Ukraine's new FP-9 ballistic missile to target Moscow's energy infrastructure by summer 2026.

Ukrainian defense manufacturer Fire Point is prepared to initiate flight trials of its new FP-9 short-range ballistic missile toward Moscow by summer or early autumn 2026, according to statements by company chief designer Denys Shtilerman on June 3, 2026. The deployment timeline relies on an engine validation test scheduled for June 2026, which represents the final major hurdle for an airframe that already features completed guidance, control, and structural systems. By validating this domestic ballistic capability, Kyiv aims to establish a reciprocal strategic deterrent against Russian infrastructure attacks while bypassing foreign policy restrictions linked to US-supplied weaponry.

The FP-9 is a short-range ballistic missile measuring 9.5 meters in length and 1.1 meters in diameter, engineered to deliver an 800-kilogram warhead across an operational range of 800 to 855 kilometers at speeds exceeding 1,200 meters per second. Fire Point plans to bypass standard procurement delays by manufacturing an initial batch of 10 to 20 test missiles simultaneously alongside engine validation trials to accelerate deep-strike readiness.

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The FP-9 is a larger, longer-range variant of the FP-7 missile pictured here, which increases the operational range from 300 km to 855 km and the warhead weight from 150 kg to 800 kg. (Picture source: Fire Point)

On June 3, 2026, Fire Point chief designer and co-owner Denys Shtilerman said Ukraine could use the FP-9 ballistic missile to strike Moscow in summer 2026 or early autumn 2026 if the engine test planned for June 2026 and follow-on flight trials validate the missile. He said FP-9 has “everything except the engine,” and tied the schedule directly to operational intent by saying that after a successful test flight, the next flight should be “to Moscow.” Shtilerman also named energy infrastructure in Moscow as a possible target category, mirroring Russia’s attacks on Kyiv’s energy system, and said the FP-9 range would make St. Petersburg, Vladimir Putin’s birth city, reachable.

The FP-9 carries an 800 kg warhead, is about 9.5 m long, has a maximum diameter of 1.1 m, and is expected to pass through roughly ten test missiles before production can expand after Ukrainian codification. The immediate significance is not an already operational ballistic missile force, but a defined path from engine testing to flight trials, codification, production expansion, and possible use against targets directly inside Russia’s capital. The FP-9 development fits into Russia’s repeated use of ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones in combined attacks against Ukraine, forcing Kyiv to defend against threats with different speeds, trajectories, altitudes, and warning times.

During May and June 2026, Iskander, Kinzhal, Zircon, and Oreshnik appeared in Russian strike claims, while Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities continued to face large missile-drone attacks. Ballistic missiles shorten the time between detection and impact, reduce engagement opportunities, and require high-end interceptors, which gives them political and military weight beyond their explosive payload. Russia’s use of these systems has likely increased Ukrainian desire for a reciprocal capability against Moscow, not only with drones or cruise missiles, but with a faster weapon that also creates a shorter air defense response.

Currently, the FP-9 remains non-operational until its engine, flight behavior, guidance, launch process, and production model are validated, with the program sequence still defined as engine test, flight test, codification, production expansion, and operational employment. The FP-9’s size and performance place it near the upper end of the short-range ballistic missile category. Its range, between 800 and 855 km, is nearly twice the range of Russia’s Iskander-M, while its 800 kg warhead gives it an unusually heavy payload for this missile category, to strike fixed infrastructure such as fuel storage, power generation facilities, rail junctions, ammunition depots, military-industrial plants, air bases, command facilities, and air defense nodes.

The missile’s 9.5 m length and 1.1 m maximum diameter also make it larger than Russia’s 9M723 Iskander missile, which is about 7.2 m long and 0.95 m in diameter. That comparison indicates a missile designed to trade compactness for range and payload rather than simply mirror an Iskander-class missile. Its reach would extend Ukrainian ballistic strike options beyond front-line depots and command posts into Russia’s deeper military, industrial, energy, and transport network, with Moscow central because of its political, command, infrastructure, and air defense significance, and St. Petersburg included under the same operational logic. The ATACMS also explains why Ukraine's political authority over the FP-9 matters as much as its specifications.

Ukraine received its first ATACMS from the U.S. in 2023, gaining a precision strike option against operational-depth targets such as airfields, depots, logistics nodes, command sites, and other military support infrastructure, but initial use was limited to Ukrainian territory, including Russian-occupied areas. In November 2024, the Biden administration allowed Ukraine to use U.S.-made weapons for deeper strikes inside Russia, but in August 2025, the Trump administration reportedly blocked Ukraine from using U.S.-made ATACMS against targets inside Russia. The practical lesson is that range does not automatically translate into usable political authority, since foreign approval can shape target selection, timing, and geography.

