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U.S. Plans New Autonomous Warfare Command to Fast-Track Combat-Proven Drones Into Military Service.


The United States is preparing a new approach to selecting and acquiring military drones and robotic systems, aiming to deploy equipment that meets the needs of frontline units more rapidly. Under Project Agincourt, performance during exercises, competitions, and combat operations will determine which technologies advance to large-scale production and which are discontinued. This approach seeks to enable U.S. forces to adapt their autonomous capabilities to changing battlefield conditions without relying exclusively on traditional weapons development cycles.

A U.S. Army soldier launches a Peregrine one-way attack drone during Project Flytrap in Lithuania on May 15, 2026, as American forces test unmanned systems to accelerate their integration into combat operations (US DoD)


The reform accompanies the creation of the Autonomous Warfare Command (AUTOWARCOM), a four-star military command scheduled to be established by October 1, 2027. The organization is intended to bring defense manufacturers closer to operational units, reducing the time between identifying a military requirement and delivering combat-ready equipment. The Pentagon also wants frontline forces to play a greater role in acquisition decisions, allowing military personnel to participate directly in testing and improving new systems.

The initiative was outlined in an open letter published on October 21, 2026, by Owen West and Senior Chief Max Strasiser, the leaders of Project Agincourt. Established under Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, the project has two principal objectives: creating AUTOWARCOM and continuing the responsibilities of the Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Systems (DRPM-UxS), while developing a new acquisition model. Its leaders emphasize that equipment should be evaluated through operational results rather than administrative milestones.

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This transformation comes as relatively inexpensive drones continue to change the economics of modern warfare. One-way attack unmanned aircraft, capable of striking vehicles, defensive positions, and military installations, can engage targets worth considerably more than the weapons used against them. Reconnaissance drones, meanwhile, can locate enemy positions and transmit targeting information to artillery units. The Pentagon wants to reduce the cost of engaging enemy targets while limiting the exposure of American personnel to battlefield threats.

The equipment potentially concerned extends across several categories of unmanned systems. Beyond aerial reconnaissance and attack drones, American autonomous warfare initiatives include unmanned ground vehicles capable of transporting supplies, conducting route reconnaissance, and performing dangerous missions. Autonomous naval systems represent another area of development, particularly for maritime surveillance and reconnaissance operations. However, the October 21 roadmap does not identify specific equipment models or indicate which existing programs would come under the authority of the future command.

The main change concerns how these systems will be selected. Manufacturers could work directly with military units to modify equipment following an exercise, correct deficiencies, or adapt its capabilities to emerging threats. The results would determine whether further investment is justified. A drone whose performance deteriorates under electronic jamming, for example, might require modifications before wider adoption. Conversely, equipment demonstrating effectiveness under the intended operational conditions could move more rapidly toward serial production. The letter explicitly states that competitions, exercises, and combat performance will determine which systems receive additional investment and which are discontinued.

The selection process will also incorporate economic criteria. West and Strasiser want every accountable dollar spent to contribute either to reducing the cost of destroying an enemy target or to lowering the risks faced by military personnel. This distinction is particularly relevant to one-way attack drones, whose operational value depends partly on the relationship between their production cost, effectiveness, and the resources an adversary must expend to intercept them. Project Agincourt therefore aims not only to accelerate procurement but also to identify which technologies justify investment in large-scale manufacturing.

The project also calls for different equipment portfolios according to operational theaters. In the Pacific, maritime distances and dispersed forces create particular requirements for autonomy, communications, and logistical support. In Europe, the proximity of frontlines, the concentration of air defense systems, and the widespread use of electronic warfare may favor different characteristics. The letter explicitly notes that a combination of systems suited to the Pacific will not necessarily meet European requirements. Combatant commanders must therefore be able to develop equipment portfolios tailored to their missions.

Beyond equipment selection, AUTOWARCOM is intended to change how responsibilities are distributed among the armed forces, manufacturers, and acquisition authorities. The Pentagon plans to bring procurement decisions and funding closer to military users, while operational units will serve as environments for experimentation. Combatant commanders must be able to employ the equipment in actual operations before it is considered ready for broader adoption. Another measure of success will be the time required to turn a problem identified on the battlefield into a fielded solution evaluated for wider deployment. This requirement is intended to prevent systems from being declared operational solely on the basis of administrative progress or industrial testing.

The reform also reflects an approach already visible in Ukraine, where defense manufacturers work directly with frontline units to test equipment, collect operational feedback, and rapidly modify their technologies, particularly in response to Russian electronic warfare countermeasures. Ukraine's Test in Ukraine initiative, opened to foreign manufacturers in 2025, illustrates how such cooperation can benefit both military users and industry. Armed forces gain access to equipment adapted to actual combat conditions, while manufacturers can refine their products before expanding production. With AUTOWARCOM, Washington appears to be seeking to institutionalize a comparable model within its own military, making battlefield performance a central factor in acquisition decisions. This approach could also reshape cooperation between American defense manufacturers, deployed forces, and NATO allies, particularly in Europe, where lessons from the war in Ukraine are already influencing military modernization priorities.


Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests include security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.

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