Iran Conducts Live-Fire Naval Drills in Strait of Hormuz Amid U.S. Carrier Deployment.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has announced a two-day live-fire naval exercise in the Strait of Hormuz beginning Saturday, January 31, according to Iranian state media. The drills coincide with expanded US naval deployments, sharpening the risk profile of one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints.

Iranian state television reported on January 29, 2025, that naval units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will conduct live-ammunition exercises in the Strait of Hormuz over two days, issuing navigational warnings to commercial shipping transiting the area. The announcement comes as the United States increases its military footprint in the Middle East, including the arrival of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and the rollout of parallel US-led exercises, turning the narrow waterway into a visible barometer of escalating regional tensions.
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Iran’s IRGC plans live-fire naval drills in the Strait of Hormuz as US forces expand their Middle East presence. (Picture source: Iran News agency)

The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the most sensitive chokepoints in the global energy system. Around 20% of seaborne oil shipments transit through this passage, meaning any military activity can translate into immediate strategic and economic volatility. Tehran leverages this geography as a deterrence and influence tool: in a narrow maritime corridor, tactical pressure can quickly generate economic costs even without open conflict. Iran’s announcement of “naval shootings” on two consecutive days, Saturday and Sunday, fits this approach, as it forces shipping companies to reassess routes, timelines, and insurance premiums.

Iran’s move comes only two days after the United States announced its own military drills in the region. According to Air Forces Central, the air component of US Central Command (CENTCOM), the exercises are intended to demonstrate the ability to “deploy, disperse and sustain combat airpower across the US Central Command area of responsibility.” The messaging suggests Washington is not only seeking to reassure regional partners but also signalling that it has the logistical depth and operational flexibility to sustain a prolonged crisis.

At the same time, CENTCOM issued a warning to Iranian forces, stating it would not tolerate what it described as “unsafe” manoeuvres, including low-altitude flights over US warships and Iranian speedboats approaching US vessels on potential collision courses. In a congested maritime environment, combining military units, heightened communications pressure, and short engagement timelines increases the likelihood of an incident, sometimes more than that of a deliberate attack.

The local naval balance reflects two different approaches. On the Iranian side, the IRGC Navy is structured for asymmetric pressure and saturation, relying on large numbers of light, fast platforms that are difficult to distinguish amid dense maritime traffic. The IRGC fields more than 20,000 naval personnel, including around 5,000 marines, and operates a substantial number of patrol boats with full-load displacement below 10 tonnes, including Boghammar-class vessels, as well as small Bavar-class wing-in-ground effect craft. This concentration of small platforms supports swarming tactics aimed at multiplying contacts, creating operational stress, and forcing an opponent to disperse protection assets.

Iran maintains a large inventory of patrol and coastal combatants within the IRGC, with 131 units in this category. Among the most prominent platforms are three Shahid Soleimani-class missile patrol craft, armed with Ghader anti-ship missiles and C-704 Nasr anti-ship missiles, and fitted with vertical launch system (VLS) cells that may accommodate surface-to-air missiles. The IRGC also operates Thondor (Houdong) fast attack craft armed with C-802A Ghader anti-ship missiles and AK-230 close-in weapon systems. In a crisis scenario, these assets can be used for rapid demonstrations, aggressive approaches, or limited standoff fires while remaining covered by coastal systems.

Iran’s posture also relies on coastal defence batteries equipped with C-701 Kosar, C-704 Nasr, C-802 Noor, C-802A Ghader, and the older HY-2 (Seersucker) anti-ship missiles, still referenced in some inventories. Combined with coastal sensors, this missile mix is intended to cover much of the Strait, where the channel narrows to about 21 nautical miles at its tightest point. Conducting live-fire activity in this environment allows Tehran to demonstrate that it can activate, at least locally, a multi-axis threat posture.

Iran retains a discreet but strategically relevant capability: naval mine warfare. Available inventories indicate limited mine countermeasure assets, reinforcing the utility of mines as a low-cost disruption tool. Even a credible indication of mining activity can impose lengthy and politically visible countermeasure operations and produce immediate effects on maritime traffic.

On the US side, the buildup relies on carrier-based airpower and joint command integration. The carrier strike group centred on USS Abraham Lincoln provides sustained strike capacity and air superiority potential, with a large embarked fighter component and nearly 5,000 sailors based on typical carrier manning levels. The US deployment also includes land-based combat aviation, with the arrival of an F-15E Strike Eagle squadron, a platform suited for long-range strike, interdiction, and precision missions. The posture is reinforced by guided-missile destroyers, including USS Delbert D. Black, contributing to theatre air and missile defence, maritime control, and cruise missile strike capacity.

In this context, Iran’s live-fire drills in the Strait of Hormuz form part of a trajectory of increasing tensions in which the prospect of a US strike becomes more credible. The reinforcement of American assets in the region and the announcement of air exercises strengthen a coercive posture, while Tehran reiterates its ability to disrupt a passage vital to the global economy. The space for de-escalation narrows, and the principal risk becomes a rapid chain of events leading to military response.