Ukraine's Magura USVs to be manufactured in the US by UForce and ReconCraft following Black Sea successes.

UForce and ReconCraft signed a memorandum of understanding at the Embassy of Ukraine in Washington to manufacture Ukrainian Magura unmanned surface vessels in the United States. The agreement leverages ReconCraft’s Oregon and South Carolina manufacturing facilities and naval engineering base to localize production for U.S. defense programs. This initiative enables the partners to adapt the combat-tested autonomous maritime system's communications, software, payloads, and weapons interfaces to American military requirements without funding a multiyear domestic development effort.

Under the agreement, UForce USA manages market development, government relations, and software integration, while ReconCraft oversees hull construction, system assembly, and industrial scaling targeting initial capacity of hundreds to thousands of vessels annually. The 25-foot Magura platform features an operational range of up to 800 nautical miles, payload capacity reaching 1,000 kilograms across strike, air defense, and reconnaissance configurations, and an estimated unit cost around $273,000.

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By August 2024, the commander of Group 13 stated that Magura operations had damaged 18 Russian vessels in 18 months, while another calculation attributed $500 million in losses caused by the Magura V5 in its first year of public combat use. (Picture source: UForce)

On July 21, 2026, UForce and ReconCraft signed a memorandum of understanding at the Embassy of Ukraine in Washington to manufacture the Ukrainian Magura unmanned surface vessels (USVs) in the United States. The agreement assigns UForce USA, led by Sean Plankey, responsibility for the American market, government relations and program development, while ReconCraft will provide an existing U.S. boatbuilding base, naval engineering capacity and military production workforce. Joe Silkowski, co-founder of ReconCraft, and UForce CEO Oleg Rogynskyy are the other principal executives attached to the agreement, which is aimed at the U.S. Drone Dominance competition and related autonomous systems programs.

No officials have announced a Magura order, no quantity has been disclosed, and neither company has identified the first U.S.-built configuration, delivery recipient, or unit price under a potential future government contract. The practical objective is nevertheless clear: instead of financing another multiyear American design effort, the partners intend to place a Ukrainian vessel already used in hundreds of Black Sea missions into U.S. production, then adapt its communications, payloads, software, cyber protection and weapons interfaces to American requirements. ReconCraft's facilities in Oregon and South Carolina are expected to form the production base, with longer-term capacity discussed in terms of hundreds and potentially thousands of vessels per year, although that scale would require major funded orders from the U.S., supplier expansion and standardized configurations. 

UForce itself was formed by consolidating nine Ukrainian unmanned systems developers and manufacturers into a company intended to combine Ukrainian engineering and wartime production with Western financing, governance and international distribution. By early 2026, the group had more than 1,000 personnel working across manufacturing, software development, system modification, testing and field support, with a distributed supply chain spanning more than 15 locations in six allied countries. UForce entered this expansion phase after recording nine-figure bookings in 2025 and growth approaching 500%, figures that indicate a business already supplying operational users rather than relying primarily on future development contracts.

Its leadership includes Rogynskyy, former Ukrainian Prime Minister Oleksiy Honcharuk, and former British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace. Honcharuk had also advised Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and chaired the supervisory board of Aerorozvidka, placing UForce's management close to the institutions responsible for Ukrainian drone employment and procurement. Plankey's appointment as head of UForce USA adds a different set of connections: he served in the U.S. Coast Guard, worked at the Department of Energy and National Security Council, acted as senior adviser to the Secretary of Homeland Security with responsibility for Coast Guard matters, and was twice nominated to lead the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.

His role is therefore not limited to sales. He is expected to manage the regulatory, cybersecurity, government integration, and industrial issues that determine whether a foreign-origin unmanned system can move from demonstration to a U.S. program of record. The Magura USV originates from Ukraine's attempt to develop a long-range maritime strike capability after the loss or capture of much of its conventional naval assets by Russia. Development of early Magura V1 and V2 test vehicles began in May 2022, while the Ukrainian government announced work on a combat surface drone with a range of up to 800 km in November of that year. The Magura V5 emerged from contracts awarded by Ukraine's Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) to private developers that had previously worked with the Security Service of Ukraine on other naval drone projects.

The V5 was publicly displayed at the International Defence Industry Fair in Istanbul from July 25 to 28, 2023, and entered operational use with HUR personnel working alongside the 385th Unmanned Surface Vessel Brigade, created in August 2023. Its mission profile differed from the larger Sea Baby used by the Security Service of Ukraine. The Sea Baby prioritizes heavier explosive loads and attacks against fixed targets, port infrastructure and ships at anchor, while the smaller Magura emphasizes speed, maneuverability and interception of moving warships at sea. The original V5 could also conduct surveillance, reconnaissance, patrol, maritime security, mine countermeasure and search-and-rescue missions, but its combat value came from combining long range with a cross-section and thermal signature far smaller than those of a crewed patrol boat.

