China Deploys Wing Loong II Drones for Coast Guard Patrols Around Taiwan.

China's confirmation of the Wing Loong II drone's operational deployment with its Coast Guard marks a critical escalation in its strategy to project state power in contested waters, particularly around Taiwan. This move signals Beijing’s intent to deploy advanced surveillance platforms as a central component of its maritime posture in paramilitary operations.

The Chinese Coast Guard has officially begun flying Wing Loong II, also known as WL-2, unmanned aerial systems as part of routine maritime patrol operations. This marks the first public acknowledgment of such deployments. The disclosure, shared by the Defense Innovation Review X account on January 27, 2026, follows the drones’ visible use during the “Justice Mission 2025” exercises in December 2025. These exercises took place in waters surrounding Taiwan and involved multiple Chinese security and military elements.
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A Wing Loong II unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) on static display at AirShow China 2018 in Zhuhai, showing the MALE drone’s sensor configuration and six external hardpoints. Originally developed by AVIC for military applications, the Wing Loong II is now in operational service with the Chinese Coast Guard for long-endurance maritime surveillance missions. (Picture source: Army Recognition Group)

Originally developed by the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), the Wing Loong II is a medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) designed to perform intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions and precision strikes. A step forward from its predecessor, the Wing Loong I, the WL-2 introduces increased flight endurance, payload capacity, and multi-sensor versatility. Technically, the UAV can operate at altitudes up to 9,000 m (29,500 ft), with a top speed of 370 km/h (230 mph), and maintain continuous flight for more than 32 hours depending on mission configuration. The platform can carry a total payload of 400 kg (882 lb) distributed across six external hardpoints.

The standard payload of the WL-2 includes electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors, synthetic aperture radar (SAR), and real-time datalink systems. These tools allow the drone to conduct long-range maritime surveillance even under adverse weather or low-visibility conditions. Although it is equipped with integrated strike capability, the Chinese Coast Guard’s configuration has not been confirmed to be armed. The airframe and architecture are fully compatible with Chinese munitions, including AR-1 laser-guided missiles, Blue Arrow 7 anti-tank weapons, and the FT-series of precision-guided bombs. This raises concerns over its dual-use adaptability.

The appearance of the WL-2 in the Taiwan Strait under the auspices of a law enforcement body marks a sharp departure from conventional coast guard practices. The Chinese Coast Guard, once limited to patrol vessels, manned aircraft, and small UAVs, now uses a high-altitude, long-endurance platform that rivals military UAVs such as the U.S. MQ-9 Reaper. This shift strengthens China’s ability to assert claims and monitor activity in real time, reinforcing its strategic posture. During “Justice Mission 2025,” the WL-2 conducted coordinated ISR flights with Hai Jing patrol ships and Y-8 maritime patrol aircraft, forming an integrated sensor and command network over contested waters.

This deployment reflects a broader shift in Chinese maritime doctrine under the framework of civil-military fusion (CMF), in which civilian or paramilitary institutions adopt advanced military technologies to project state authority without overt escalation. The use of the WL-2 under a coast guard banner allows the Chinese state to maintain a persistent presence and real-time situational awareness over strategic maritime zones, particularly the Taiwan Strait, Bashi Channel, and Luzon Strait.

The drone’s maximum operational range of over 4,000 km (2,485 mi) provides unprecedented surveillance depth for a coast guard entity. In conjunction with satellite communication and shore-based command centers, these drones can track foreign naval and commercial vessels across international waters. This gives Beijing a strategic ISR reach beyond the first island chain. Recent satellite imagery confirms the expansion of drone hangar and launch facilities on Hainan Island. This strongly indicates a long-term commitment to unmanned operations under Coast Guard command.

Furthermore, the use of advanced sensor systems on the WL-2 enhances China’s ability to conduct electronic reconnaissance, real-time geolocation of surface vessels, and multi-domain command and control. Synthetic aperture radar enables high-resolution sea surface mapping regardless of cloud cover, while EO/IR systems provide continuous visual confirmation of targets. These capabilities, embedded within a paramilitary maritime force, significantly elevate the Chinese Coast Guard’s situational awareness and operational tempo in disputed regions.

Although the Chinese government continues to describe these drone missions as maritime policing, their integration into exercises that simulate joint operations around Taiwan indicates deeper strategic intent. The use of WL-2 for such missions helps to normalize a strong, technologically advanced presence in contested areas, shifting the status quo and blurring the distinction between law enforcement and military operations. This approach allows China to assert sovereignty and incrementally increase influence while reducing direct military confrontation and keeping escalation at a manageable level.

The Chinese Coast Guard’s shift from law enforcement to drone-enabled ISR marks a central reconfiguration of maritime power. With the WL-2, Beijing now drives its push for air-sea dominance in the Western Pacific by enabling integrated surveillance, operational challenges for rivals, and more assertive control.

China’s move to arm its Coast Guard with Wing Loong II UAVs sets a new international standard for merging civilian authority with military-grade technology. This approach represents China’s broader aim to exert control in East Asian waters by normalizing the use of dual-use paramilitary platforms as tools of state strategy.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.