20s annually requires ten aircraft and 20 installed engines monthly, excluding spares.
Shenyang is also expanding the manufacturing of the J-35 through a 4.2 km² complex with 371,600 m² of manufacturing space and a reported investment of 8.6 billion yuan. No verified annual J-35 production rate is available, but an eventual output of 100 J-35s alongside 120 J-20s would total 220 Chinese fifth-generation fighters annually, exceeding the F-35's planned 156 by 64 aircraft or 41%. This distribution directly affects the balance of combat aviation in the Western Pacific: Chinese fighter production primarily reinforces forces concentrated in the Indo-Pacific, whereas the F-35 output is divided among three U.S. services and international customers. Over five years, manufacturing at 156 F-35s annually would produce 780 units against 600 J-20s at 120 annually, but only part of the U.S. production would support Western Pacific operations.
Mainland Chinese airfields lie close to Taiwan, separated by a strait narrowing to 130 km, while U.S. reinforcements may operate from Japan, Guam, Hawaii, or continental installations. The J-20's integration with PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles, KJ-500 airborne early warning aircraft, and Chinese ground-based air defense networks creates particular challenges for U.S. aerial refueling, airborne early warning, and intelligence aircraft supporting fighter operations. Carrier aviation adds another dimension, as China's J-35 is intended to operate from catapult-equipped carriers such as the Fujian alongside J-15 fighters and KJ-600 airborne early warning aircraft, while U.S. carrier air wings combine F-35Cs, F/A-18E/Fs, EA-18Gs and E-2Ds.
The resulting balance cannot be calculated from worldwide fifth-generation fighter inventories alone, since operational strength depends on the number of aircraft deployed within range, airfield and carrier availability, tanker capacity, weapons stocks and the ability to generate repeated sorties. The implications become more substantial through 2030 if China's projected aircraft expansion continues. One estimate places the J-20 fleet near 1,000 fighters by 2030, compared with 300 in mid-2025, although achieving 700 additional aircraft over five and a half years would require average net additions of 127 annually.
China's J-16 inventory could simultaneously increase from 450 to 900, producing a combined J-20 and J-16 force of 1,900 fighters, excluding J-10s, J-15s and J-35s. The projected addition of 700 J-20s is numerically equivalent to 29 formations of 24 fighters, although actual allocations would include training units, reserves and replacement aircraft. At their respective manufacturing rates, the F-35 program could produce three fighters weekly and Chengdu approximately 2.3 J-20s, with combined Chinese fifth-generation output potentially reaching 4.2 weekly if J-35 manufacturing eventually attains 100 annually.
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Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.