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Ukraine conducts second strike on Russian frigate Admiral Makarov within five weeks to disrupt missile attacks.
Ukraine conducted a second precision drone strike against the Russian Navy’s Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate Admiral Makarov at the Novorossiysk naval base, retargeting a key Kalibr cruise missile launch platform within five weeks.
The April 6, 2026, operation, executed by Ukrainian unmanned systems forces, aimed to degrade Russia’s sea-based long-range strike capability and disrupt ongoing missile attack cycles against Ukrainian territory. The first strike, confirmed by the Ukrainian General Staff following earlier damage assessment inflicted on March 2, inflicted damage to both the Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov frigates, reducing Russian launch capacity, weakening operational readiness, and increasing pressure on Black Sea Fleet survivability and deterrence posture.
The limited number of available Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates, only three, increases the operational importance of each unit, as each unit's damage directly reduces Russia's missile strike capacity against Ukrainian cities. (Picture source: Russian and Ukrainian MoD)
On April 6, 2026, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine confirmed that two Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates of the Russian Navy sustained damage during the March 2 strike against the port of Novorossiysk. The attack, carried out overnight between March 1 and March 2, resulted in confirmed damage to the frigates Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov, both equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles used for land-attack missions against Ukraine. Ukrainian forces then conducted a renewed drone strike against the Admiral Makarov, also on April 6, indicating a sustained operational effort targeting naval strike assets and associated infrastructure at the same port within a five-week interval.
The Novorossiysk naval base, located in Krasnodar Krai, has functioned as a primary basing site for Black Sea Fleet units relocated from Sevastopol following repeated Ukrainian strikes in Crimea. The targeting cycle demonstrates a focus on targeting ships while in port, during maintenance or rearming phases, where defensive readiness is reduced, one week after an attack against the Project 23550 combat icebreaker Purga. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov sustained damage during the March 2 strike, with the extent of structural and systems degradation still under assessment and additional vessels potentially affected.
Admiral Essen had previously been identified in satellite imagery with visible damage consistent with an impact near key onboard systems, including radar and air defense components. Both frigates belong to the same class and represent two of the few Kalibr-capable surface units available in the Black Sea, increasing the operational significance of the strike. The attack was conducted at night, reducing visual detection and complicating defensive engagement. The concentration of these vessels at a single port creates a density of high-value targets within a constrained area. Damage to either ship reduces available launch capacity for 3M14 Kalibr missiles, each vessel typically carrying up to eight missiles per deployment cycle.
The loss or degradation of onboard sensors and air defense systems further reduces survivability in subsequent engagements. This creates a compounding effect on operational readiness over time. The April 6 operation was carried out by the 1st Separate Center of Unmanned Systems Forces, with planning and coordination by the Security Service of Ukraine, against one of the frigates moored in Novorossiysk, initially identified as Admiral Grigorovich but later clarified as the Admiral Makarov based on fleet disposition. The drones approached at low altitude and were engaged at close range by the ship’s onboard Shtil-1 air defense system, which launched interceptors directly from the deck during the approach phase.
Despite this response, at least one drone impacted the vessel, and multiple fires were observed along the port area, including near fuel and logistics infrastructure. The engagement distance suggests that detection occurred within a short time window, likely under a few kilometers, limiting interception opportunities. The attack coincided with a broader drone strike affecting port facilities, including the Sheskharis oil terminal area, indicating a coordinated strike package. The extent of damage to the frigate remains under evaluation, including potential impacts to the bridge, vertical launch system, or sensor arrays. The ability to conduct a second strike within weeks confirms that Russia's shipboard defenses alone are insufficient to fully secure vessels in port.
The Admiral Grigorovich-class, or Project 11356R, consists of three frigates with a full displacement of approximately 4,035 tons, a length of 124.8 meters, and a crew of about 180 personnel, including officers and support elements. Each ship is equipped with a universal vertical launch system capable of deploying up to eight Kalibr cruise missiles, with ranges exceeding 1,500 kilometers depending on variant. Air defense is provided by the Shtil-1 system with 24 9M317M missiles, supported by two AK-630M close-in weapon systems and portable air defense launchers. The ships also carry a 100 mm A-190 naval gun, anti-submarine rocket systems such as RBU-6000, and torpedo launchers.
