Ukraine adapts Stugna-P anti-tank missile for short-range air defense against Russian drones.

Ukraine's 1021st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment converted Stugna-P anti-tank guided missiles into short-range air defense systems to intercept Russian Geran-2 and Gerbera-class attack drones. The deployment addresses critical shortages of conventional surface-to-air interceptors by repurposing existing laser-guided anti-tank architecture for lower-cost aerial engagement. Operating units utilize remote-control terminals and thermal optics to execute tracking and terminal destruction of slow-moving unmanned aerial vehicles.

The adapted Stugna-P surface-to-air (SAM) missile incorporates high-explosive fragmentation warheads with laser proximity sensors to engage aerial targets without requiring direct impact. This modification leverages established manufacturing lines by Luch Design Bureau to supplement short-range air defense layers against massed drone strikes, just days after the company unveiled the RK-2PZ surface-to-air missile at MSPO 2026.

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The main advantage of converting an ATGM such as Stugna-P into a short-range air defense system is that it reuses an already-produced missile architecture and industrial supply chain, while creating a faster-to-field and potentially cheaper interceptor for slow Russian UAVs without consuming more sophisticated Western SAMs. (Picture source: 1021 ЗАП)

On September 13, 2026, Ukraine's 1021st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment showed a Stugna-P anti-tank missile configured for air defense against Russia's Geran-2 and Gerbera-class attack drones, only five days after Luch Design Bureau, the company behind the ATGM, unveiled the RK-2PZ 130 mm surface-to-air missile at MSPO 2026. The RK-2PZ weighs 28.9 kg, 47 kg in its transport-launch container, and carries a 6.1 kg HE-fragmentation warhead, equal to 21.1% of the missile's mass. It notably retains the Stugna/RK-2 missile's laser guidance but integrates an automatic aerial target tracking, a proximity sensing, and a contact initiation. As target acquisition remains external to the missile through television or thermal-imaging optics, this avoids fitting a costly active radar or infrared seeker in each round. The result is not simply an ATGM fired upward, but that Ukraine is effectively improving the air defense potential of the existing Stugna/RK-2 to a battlefield increasingly shaped by repeated Russian drone attacks, which require the country to intercept large numbers of relatively slow one-way attack and decoy UAVs without consuming scarce Western surface-to-air missiles on every target.

The 1021st Regiment provides a particularly relevant environment for determining if the Stugna fits to counter drones because it already operates several weapons covering different portions of the problem. Formed as an anti-aircraft artillery battalion in 2022, reorganized as a regiment in early 2024, and transferred from the Ground Forces to the Ukrainian Air Force in late April 2026, the formation includes three self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery battalions and a dedicated UAV-interceptor battalion, supported by engineer, repair, and logistics companies. Its inventory includes Gepard 1A2 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, ZU-23-2 23 mm guns, and Sting and P1-Sun interceptor UAVs. One Ukrainian Gepard crew had recorded 32 kills by March 2025, comprising 28 attack UAVs and four cruise missiles. The Stugna therefore can occupy the space between gun and UAV interception on one side and conventional SAM expenditure on the other, particularly where a target is within several kilometers, can be held continuously by electro-optical tracking, and does not justify the expenditure of a surface-to-air missile.

This adaptation is possible because the Stugna-P ATGM was modular from the start. Developed by Luch between 2005 and 2010, accepted into Ukrainian service in April 2011 and placed into mass production in March 2015, a standard Stugna-P firing position combines a 32 kg launcher, a 15 kg PN-I guidance unit, a 10 kg remote control panel and a containerized missile. Moreover, the operator can work up to 50 m from the launcher, allowing the sight and launcher to remain forward while personnel occupy cover. Its standard 130 mm RK-2 ammunition covers 100 to 5,000 m by day, while the 152 mm round reaches 5,500 m; nighttime range is 100 to 3,000 m. Furthermore, this ammunition family already separates propulsion and guidance from terminal effect and could use the RK-2S tandem-HEAT and the RK-2OF HE-fragmentation warheads. The newer RK-2PZ consequently changes the target set while retaining much of the existing anti-tank missile architecture.

