South Korea to deploy P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and mine clearing teams closer to Strait of Hormuz.

South Korea announced plans to expand its naval Cheonghae Unit’s operational radius from 600 to 1,200 nautical miles, extending anti-piracy coverage into the Arabian Sea south of Oman. The proposed mission adds a Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned surface and underwater vessels, and 75 specialized personnel to safeguard commercial energy shipments and address potential sea-mine hazards. While bolstering long-range maritime surveillance, the deployment keeps South Korean forces outside the Strait of Hormuz and excludes direct participation in the regional conflict.

South Korea's proposed Cheonghae Unit expansion would include one P-8A Poseidon, 45 aviation personnel, 30 mine warfare specialists, sets of unmanned surface and underwater vehicles, and remotely operated underwater robots. (Picture source: South Korea Navy)

On November 5, 2026, South Korea announced plans to send a P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned surface vessels, unmanned underwater vehicles, underwater disposal robots, and mine clearance specialists closer to the Strait of Hormuz, expanding its naval presence as the U.S.-Iran war continues to disrupt oil shipments and commercial shipping across the Middle East. The proposal would double the Cheonghae Unit's operating radius from 600 to 1,200 nautical miles (1,111 to 2,222 km) until December 31, 2027, extending its mission from the Gulf of Aden into the Arabian Sea south of Oman, more than 650 km from Hormuz. Seoul also intends to increase authorized personnel from 320 to 395, adding 45 aviation specialists and 30 mine warfare personnel, while retaining a single destroyer.

The expansion follows a rise in regional piracy incidents from 11 in 2025 to 36 by November 5, 2026, a 227% increase, and comes as South Korea seeks to protect its energy imports, 70% of which came from the Middle East in 2025. Although the deployment would remain outside the contested strait and exclude participation in the war, the new maritime patrol aircraft and underwater equipment would also prepare South Korea for possible mine clearance operations to reopen shipping routes after the conflict. The Cheonghae Unit has operated continuously in the Gulf of Aden since April 16, 2009, following the departure of its first destroyer, ROKS Munmu the Great (DDH-976), from Jinhae on March 13, and has since directly escorted more than 2,400 merchant vessels while providing navigation assistance to over 39,000 others.

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Its 49th rotation, commanded by Captain Lee Jin-seong, departed Busan on October 2, 2026, aboard ROKS Chungmugong Yi Sun-sin (DDH-975) with 254 personnel for a 193-day deployment ending April 13, 2027. Sixty personnel, or 23.6%, have previous Cheonghae experience, including skills relevant to helicopter operations, boarding, medical support, and ship maintenance. Previous missions include the April 2010 pursuit of the 300,000-ton Samho Dream carrying $170 million in crude oil and the January 21, 2011, rescue of 21 hostages aboard Samho Jewelry, during which eight pirates were killed and five captured. The proposed 75 additional personnel would mainly operate from shore-based aviation and mine warfare facilities, meaning the proposal, which still requires National Assembly authorization, would create a geographically distributed naval contingent rather than substantially enlarge the boarding force available aboard the destroyer.

ROKS Chungmugong Yi Sun-sin is a 150 m KDX-II destroyer displacing 4,400 tonnes standard and 5,500 tonnes fully loaded, with a 17.4 m beam, two LM2500 gas turbines, two MTU diesel engines and a maximum speed of 30 knots. Its 5,500-nautical-mile range at 20 knots permits 275 hours of nominal cruising, while its weapons include a 127 mm Mk 45 gun, 32 Mk 41 missile cells, additional Korean vertical-launch cells in applicable configurations, SM-2 missiles, RAM and Goalkeeper close-in defenses, as well as anti-submarine weapons. Its AN/SPS-49(V)5 air-search radar, MW08 three-dimensional radar, STIR 240 fire-control radar, DSQS-21BZ hull sonar and SQR-220K towed sonar provide air and underwater surveillance, while its two Super Lynx helicopters, rigid-hull inflatable boats and UDT/SEAL personnel conduct the actual merchant protection and interception tasks.

How South Korea's P-8A Poseidon could extend naval surveillance toward Hormuz

A diversion of 400 nautical miles requires 20 hours at 20 knots, or 13 hours and 20 minutes at maximum speed, before the ship can intervene; returning to its original position doubles the transit distance. Consequently, doubling the operating radius without adding a second destroyer increases the potential time between detection and intervention, regardless of the ship's missile armament. South Korea's proposed P-8A Poseidon detachment would consequently address this surveillance gap using one of the six U.S. aircraft delivered in 2024, with three arriving on June 19 and three on June 30. The Boeing 737-derived aircraft measures 39.5 m in length, has a 37.6 m wingspan, weighs up to 85,820 kg at takeoff, and reaches 490 knots using two CFM56-7BE engines.