The subsequent V6P and V7 variants expanded the design into a reusable multipurpose vessel carrying guns, missiles, sensors and aerial drones rather than only an explosive warhead. The Magura V5 is a 5.5 m unmanned vessel with a beam of approximately 1.5 m, a total mass below 1,000 kg and only about 0.5 m of structure exposed above the waterline. That geometry matters operationally because the vessel presents a small visual target, limited radar-reflecting area and little thermal output compared with a conventional motorboat. Its published payload is 300 to 320 kg, although some configurations allocate about 200 kg to the explosive charge after accounting for fuel, sensors, communications and control equipment.

The vessel cruises at approximately 22 knots, or 41 km/h, and reaches 42 knots, or 78 km/h, with higher short-duration speeds near 54 knots reported for some configurations. Endurance reaches 60 hours, maximum voyage range reaches 800 km, and practical strike radius is commonly placed near 400 km when fuel must be reserved for routing, holding, terminal maneuvering, or recovery. Navigation uses automatic GNSS, inertial and visual methods, backed by autopilot software and manual remote control. The communications architecture can use mesh links and satellite communications, supports as many as three simultaneous HD video streams and includes 256-bit encryption.

A complete Magura USV includes more than the hull: it can incorporate a ground control station, transportation and storage equipment, a data-processing center, night vision cameras, redundant communications modules, electro-optical sensors, marine radar and a laser rangefinder. The reported cost of an early V5 system was approximately $273,000, or about 10 million Ukrainian hryvnias at the exchange rate used at that time, although wartime configuration, imported components and weapon integration likely changed that amount. The V7 and MV7 represent a substantial Magura redesign rather than a simple enlargement of the V5. The V7 measures about 7.2 m, has a mass below 1,300 kg in its basic configuration, carries up to 650 kg and uses a 270 hp diesel engine.

It cruises at approximately 23 knots, reaches about 39 knots and extends maximum range to 1,000 km. Endurance is at least 48 hours on battery-supported configurations and can reach as long as seven days when a generator is fitted, allowing the vessel to hold position, conduct surveillance or remain in an engagement area rather than proceeding directly to a target. The MV7 increases hull length to 7.8 m and beam to 2.35 m, carries 1,200 liters of fuel and retains a maximum speed near 39 knots. Its stated range is approximately 800 nautical miles, equivalent to about 1,480 km, although actual range depends heavily on sea state, speed, payload, and whether the vessel must return. The hull is made of fiberglass reinforced with carbon fiber and Kevlar, and propulsion can use either a waterjet or sterndrive.

UForce rates the MV7 for operations in Sea State 4 and survival in Sea State 6, a meaningful distinction from earlier boats developed around Black Sea conditions. Sea State 4 corresponds to moderate seas with wave heights of roughly 1.25 to 2.5 m, while Sea State 6 involves very rough conditions with waves of approximately 4 to 6 m. This gives the MV7 a more credible basis for Baltic, North Atlantic, Mediterranean and Indo-Pacific use, but the survivability rating should not be confused with an ability to conduct precise weapon employment at the upper limit of those conditions. The larger hull changes what the Magura can carry and how it can be employed. The MV7's basic payload limit is 650 kg, but UForce lists a distributed load exceeding 1,000 kg when weapons, sensors, UAVs and other equipment are placed across separate mounting points.

Configurations include an attack warhead, a gyro-stabilized remote weapon station, short-range surface-to-air missiles, a UAV mothership package, logistics payloads and mine warfare equipment. The V7 has been shown with either a turret-mounted machine gun or two surface-launched AIM-9 Sidewinders, while earlier V5 adaptations carried two R-73 infrared-guided missiles. These integrations required more than attaching launch rails. An air-to-air missile fired from a slow surface vessel needs electrical power, seeker cooling, launch authorization, target cueing and a method of pointing the seeker toward the target despite vessel roll, pitch and yaw. The vessel's heading may provide part of the initial alignment, while electro-optical sensors, external surveillance assets and remote operators contribute target location.

The Magura has also been used as a carrier for aerial drones, enabling a vessel to move hundreds of kilometers by sea, launch a UAV closer to the coast and extend the kamikaze drone's reach against air defense positions, command posts or logistics facilities inland. In this configuration, the surface vessel can remain as a communications relay, recover if fuel permits, or support other Maguras approaching from separate directions. The Magura's evolution into an air defense platform was driven directly by Russian attempts to destroy Ukrainian naval drones with helicopters and tactical aircraft. On December 31, 2024, a V5 adapted to fire R-73 missiles engaged Russian helicopters near Cape Tarkhankut in western Crimea, destroying one Mi-8 and damaging another. The surviving helicopter used flares and returned to base, indicating that the Magura's missile employment had become a real threat.

