U.S. and Canada Conduct Joint Arctic Naval Exercise to Strengthen North American Defense.

The United States and Canada are testing a faster Arctic kill chain near Russia, using Alaska-based F-35 fighters, E-3 Sentry airborne warning aircraft, and maritime forces to accelerate the detection, tracking, and engagement of threats approaching through the Bering Sea. During Operation TUNDRA MERLIN from September 18 to 22, 2026, the two countries are linking sensors and combat platforms roughly 100 nautical miles north of Dutch Harbor to reduce the time between initial contact and a coordinated response.

The exercise is focused on moving targeting data quickly across airborne, surface, and subsurface forces so commanders can build a common threat picture and assign weapons before an adversary can exploit distance or gaps in coverage. That capability is increasingly important for North American defense as the Arctic becomes a more active military operating area and places greater demands on long-range sensing, joint command, and rapid maritime engagement.

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U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Stratton prepares to depart Dutch Harbor, Alaska, on Sept. 17, 2026, ahead of Operation TUNDRA MERLIN, a U.S.-Canadian Bering Sea exercise integrating naval forces, maritime patrol aircraft, F-35 fighters, and E-3 airborne warning aircraft. (Picture source: U.S. Department of Defene/War)

The operation directly reflects a wider Pentagon and NORAD effort to strengthen North America’s northern defenses as the Arctic becomes a more important military approach to the continent. The Department of Defense’s Arctic strategy centers on a “monitor and respond” concept built around domain awareness, intelligence and surveillance, allied cooperation, and forces that can react once potentially threatening activity is detected. NORAD and U.S. Northern Command reinforced that direction in July 2026 by developing a binational framework for future Arctic military capabilities, while NORAD exercises increasingly emphasize the ability to detect, track, identify and respond to modern threats approaching North America.

The Bering Sea makes that requirement particularly important because Alaska faces the Russian Far East across one of the shortest strategic approaches between the two countries. The military challenge is therefore not simply maintaining ships or fighters in the Arctic, but shortening the chain from initial detection to identification, command decisions, targeting, and, if required, engagement. TUNDRA MERLIN addresses that problem by combining U.S. Coast Guard and Royal Canadian Navy surface and subsurface vessels, Royal Canadian Air Force maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, and U.S. Air Force F-35 fighters and E-3 airborne warning and control aircraft into a single multi-domain network.

Russia remains the more immediate conventional military factor in this part of the Arctic because it is an Arctic state with extensive northern territory, established bases, airfields, radar infrastructure, naval forces, and long-range aviation able to operate close to Alaska. Russian military aircraft also continue to operate periodically inside the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone while remaining in international airspace. China presents a different challenge: it has no Arctic coastline and a much smaller direct military footprint in the region, but the Pentagon assesses that Beijing is seeking greater Arctic access and operational experience while expanding cooperation with Moscow. The significance for U.S. planners is therefore not that Russian and Chinese Arctic capabilities are equivalent, but that established Russian military power could increasingly be accompanied by Chinese naval, aviation, coast guard and other activity.

Recent NORAD operations demonstrate why Alaska’s F-35 and E-3 forces matter to this defense architecture. On February 19, 2026, NORAD detected two Russian Tu-95 bombers, two Su-35 fighters and an A-50 airborne early-warning aircraft in the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone and responded with F-16s, F-35s, an E-3 and KC-135 tankers. On March 4, NORAD again launched F-35s, F-22s, an E-3, and U.S. and Canadian support aircraft after detecting two Russian Tu-142 maritime patrol aircraft in the Alaskan ADIZ. NORAD stressed in both cases that the Russian aircraft remained in international airspace and that it did not assess the activity as a threat, but the responses show the layered detection and interception system that TUNDRA MERLIN is intended to make faster and more integrated.

The first requirement is detection. North American defense depends on overlapping information from satellites, ground-based radars, airborne sensors, maritime patrol aircraft, and ships rather than a single surveillance system. NORAD describes its air-defense architecture as a layered network combining satellites, ground and airborne radars, and fighter aircraft, allowing military activity approaching Alaska to be discovered and monitored before commanders decide whether additional forces need to respond. Over the Bering Sea, where distances are immense and fixed surveillance infrastructure cannot provide every piece of information required, mobile airborne and maritime sensors become particularly important.

The second requirement is tracking and maintaining target custody. Detecting an aircraft or vessel once is insufficient if commanders lose its position, identity, or movement before an interception can be organized. Maritime patrol aircraft can search broad ocean areas and classify contacts, while surface and subsurface vessels can maintain closer surveillance of the maritime target. Combining their information with airborne radar and other sensors allows U.S. and Canadian commanders to construct a continuously updated operational picture rather than relying on isolated detections from individual aircraft or ships.