Its reference mission exceeds 1,200 nautical miles from base with more than four hours on station, using maritime radar, infrared sensors, electronic support equipment, satellite communications and Link 11/16; its anti-submarine equipment includes capacity for 129 sonobuoys and compatibility with Mk 54 torpedoes. South Korean crews also recently conducted combined P-8A operations with the U.S. Navy during RIMPAC on July 7, 2026. From a prospective base in Djibouti, a Poseidon traveling at 400 knots could investigate a contact 400 nautical miles away in one hour, compared with 20 hours for the destroyer, allowing the naval contingent to investigate distant contacts before deciding whether to divert its ship. The proposed 45-person aviation component would support aircraft operations, but the exact base, maintenance arrangements, and sustained sortie rate have not been finalized.

How South Korea plans to use unmanned vessels for mine countermeasures

The mine warfare reinforcement would include 30 explosive ordnance disposal and mine countermeasure specialists, two sets of unmanned surface vessels, two sets of unmanned underwater vehicles, and remotely operated underwater robots, introducing a separate underwater mission into a force previously organized primarily for surface escort and counter-piracy operations. South Korea already conducted a nine-day mine warfare exercise near Pohang in April 2025 with 10 ships and three helicopters, including ROKS Nampo and USS Warrior. On August 3, 2026, a Busan experiment also combined the 730-ton ROKS Ongjin, two unmanned surface vessels, one autonomous underwater vehicle, and an aerial drone, including Hanwha's Haeryeong reconnaissance vessel and a 30-ton unmanned combat vessel.

AI-assisted processing supported a simulated mined-port scenario, but the unmanned vessels did not carry operational mine-sweeping equipment, and mine neutralization was simulated. LIG Nex1 separately received a KRW 171.8 billion contract on September 30, 2025, for variable-depth sonar and combined-influence minesweeping systems for future Korean naval minesweepers. The proposed detachment could locate, inspect, and potentially neutralize individual mines, but no dedicated minesweeper, confirmed clearance rate, or complete shipping-lane clearance capability has been assigned. South Korea's exposure to the deterioration of the situation around the Strait of Hormuz extends beyond crude oil availability: the Middle East supplied 70% of its oil in 2025, while 61% of its crude oil imports and 54% of its naphtha imports passed through the strait, creating direct consequences across fuel supply, refinery operations, and petrochemical manufacturing.

Why the Strait of Hormuz crisis threatens South Korea's energy supplies

Following the outbreak of the U.S.-Iran war on February 28, multinational naval forces also shifted toward the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, reducing the naval presence available for counter-piracy patrols off Somalia. Regional piracy incidents increased from 11 during 2025 to 36 by November 5, 2026, while pirate activity extended farther toward southern Oman, where South Korea now intends to operate. At the same time, commercial vessels are targeted in the strait: on October 14, the Singapore-flagged GFS Pride sank near Hormuz after a projectile strike; on November 5, Iran's Revolutionary Guard reported fires involving two tankers and a tugboat, including a tanker reportedly striking a mine. Disrupted tanker movements consequently affected freight rates, war-risk insurance, refinery feedstock deliveries and naphtha-dependent ethylene and propylene production, even when replacement cargoes remain available.

The proposed Cheonghae reinforcement could improve security along southern Arabian Sea routes, but its geographical boundary more than 650 km from Hormuz means it cannot independently secure the passage through which most of the affected energy shipments must travel. However, South Korea previously expanded Cheonghae operations toward Hormuz on January 21, 2020, deploying the 31st contingent aboard the 4,400-ton ROKS Wang Geon with some 300 personnel while retaining independent command outside the U.S.-led International Maritime Security Construct. Two Korean liaison officers served at its Bahrain headquarters, and the contingent assisted 10 sailors aboard a drifting Iranian vessel in February 2020.

In January 2021, Cheonghae forces also moved toward Hormuz after Iran's Revolutionary Guard seized the South Korean tanker Hankuk Chemi. The 2026 proposal is more restrictive: operations would stop south of Oman, surveillance of Iranian territory and Hormuz would be prohibited, and engagements would remain limited to self-defense. President Lee Jae Myung also rejected a direct participation in the Iran war on September 18, while allowing additional merchant shipping protection. Future mine clearance inside Hormuz would therefore require an end to hostilities or an agreement establishing safe operating conditions, followed by separate National Assembly authorization.

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Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.