Aviation capability includes a hangar and flight deck for one Ka-27PL or Ka-31 helicopter, enabling reconnaissance and anti-submarine operations. Propulsion is provided by a gas turbine system generating over 60,000 horsepower, enabling speeds above 30 knots. Operational endurance reaches up to 30 days, with a range of approximately 4,850 nautical miles at cruising speed. Within the current conflict with Ukraine, these specifications position the class as a multi-role combatant with primary emphasis on strike missions. Within the Black Sea Fleet, only a limited number of Project 11356R frigates are available, and as of early 2026, only Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov were consistently present in the Black Sea due to access restrictions through the Bosphorus affecting Admiral Grigorovich.
This constraint increases the operational importance of the three units, as they represent a significant portion of the fleet’s surface-based long-range strike capability. Each frigate can launch a finite number of Kalibr missiles before requiring a return to port for reloading, creating predictable logistical cycles that can be targeted. The relocation of these ships to Novorossiysk was intended to reduce exposure after attacks on Sevastopol, but the March and April strikes indicate that this relocation has not provided effective protection. Damage to Admiral Essen on March 2 and the renewed attack on Admiral Makarov on April 6 reduce available launch platforms, potentially lowering the frequency of missile strikes conducted from the sea.
The targeting of these ships during port calls also disrupts both operational deployment and maintenance cycles. The FP-2 drone used in the attack is a kamikaze drone developed by the Ukrainian company Fire Point to deliver heavier payloads at shorter distances than earlier deep-strike systems. The FP-2 has an operational range of about 200 kilometers, a reduction from the 1,400 to 1,600 kilometers of the earlier FP-1, achieved by increasing the warhead mass to between 100 and 120 kilograms depending on configuration. The drone has a wingspan of about 6 meters and a takeoff weight of roughly 215 kilograms, allowing it to carry modified aerial bombs or dedicated high-explosive charges capable of damaging hardened infrastructure and naval vessels.
It uses a fixed-wing configuration with propeller propulsion and can be launched from simple ground-based ramps within about 15 to 20 minutes, enabling rapid deployment close to the frontline. Guidance combines autonomous navigation for pre-programmed targets with optional terminal control for higher accuracy, resulting in successful strikes against air defense systems such as S-400 radars and Pantsir-S1 systems. In parallel with the frigate strike, Ukrainian forces targeted the Sivash offshore drilling platform using unmanned systems from the 413th Separate Battalion “Raid,” coordinated with naval deep-strike units.
The cumulative impact of Ukrainian strikes on Novorossiysk oil infrastructure since 2024 has shifted from temporary disruption to recurring degradation of export handling capacity, particularly at the Sheskharis terminal and the adjacent Caspian Pipeline Consortium facilities. The Sheskharis terminal, historically responsible for a significant share of Russian Black Sea oil exports and capable of processing multiple tankers simultaneously, has been repeatedly targeted, with six of its seven loading berths damaged during the March 2, 2026, strike and again affected on April 6.
The April 6 attack also damaged pipeline nodes, oil metering systems, and loading piers, while setting multiple storage tanks on fire and affecting at least one single-point mooring connection linked to CPC operations. Similar attacks on Baltic terminals such as Primorsk and Ust-Luga have reduced overall Russian export capacity by up to 20% during peak disruption periods in early April 2026, indicating a coordinated campaign targeting multiple export corridors. The defensive performance observed during the April 6 engagement highlights specific limitations of shipborne air defense systems when operating in a fixed port environment.
The Shtil-1 system relies on radar detection and missile guidance, both of which are affected by clutter and limited engagement geometry in a harbor setting. The close-range detection of incoming drones reduces the available reaction time, potentially to seconds rather than minutes. Ships moored at port cannot maneuver to optimize defensive orientation or create separation from threats, further reducing effectiveness. The use of multiple drones increases the likelihood of saturation, where the number of incoming targets exceeds available interceptors or engagement channels. The cost disparity between drones and interceptors increases the economic burden of defense for Russia, suggesting that additional layered defenses, including harbor-based systems, may be relocated in the future.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.