The FP-9 would reduce that dependency if it becomes operational, because target selection and launch timing would fall under Ukrainian authority rather than Washington’s approval cycle. It would certainly not replace the ATACMS for operational-depth missions, but it would occupy a different threat scale against rear infrastructure that supports Russian operations at scale. Fire Point’s portfolio now points to a layered strike structure across drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. The FP-7, with a range of about 300 km, fits tactical and operational-depth missions broadly aligned with ATACMS use, while the FP-9 extends that logic to strategic-depth ballistic strikes against more distant targets between 800 and 855 km, including Moscow and St. Petersburg.

The more widely used FP-5 Flamingo is a cruise missile with a 3,000 km range and a 1,150 kg warhead. Although the FP-5 has greater reach and payload than the FP-9, it faces a different air defense problem because cruise missiles usually spend more time in defended airspace and allow more time for detection, tracking, and interception. Ukraine has also increased attacks on Russian energy and military infrastructure with domestically produced drones and missiles, while earlier Ukrainian ballistic projects, such as the Hrim-2/Sapsan, show that the ballistic strike concept predates the current Fire Point track. The operational logic is practical: drones create volume and cost pressure, cruise missiles deliver long-range payloads, and ballistic missiles compress warning time and complicate interception.

The main operational rationale for the FP-9 is the penetration problem around Moscow. Denys Shtilerman has referred to multiple defensive rings around the city, creating a serious challenge for slow or medium-speed weapons crossing long distances through defended airspace. Long-range drones can be produced in numbers and impose a continuing defense burden, but they are vulnerable to radar detection, electronic warfare, fighters, guns, and surface-to-air missiles. Cruise missiles such as the FP-5 can fly low and maneuver, but their flight time still allows Russian defenders to build tracks, warn target areas, allocate interceptors, and attempt engagements.

A ballistic missile, descending at high speed, would give less time for detection, classification, interceptor launch, and final engagement. Fire Point's FP-9 has a speed above 1,200 m/s, which would not make the missile impossible to intercept but would change the cost, density, and timing requirements of defense. Russia currently imposes this problem on Ukraine, while Kyiv depends on scarce high-end interceptors and systems such as Patriot, which Ukrainian leaders continue to request after large Russian attacks. If the FP-9 becomes available even in modest numbers, Russia would have to face the same problem: shifting even more high-end air defense assets toward key cities, air bases, logistics hubs, energy sites, defense-industrial facilities, ammunition depots, command sites, rail junctions, and air defense nodes.

Fire Point’s industrial base gives the FP-9 a credible production pathway, but ballistic missile output remains more demanding than drone manufacturing. The company operates more than 60 dispersed production sites inside Ukraine, has a workforce between 2,000 and more than 4,000 personnel, and held more than $1 billion in Ukrainian state contracts in 2025. Fire Point leadership said the FP-1 long-range drone production exceeded 100 units per day. The company’s first working product required about $2 million in initial investment, and Shtilerman separately said he had personally invested about $2.5 million.

Its procurement model relies on parallel sourcing, with multiple engines, antennas, parts, suppliers, and subcontractors tested at the same time to reduce schedule risk. That method can shorten component problem-solving, but ballistic missiles impose stricter demands in propulsion consistency, structural loads, thermal stress, guidance survivability, launch preparation, and post-launch reliability. The FP-9’s main bottlenecks remain engine reliability, solid propellant supply, airframe manufacturing, guidance package availability, and state-funded procurement. A missile that can fly once still has to be produced repeatedly, stored safely, transported, launched from survivable positions, and guided accurately enough to justify each launch.

Key indicators of the FP-9's effectiveness will include successful flight tests, demonstrated flights, predictable ballistic trajectory, terminal behavior, and range performance close to the claimed 800-855 km band. Accuracy will matter because an 800 kg warhead has different military value if it can hit a defined military-industrial plant, energy facility, depot, air base, command site, rail node, or air defense position rather than only a broad area. Launch survivability will also be critical, including Ukraine’s ability to prepare, move, conceal, and fire FP-9s before Russian intelligence, surveillance, missiles, drones, or aircraft can attack the launch chain.

Codification would move the missile into a formal procurement and fielding process, while the monthly production rate would determine whether the FP-9 becomes a recurring operational pressure mechanism rather than a small number of demonstrative launches like Russia's Oreshnik. If codified, funded, produced beyond symbolic numbers, and launched from survivable positions, the FP-9 would force Russia to account for Ukrainian ballistic strike risk out to nearly 850 km, making Moscow, St. Petersburg, major air bases, logistics hubs, energy sites, military-industrial facilities, ammunition depots, command centers, rail junctions, and air defense nodes compete for ballistic missile defense coverage, mirroring what Kyiv has to face every day.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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