Egypt seeks more production rights before acquiring Barracuda submarines from France.

Egypt remains in negotiations with France over a potential acquisition of Barracuda-derived submarines, with talks focused on expanded production rights. No contract has been signed to date as Cairo seeks deeper involvement in construction and long term program ownership.

According to Tactical Report on December 31, 2025, Egypt is seeking expanded production rights as part of negotiations with France to acquire Barracuda-class submarines, a condition that has delayed contract signature. The proposed package, expected to include four conventionally-powered submarines valued between €4.5 to €6.0 billion, would replace four aging Romeo-class submarines while avoiding a near term capability gap.
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The Barracuda could replace four aging Romeo-class submarines in the Egyptian Navy, while complementing the four Type 209 submarines delivered between 2016 and 2021, without creating a near-term capability gap. (Picture source: French Navy)

Egypt remains in negotiations with France over the potential acquisition of Barracuda submarines, and, according to available information, discussions seem to center on a program likely involving four conventionally powered submarines, with the first submarine’s entry into service expected between 2032 and 2035. Based on comparable Barracuda-derived programs in Europe, the acquisition cost for such a package would likely fall in the range of €4.5 to €6.0 billion, depending on configuration, weapons integration, infrastructure, and the extent of industrial participation. The talks have not progressed to contract signature because Egypt is reportedly seeking conditions that go beyond a short-term procurement, including local manufacturing rights and future export options.

From Egypt’s perspective, the Barracuda could replace four aging Romeo-class submarines while complementing the four Type 209 submarines delivered between 2016 and 2021, without creating a near-term capability gap. One of the main elements slowing progress is apparently Egypt’s demand for the right to locally manufacture derivatives of the Barracuda-class, a requirement that significantly alters the structure of the deal. Cairo is not seeking a limited final assembly role, but rather an arrangement that would allow its domestic shipyards to progressively assume responsibility for hull construction, integration, and long-term support, comparable to previous naval programs where technology transfer and local construction were central conditions.

This requirement introduces complexity because submarine construction involves tightly controlled processes, long supplier chains, and sensitive systems that are not easily transferred in full. As a result, a significant portion of the negotiations has focused on defining the scope of local manufacturing, the division of responsibilities between French and Egyptian industry, and the long-term sustainability of such an arrangement. A second major point under discussion is Egypt’s request to obtain re-export rights for locally manufactured Barracuda derivatives, which would allow Cairo to offer adapted versions to third countries in the future.

For France, this raises questions related to industrial risk-sharing, protection of sensitive technologies, and long-term oversight of production standards, making the industrial chapter one of the most complex elements of the negotiations. This objective also implies strategic and commercial implications to the talks, since it affects how production rights, configuration control, and export approvals would be managed over decades. Granting re-export rights would require clear limitations on which variants could be sold, which systems would remain restricted, and how France would retain oversight over downstream exports. To date, these questions remain unresolved and are directly linked to the industrial framework being negotiated, contributing to the absence of a finalized agreement.

Although no official figures have been disclosed for a potential Egyptian order, available reference points from other Barracuda-related programs indicate that such a project would likely involve several billion euros in total program value. European Barracuda-derived contracts, depending on scope and industrial participation, have reached figures in the range of €5 billion to €6 billion for four submarines, excluding long-term support and infrastructure. If Egypt were to pursue local manufacturing, initial costs could be higher due to investments in facilities, tooling, workforce training, and quality-control processes, all of which would add cost and time during the early phases of the program. Delivery schedules, assuming a contract were signed, would likely extend over more than a decade, with the first submarine entering service between 2032 and 2035, with subsequent units delivered at intervals of 18 to 24 months, depending on production capacity and local ramp-up.

The Barracuda submarine program was launched in the late 1990s, when France launched the replacement process for its Rubis-class nuclear attack submarines, whose service life was approaching structural and operational limits. The program was formally initiated in 1998, with industrial responsibility assigned to Naval Group for overall design and construction, and TechnicAtome for nuclear propulsion. In December 2006, France placed the initial order covering the development and construction of six submarines, later designated as the Suffren class, with the first hull laid down in the late 2000s. Budgetary constraints and technical complexity pushed the original entry-into-service schedule back by more than a decade, with the lead boat delivered in 2020 and operational service beginning in 2022.

Parallel to the domestic program, the Barracuda design was progressively adapted during the 2010s into conventionally-powered export variants, allowing the same core architecture to support non-nuclear configurations for foreign customers. In French service, the program took shape as the Suffren-class submarine, with the delivery schedule revised forward by approximately one year compared with earlier planning. The lead boat, Suffren, entered active service in 2022, followed by the Duguay-Trouin in August 2023 and the Tourville in November 2024, while the De Grasse is scheduled to begin sea trials in early 2026. The remaining two submarines, Rubis and Casabianca, are now expected to reach operational status by 2029, instead of the previously planned 2030, as the final submarines are expected to require roughly seven years to build, compared with thirteen years for the lead boat.

The Suffren-class displaces approximately 4,650 tonnes surfaced and about 5,300 tonnes submerged, with an overall length of 99.5 meters and a beam of 8.8 meters. Propulsion is provided by a K15 pressurized-water nuclear reactor driving a pump-jet system, allowing submerged speeds in excess of 25 knots. Armament is centered on four 533 mm torpedo tubes with a total capacity of up to 24 weapons, including F21 heavyweight torpedoes, SM39 Exocet anti-ship missiles, and MdCN naval cruise missiles capable of land-attack missions at ranges of around 1,000 kilometers.

The Barracuda submarines are also designed to deploy special forces via a dry deck shelter and to conduct intelligence, escort, and strike missions across extended patrol durations of roughly 70 days. For export customers, the Barracuda design has already been adapted in different ways, illustrating both its flexibility and the industrial commitments it entails. A conventionally powered derivative was selected by Australia in 2016 for a twelve Attack-class submarine program, canceled in 2021 for strategic reasons unrelated to technical performance. More recently, a Barracuda-derived design was chosen by the Netherlands to replace the Walrus-class submarines, resulting in a four-boat program with construction centered in France and structured industrial cooperation with Dutch industry.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.