Beginning in January 2025, Ukraine developed an AIM-9-armed V7, and HUR chief Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov later stated that the Sidewinder produced better results than other missile options used on the vessel. On May 2, 2025, at least three Magura V7s operating approximately 50 km west of Novorossiysk engaged two Russian Su-30SM fighters. Both aircraft were claimed destroyed; one crew ejected and was recovered by a civilian cargo ship, while the second crew was reported killed. At an estimated $50 million per Su-30SM, the two losses represented roughly $100 million in aircraft against a group of unmanned boats whose aggregate acquisition cost would have been a small fraction of that figure. More important than the exchange ratio was the tactical effect.

Russian helicopters and fighters had been among the principal counters to surface drones because they could detect them outside harbor defenses and attack them with cannon fire. Once missile-armed Maguras appeared, those aircraft had to account for an engagement threat extending upward from the sea surface, complicating low-altitude interception patterns and forcing greater standoff distance, higher altitude, more countermeasure use, and additional surveillance support. ReconCraft's part in the arrangement is more concrete than a generic industrial partnership because the U.S. company already designs and builds military boats. Founded in 2008 and headquartered in Oregon, it produces vessels ranging from riverine craft and rigid-hull inflatable boats to offshore interceptors as large as 120 feet.

Its portfolio includes 42-foot, 54-foot and 62-foot offshore interceptors, combatant craft, landing craft and shallow-draft boats for military, law enforcement and Special Operations customers. The company performs naval architecture, structural engineering and manufacturing in-house and can integrate customer-selected propulsion, sensors, communications, ballistic protection and remote weapon stations. For instance, in August 2025, the U.S. Special Operations Command selected ReconCraft to develop the Combatant Craft Medium Mk2 Engineering Development Model, the successor to the Mk1 used by Naval Special Warfare personnel for long-range infiltration, extraction and maritime mobility missions. The company has also supplied Combatant Craft Medium vessels to Norwegian special forces.

These programs give ReconCraft a direct experience with military acceptance testing, configuration management and customer-specific integration, areas where a foreign drone manufacturer would otherwise face a steep entry barrier. For the Magura, ReconCraft can handle hull production, propulsion installation, wiring, electronics integration, structural modifications, quality control and final testing, while UForce retains the vessel architecture, autonomy software and combat-derived mission configurations. The central acquisition question will be whether the partners can standardize enough of the design to support repeatable production without eliminating the modularity that made the Ukrainian system so adaptable.

The Black Sea record also explains why the US company is considering the Magura as a production candidate rather than developing another experimental USV. In May 2023, three V5s attacked the Russian intelligence ship Ivan Khurs; then, on November 11, 2023, several Maguras sank the Serna-class landing craft D-144 and Akula-class landing craft D-295 at Chornomorske. On February 1, 2024, six V5s attacked and sank the Project 1241 Tarantul-III missile corvette Ivanovets near Lake Donuzlav; the vessel had a crew of approximately 40. On February 14, Maguras sank the larger Project 775 landing ship Tsezar Kunikov near Alupka, a ship valued in some estimates at $200 million to $300 million.

On March 5, five V5s sank the Project 22160 patrol ship Sergey Kotov near the Kerch Strait, with the loss commonly valued near $65 million. Magura attacks also destroyed two KC-701 boats on May 30, 2024, and another KS-701 craft near Chornomorske on August 10. By August 2024, the commander of HUR's Group 13 stated that the Magura had damaged 18 Russian vessels in approximately 18 months. The cumulative effect was not the physical elimination of the Black Sea Fleet, but the removal of much of its operational freedom west of Crimea. Russia shifted major vessels from Sevastopol toward Novorossiysk, expanded harbor booms and barriers, added machine gun positions and patrol craft, increased helicopter coverage and treated every small surface contact as a potential attack.

These changes imposed continuing personnel, sensor and readiness costs even when no Magura strike occurred. They also reduced Russia's ability to use Sevastopol routinely as a forward base for patrol, blockade and missile launch operations. For U.S. planners, the relevant lesson is therefore not that a $273,000 unmanned boat can replace a multi-million-dollar destroyer or frigate. It is that dozens of low-profile vessels, deployed repeatedly and modified faster than the defender can adjust, can force a navy to disperse, remain behind barriers, and dedicate expensive aircraft, ships and surveillance systems to local defense.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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