The E-3 Sentry is central to this phase because it serves as both an airborne surveillance aircraft and a battle-management node. Its radar can monitor a large volume of airspace while mission crews coordinate fighter activity and distribute the tactical picture to other forces. In an Alaska defense scenario, this lets an E-3 connect information from distant sensors with fighters positioned to intercept, reducing the time spent establishing a contact, deciding which aircraft should respond, and directing those fighters toward it. The aircraft’s presence in NORAD responses to Russian aviation in February and March 2026 shows that this command-and-control function already forms part of Alaska's operational defense.

The third requirement is positioning an aircraft capable of acting on that information. Alaska-based F-35s contribute advanced radar, electro-optical sensing, electronic warfare, and sensor fusion while retaining the ability to conduct air-to-air and air-to-surface engagements. Their operational importance therefore extends beyond serving as interceptors. An F-35 receiving information from an E-3 or another sensor can add its own observations to the tactical picture, improve target identification, and distribute information to other forces while moving into a position from which it could employ weapons if an engagement were authorized.

TUNDRA MERLIN extends that process from traditional air interception into the maritime domain. Its simulated maritime engagements test whether information collected by one aircraft, ship, or other sensor can become usable targeting data for a different U.S. or Canadian force. The critical measure is how quickly the network can progress from detecting a contact to establishing its location, maintaining custody, distributing a sufficiently accurate track and assigning an appropriate force to respond. In a real confrontation, delays at any point in that sequence could give a hostile aircraft, warship or submarine additional freedom to maneuver through the northern approaches.

Canadian participation is essential because the defense of North America cannot be divided cleanly at the Alaska-Canada boundary. NORAD already provides a binational framework for aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning, while U.S. Northern Command and Canadian forces must exchange information rapidly when threats move across enormous northern areas. Royal Canadian Air Force maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft can extend surveillance over remote waters, while Royal Canadian Navy surface and subsurface forces provide additional sensors and the ability to maintain contact with maritime activity.

The maritime element also increases the defensive network's persistence. Aircraft can cover large areas quickly but operate for limited periods, while ships can remain in strategically important waters and maintain surveillance longer. The U.S. Coast Guard and Royal Canadian Navy demonstrated that role earlier in September when USCGC Munro and HMCS Max Bernays conducted a September 8-9 combined sail through the Bering Sea under TUNDRA MERLIN. U.S. Northern Command described the activity as part of the effort to sustain maritime presence, improve domain awareness and integrate U.S. and Canadian capabilities across North America’s Arctic approaches.

The wider strategic objective is to prevent geography from becoming an advantage for an adversary. Alaska contains fighter bases, missile-warning and surveillance infrastructure and other military installations critical to homeland defense, while its location also connects the continental United States with forces operating across the northern Pacific. Vast distances, difficult weather, and limited infrastructure complicate the movement of aircraft, ships, and information, meaning an adversary that exploits gaps in surveillance or command and control could reduce the warning available to U.S. and Canadian forces.

That is why Pentagon Arctic policy increasingly places domain awareness at the beginning of the defense problem. Russia already possesses the infrastructure and military forces necessary to generate activity around Alaska, while China is gradually increasing its experience and cooperation with Russia in the broader Arctic. The Pentagon has specifically cited growing Russian-Chinese military cooperation and joint activity near Alaska as factors changing the regional security environment, while distinguishing China’s expanding ambitions from Russia’s much more established physical and military presence in the High North.

Operation TUNDRA MERLIN therefore matters less as an isolated Arctic exercise than as a test of whether North America can compress the time required to find and engage a threat approaching Alaska. The military objective is to connect satellites, radars, reconnaissance aircraft, ships, E-3 battle management, and F-35 fighters closely enough that detection becomes a continuous track, the track becomes actionable targeting information, and that information reaches the force best positioned to respond.

For the United States and Canada, a faster Arctic kill chain strengthens deterrence by reducing the opportunity for an adversary to exploit the Bering approaches undetected or force commanders to assemble a response only after a threat has moved closer to North America. With Russia maintaining significant military capability directly across the Arctic approaches and China expanding its involvement alongside Moscow, the effectiveness of Alaska’s defense increasingly depends not simply on how many fighters, radars, or ships are available, but on how rapidly those separate capabilities can operate as one integrated detection, tracking, and engagement network.

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Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.