Discover how an Iranian F-5 jet reportedly exploited a 120-second window to strike a US base in Kuwait.

An NBC News investigation reveals that an Iranian F-5 fighter likely exploited a brief moment of overwhelming in U.S. air defenses to strike Camp Buehring during the opening phase of Epic Fury, showing that even 1960s jets can penetrate when systems are saturated. As the attack occurred at the exact moment defenses were saturated, it exposes a critical vulnerability in US air defense networks under coordinated attacks, where timing and overload can neutralize technological advantages.

The Iranian F-5 likely flew at very low altitude, compressing detection to a roughly 120-second window between radar contact and impact, leaving almost no time to react. This narrow window was decisive because saturated defenses were already prioritizing faster ballistic threats, enabling the F-5 to slip through and deliver a close-range strike against high-value infrastructure inside the defensive perimeter.

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The Iranian F-5 likely flew very low to avoid early radar detection, giving U.S. air defenses less than about 120 seconds to spot, track, and react, which was not enough time under heavy missile and drone attacks to stop it before it reached and struck Camp Buehring. (Picture source: X/Iran's Today)

On April 25, 2026, an NBC News investigation indicates that Iranian strikes conducted in the opening phase of hostilities caused materially higher levels of damage to U.S. military infrastructure than initially disclosed, including a strike by an Iranian F-5 fighter jet against Camp Buehring, Kuwait. Beginning on February 28, 2026, the conflict started with U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iranian targets, followed within hours by coordinated Iranian retaliation across U.S. bases in the Gulf. Within the first days, attacks were executed across seven Gulf countries while U.S. personnel had already been dispersed from fixed sites, reducing casualty exposure but leaving infrastructure fully exposed.

Inputs referenced include three U.S. officials and two congressional aides, indicating that damage assessments remain incomplete under current ceasefire conditions. Early internal figures indicate that infrastructure damage alone reaches into the billions, with additional losses not yet fully quantified, as the geographic scale of the strikes and the current ceasefire complicates a final damage assessment. During the first 72 hours, Iranian forces executed a coordinated strike package targeting more than 100 target sites across seven countries, including Kuwait, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar, Iraq, and Bahrain.

The targeting pattern shows emphasis on operational enablers, specifically runways, hardened shelters, maintenance hangars, radar arrays, fuel farms, logistics warehouses, command centers, and satellite communications nodes. U.S. air defense systems were required to process simultaneous ballistic missile trajectories and high-volume drone incursions, with engagement doctrine prioritizing ballistic threats due to velocity and payload. Concurrently, Iranian strikes degraded radar coverage and damaged at least two air defense systems, reducing sensor fidelity and engagement capacity. Multiple engagement cycles were delayed or interrupted due to competing target prioritization.

The resulting environment was characterized by reduced detection range, delayed classification, and constrained interceptor allocation, which directly influenced the outcome at Camp Buehring. The F-5 strike at Camp Buehring occurred during the active saturation of the base by Iranian drones and missiles, indicating that the F-5 did not act alone, but was part of a saturation attack. The Northrop F-5 used in the strike is a U.S. twin-engine light fighter equipped with two J85 turbojets, producing speeds up to Mach 1.6 but with limited onboard radar capability estimated between 20 and 90 km.

Therefore, the aircraft lacks radar-guided air-to-air missiles and has no beyond-visual-range engagement capability, restricting it to short-range infrared weapons and unguided or basic guided bombs. Operationally, this requires entry into defended airspace and visual acquisition of the target. However, the aircraft’s reduced radar cross-section relative to larger fighters and its ability to operate at very low altitude provided a key survivability advantage under degraded detection conditions. The aircraft’s maneuverability at low altitude complicates fire control solutions for ground-based systems, which become operationally relevant only when defensive timelines are compressed.

Under normal conditions, such an aircraft would have been detected, engaged, and likely destroyed, and at a longer range too. The penetration profile required to reach Camp Buehring would involve sustained low-altitude ingress, likely below 50 meters above ground level, to exploit radar line-of-sight limitations. Ground-based radar detection against such targets is constrained to approximately 30 to 40 km due to Earth's curvature, reducing early warning time. At an ingress speed of 800 to 900 km/h, equivalent to roughly 220 to 250 m/s, the available engagement window is less than 120 seconds from detection to impact. Within this period, the air defense system must complete detection, classification, threat prioritization, interceptor assignment, and engagement.