The Stugna-P's current kinematics help to explain its potential air defense effectiveness better than the generic label "ATGM converted into SAM." The parent RK-2 family flies at 200 to 220 m/s (720-792 km/h) towards its target; to date, the RK-2PZ velocity remains undisclosed. Still, at those reference speeds, hitting a Russian drone located 3 km away requires 13.6 to 15 seconds; 4 km requires 18.2 to 20 seconds, and 5 km requires 22.7 to 25 seconds. A Gerbera flying at 160 km/h gives the missile a 4.5-4.95:1 speed advantage; a Geran-2 at 250 km/h reduces this to 2.88-3.17:1. During a theoretical 4 km flight, a 250 km/h Geran-2 moves 1.26 km, so automatic tracking and lead calculation are essential. In a simplified head-on engagement, a 220 m/s missile and a 250 km/h Geran-2 close at 289.4 m/s, or 1,042 km/h. Rear-aspect geometry is worse: starting 3 km behind the same UAV would require 4.38 km of missile travel to catch it, while a 4 km initial separation requires 5.84 km, potentially exceeding the ATGM's current engagement envelope.

However, the Stugna-P had already demonstrated that its guidance architecture could engage airborne targets before the RK-2PZ's appearance. The original weapon was primarily intended for tanks, armored vehicles, and fortified positions, but hovering helicopters were already part of its target set; on April 5, 2022, Ukraine's 95th Air Assault Brigade destroyed a Russian Ka-52 with the ATGM. Another engagement against a hovering Ka-52 followed on May 1. Ukrainian crews have also conducted ground engagements at ranges of up to 5 km, with another claimed shot at 5.3 km, demonstrating the ability to maintain guidance over long flight times. A Geran-2 or Gerbera creates a harder tracking problem because it continuously changes position in azimuth and elevation. Subsequently, the RK-2PZ combines an already demonstrated airborne target capability with automatic tracking and a warhead specifically configured for interception rather than relying on the original ATGM's direct-hit geometry.

The warhead is therefore the principal physical change. Standard RK-2S uses a tandem HEAT designed for at least 800 mm penetration behind ERA, while the RK-2OF uses HE-fragmentation and produces roughly 600 fragments; the RK-2PZ instead combines HE-fragmentation with laser proximity sensors positioned around its forward section and a contact sensor for direct impact. This removes the requirement for the 130 mm missile body itself to collide with a small UAV. That matters against a Gerbera weighing 18 kg with a 2.5 m wingspan, because a near pass can place fragments through its propulsion, structure, control components, or electronics even without direct impact. Guidance remains the main performance constraint. The Stugna-P's current PN-I can detect a tank-sized object at up to 6.5 km in daylight and recognize it at 2.5 km, but those figures cannot be transferred directly to a much smaller Gerbera or Geran-2.

The RK-2PZ uses television or thermal imagery for acquisition, automatic optical tracking after target selection, and laser guidance until interception. A 4-5 km engagement could therefore occupy a guidance channel for 18 to 25 seconds using parent-missile velocity as a reference. This becomes critical during saturation attacks if a launcher can guide only one missile at a time. The industrial advantage is more measurable than claims that the missile is simply cheaper than a SAM. Ukraine delivered roughly 2,500 Stugna missiles to its armed forces in 2018, and by August 2023, the monthly Stugna-P production had reached four times its January 2023 level. Conventional Stugna missiles have been said to have a price in the $20,000-$50,000 range, although no RK-2PZ unit price has been released. Luch can still reuse its experience while concentrating new work on the 6.1 kg fragmentation warhead, proximity sensors, and aerial-target fire control. The trade is equally specific: Ukraine gains a new domestically producible interceptor suited to slow UAVs without putting a costly seeker in every missile.

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Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.