U.S. Navy Cuts Constellation Frigate Program Short and Starts Over With FF(X) Ship Design.

Congress has received a new assessment showing the US Navy plans to truncate the Constellation-class frigate program at no more than two ships while accelerating a new FF(X) effort based on a cutter-derived hull. The move highlights a growing willingness to trade near-term combat ambition for speed, cost control, and industrial-base stability.

U.S. Congress received an updated Congressional Research Service assessment in early January 2026 outlining a major course correction in the US Navy’s approach to small surface combatants. The report indicates that the Constellation-class (FFG-62) frigate program is set to be truncated to no more than two ships, while the Navy moves to accelerate a new FF(X) frigate effort based on a hull derived from Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Legend-class National Security Cutter. More than a routine program update, the document highlights a strategic recalibration driven by schedule pressure, cost growth, and operational demand, placing lawmakers at the center of a consequential decision over whether speed and industrial-base pragmatism should take precedence over the high-end combat ambition that originally defined the Constellation design.
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The US Navy is reassessing its future frigate force, scaling back the Constellation-class program while accelerating a new FF(X) design based on the National Security Cutter to meet near-term operational demands (Picture source: Fincantieri).

The numbers inside the report show how abrupt the pivot really is. The Navy began procuring Constellation-class frigates in FY2020 and, before November 2025, planned at least 20 ships. Six were procured through FY2025, including one per year from FY2020 to FY2023 and two in FY2024, followed by none in FY2025, and the proposed FY2026 budget requested no additional FFG-62 procurement. Under the Navy’s desired restructuring, the third through sixth ships, not yet started, would be cancelled outright, while the first two hulls now under construction would remain under review.

Constellation was supposed to be the Navy’s corrective after Littoral Combat Ship compromises: a multimission small surface combatant able to conduct anti-air, anti-surface, anti-submarine, and electromagnetic warfare in both blue-water and littoral environments, operating independently or inside larger formations. The Navy’s official fact file anchors that intent in specific architecture choices, including the Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar, Baseline 10 Aegis Combat System, and an Mk 41 Vertical Launch System, with additional electronic warfare and information operations growth designed into the hull. Each ship was planned with 32 Mk 41 VLS cells, and internal Navy debates repeatedly explored expanding that capacity to 48 cells to offset the looming loss of cruiser vertical launch capacity. The design also envisioned separate deck-mounted launchers for 16 anti-ship cruise missiles and a 21-cell Rolling Airframe Missile launcher for close-in defense, a weapons mix intended to make the frigate tactically relevant even when destroyers and carriers are forced to operate more widely dispersed.

What broke the program was not the mission, but the pathway from a foreign parent design to a US-standard warship. The Navy’s FY2026 budget estimated the lead ship would deliver in April 2029, a 33-month delay from the July 2026 date presented in the FY2020 budget submission, and as of November 2025, the first ship was reportedly only about 12 percent complete. Oversight findings describe a chronic lack of design stability more than two years after starting lead-ship construction, with the Navy and shipbuilder still revising core design products such as general arrangement drawings while structural work proceeds, an approach that runs counter to established shipbuilding best practices. The weight problem is equally operational, not cosmetic: growth of roughly 759 metric tons from initial estimates, nearly a 13% increase, threatens long-term modernization margin and risks eroding combat capability over the ship’s expected service life.

That context makes the Secretary of the Navy’s justification read like a political and tactical indictment at once. John C. Phelan argued that Constellation no longer made sense to build because it approached 80% of the cost of a DDG-51 destroyer while delivering only about 60 percent of the capability. For operational commanders, the implication is stark: a delayed, overweight escort with uncertain growth margin is not the ship that reliably keeps pace with carrier strike groups, hunts submarines across contested chokepoints, or meaningfully contributes to missile defense in the Western Pacific. In that light, truncation is being presented as a readiness decision disguised as acquisition reform.

The replacement plan is intentionally simpler and faster. A Navy press release in December 2025 stated that FF(X) will be based on a proven National Security Cutter design, to launch the first hull by 2028, and then expand production using a lead-yard model followed by competitive construction at additional shipyards. The first ship would be sole-sourced initially, with competition introduced as quickly as feasible. The physical trade is straightforward: the cutter-derived design is substantially smaller, at roughly 4,500 tons full load compared to Constellation’s nearly 8,000-ton design, and correspondingly less heavily armed in its baseline configuration.

The operational logic, however, is not to replace a frigate with a cutter, but to buy time and coverage. Navy officials have pointed to 5th Fleet and 4th Fleet operating areas as examples where a lower-end ship could take on persistent presence and escort duties, freeing destroyers for higher-end missions. The near-term armament described for the first FF(X) configuration emphasizes self-defense and maritime security, including a 57 mm gun, two 30 mm guns, a Mk 49 Rolling Airframe Missile launcher, countermeasures, and a flight deck to operate helicopters and unmanned systems. A central design feature is a flexible weapons system built around containerized payloads, allowing mission packages such as counter-UAS systems or additional missiles to be added without redesigning the hull.

The containerized payload approach is where the Navy’s new frigate intersects most directly with joint-force fires and modular launcher concepts. The design includes space above the open boat deck specifically to host containerized mission packages, with the Army and Lockheed Martin’s Mk 70 Typhon launcher often cited as a representative 40-foot container system. The tactical upside is clear: a ship that can be rapidly reconfigured for counter-UAS defense, surface strike, or theater presence without committing early flights to an expensive permanent vertical launch system. Without an integrated VLS and organic area-defense missiles, early FF(X) ships may be constrained in how independently they can operate in higher-threat environments, reviving a core limitation that Constellation was meant to solve after the Littoral Combat Ship era.

The Navy’s answer to that tension is manned-unmanned teaming and distributed firepower. FF(X) is expected to act as a mothership for unmanned surface and air systems, extending sensors and weapons beyond the hull itself and complicating adversary targeting. At the same time, early renderings and concept discussions suggest space for deck-launched Naval Strike Missiles and containerized Mk 70 Payload Delivery System launchers derived from the Mk 41 family, potentially restoring some strike and air-defense flexibility without cutting a full VLS into the hull. Both approaches promise operational agility, but they also introduce development, integration, and command-and-control risks that remain unresolved.

Congress is now being asked to endorse this swap without yet seeing the level of formal analysis typically associated with major requirements changes. Lawmakers are weighing whether sufficient information exists on design features, procurement, and life-cycle costs, annual production rates, and the timeline to introduce competition. The industrial-base implications are just as significant. Continued work on the first two Constellation hulls is intended to sustain Fincantieri Marinette Marine in the near term, while FF(X) production would initially consolidate work at Ingalls before opening competition. How Congress balances speed, competition, and capability in this decision will shape not only the Navy’s future frigate force but the credibility of its broader shipbuilding strategy.

Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst.

Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.