Under conditions of simultaneous ballistic and drone threats, these processes are delayed due to system saturation. Damage to radar nodes further reduces tracking continuity and increases uncertainty in target identification. This compresses the decision cycle and increases the probability of delayed or missed engagement. In short, the timing constraints alone can allow a low-observable, low-altitude strike aircraft to reach release range. Weapon delivery also required the F-5 to enter the defended perimeter of Camp Buehring, as it lacks stand-off capability and precision-guided munitions for long-range release. The likely payload consisted of unguided or basic guided bombs in the 250 to 900 kg class, requiring release at short range.

The attack profile would involve either continuous low-level release or a brief climb maneuver to improve release geometry before returning to low altitude. In both cases, the Iranian F-5 must reach visual targeting distance, typically within a few kilometers of the aim point. This further confirms that the strike relied on physical penetration rather than remote engagement. The aircraft was operating within the U.S. defensive envelope at the moment of release. The success of the strike indicates that detection occurred late or engagement was delayed, which is consistent with a temporary breakdown in the detection-engagement sequence. The overall distribution of Iranian strikes also indicates a deliberate effort to degrade U.S. operational infrastructure across the region.

Confirmed affected locations include Camp Arifjan, Ali Al Salem Air Base, Shuaiba Port, Al Dhafra Air Base, Al Ruwais military base, Prince Sultan Air Base, Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, Al Udeid Air Base, a munitions storage facility in northern Iraq, and the U.S. Navy Fifth Fleet headquarters. Damage categories include runway cratering, destruction of hangars and maintenance facilities, loss of logistics warehouses, damage to command headquarters, and disruption of satellite communications infrastructure. The Fifth Fleet headquarters alone has an estimated repair cost of $200 million. Fuel storage, barracks, and medical facilities were also affected at specific sites such as Al Dhafra.

With a focus on sustainment and command functions, multiple sites were struck concurrently by Iran, reducing the U.S. air defense network's effectiveness. The overall effect is a broad reduction in operational readiness, which Iran exploited to launch its F-5. As a result, equipment losses are significant and span multiple mission categories. Reported damages/losses include at least 12 MQ-9 Reaper UAVs, two MC-130 tanker or transport aircraft, two CH-47 helicopters, two E-3 Sentry airborne warning aircraft, eight KC-135 refueling aircraft, one KC-46, one A-10, one F-35, four F-15E, and four MH-6 helicopters.

Additional damage includes multiple high-end radar systems and at least two air defense systems degraded or destroyed. These losses directly affect ISR coverage, aerial refueling capacity, heavy lift capability, and command and control. The concentration of losses in support aircraft has implications beyond immediate combat operations, particularly for sustainment and redeployment. Replacement costs for these systems are not included in initial estimates. The degradation of radar systems reduces early warning and tracking capability across affected sectors. Overall, U.S. operational capacity is now reduced in the Gulf until replacement and repair are completed.

Financial estimates indicate infrastructure repair costs up to $5 billion, excluding aircraft replacement, radar systems, and other advanced equipment rendered unusable. Operational expenditures reached $11.3 billion within the first six days of the conflict, with $5.6 billion spent on munitions within the first two days alone. This produces a combined cost exceeding $16 billion within the first week when infrastructure and operational costs are aggregated. These figures do not include long-term reconstruction, replacement of advanced systems, or loss of unsalvageable equipment.

Additional costs are expected as assessments progress, as budgetary impact will extend beyond the immediate conflict period. For now, information flow about Epic Fury to lawmakers remains limited, with detailed damage assessments not fully shared weeks after the initial strikes. Congressional staff indicate that repeated requests for specifics have not resulted in comprehensive briefings. This creates a gap between operational execution and oversight visibility. The situation occurs alongside requests for increased defense funding, including a record-level budget proposal. Limited transparency complicates independent verification of damage and cost estimates. The scale of the conflict and geographic dispersion of affected sites contribute to delays in assessment. However, the absence of detailed reporting remains a point of concern, and full damage accounting is still in progress.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.