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UK's Babcock And Estonia’s Frankenburg Partner On New Maritime Counter-Drone Air Defense System.
Babcock International Group has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Frankenburg Technologies to explore a new, low-cost maritime counter-drone air defence system, according to information published on January 7, 2026. The effort aims to deliver scalable, kinetic protection against one-way attack drones for deployed forces and critical infrastructure across Europe.
Information published by the Babcock International Group, on January 7, 2026, states that the British defense company signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Frankenburg Technologies to explore a “new and affordable” maritime counter-drone air defence system in response to the rise of one-way attack drones. Babcock says the core deliverable under the MoU is a cost-effective, containerised platform for launching Frankenburg’s new low-cost missiles, which the Estonian startup is manufacturing at pace specifically to defend against one-way attack drones. The companies frame the objective as more affordable, scalable, kinetic protection for deployed forces and critical national infrastructure sites that could be exposed to attack across Europe, with engineering led from the UK to support a sovereign capability and export potential.
The image is illustrative, showing Frankenburg’s Mark 1 missile and launcher mounted on a tripod
photographed at DSEI 2025 and MSPO 2025, highlighting the type of low-cost counter-drone capability referenced in the Babcock–Frankenburg cooperation (Picture Source: ARMY RECOGNITION GROUP)
What makes this announcement more than another MoU headline is the operational problem it is trying to solve: the sea is becoming an amplifier for cheap drones. In coastal waters, radar horizon and sea clutter shorten warning times, while dense topside structures complicate firing arcs and safe engagement envelopes. A defender can detect a low flyer only when it crests the horizon, then must classify it quickly, decide whether it is a decoy, a loitering munition, or a one-way attack drone carrying a warhead, and engage before it disappears into the ship’s own mast-and-sensor clutter. That timeline collapses further when the attacker uses multi-axis routing, staggered arrivals, and mixed profiles to force the combat system into a triage fight, not a marksmanship contest.
The drone set that has driven European militaries into this corner is wider than the public shorthand suggests. At the low end are FPV-style multicopters and small quadcopters that can be piloted into a ship’s exposed sensors, flight deck equipment, or close-in weapon mounts, often at very low altitude where background clutter is worst. Above that sit fixed-wing, propeller-driven one-way attack drones that follow pre-programmed routes using inertial navigation backed by satellite guidance, sometimes “snaking” along coastlines to complicate detection and to exploit civilian maritime traffic as visual and radar masking. At the higher end are long-range loitering munitions and cruise-missile-like UAVs that can carry heavier payloads, approach from the sea or land, and pressure defenders into using missiles that cost vastly more than the incoming threat. The tactical pattern is consistent even as airframes differ: drain the defender’s magazine, compress their decision time, and force expensive shots.
This is where Babcock’s containerised launcher concept matters. A container is not just a packaging choice, it is a logistics and integration strategy. It implies a launch module that can be craned aboard different hull classes, moved between ships, or placed ashore to defend ports, shipyards, fuel farms, radar sites, and ammunition storage areas without waiting for a bespoke ship redesign. In wartime terms, it promises a way to add magazine depth quickly, turning air defense from a scarce “golden round” problem into a sustainable “enough shots for day 30” posture. Babcock is explicit that the end state is affordability and scalability as much as capability, and the company’s language signals a deliberate attempt to change the cost-exchange equation that drones have weaponized.
The missile that would populate that launcher is described by Frankenburg as the Mark 1, and it is being marketed as the world’s smallest guided missile, roughly 60 centimeters long. The design approach, as the company has characterized it, favors mass manufacture and speed-to-field: a solid-fuel rocket motor, commercially available components, and a development tempo that aims to move from prototype to live-fire at a pace that traditional missile programs rarely attempt. The company has also publicly framed its ambition in blunt industrial terms, aiming for missiles that are an order of magnitude cheaper and dramatically faster to produce than conventional options, with Estonia selecting it for participation in a national Defense Industry Park and a stated first-phase goal measured in triple-digit missiles per day.
The most consequential claim around Mark 1 is not its size, but its proof point. Frankenburg has said it achieved a “full kill-chain hard-kill intercept” against a fast-moving aerial target at Ādaži NATO base in Latvia, a milestone that matters because counter-drone marketing often leans on partial demonstrations that do not include the complete detection-to-engagement sequence. If a small, low-cost interceptor can repeatedly complete that chain under realistic clutter and time pressure, it becomes a viable layer in a broader maritime stack that still includes soft-kill electronic warfare, decoys, and guns. In other words, it is not meant to replace high-end naval air-defense missiles, it is meant to stop navies from burning them on targets that were built to be expendable.
Babcock’s value-add, and the reason this partnership is being positioned as maritime-first, is integration. Container launchers live or die on how quickly they can accept target cueing and how cleanly they can fit into ship routines. A credible shipborne counter-drone missile layer needs rapid handoff from radar and electro-optical sensors, stable fire-control solutions against low, slow targets that can jink, and engagement authority that can be executed fast without creating hazards for the ship’s own masts, antennas, and embarked aircraft. At the pier or ashore, the same launcher has to be safe around civilian infrastructure and friendly traffic while still responding in seconds. Babcock’s statement leans into that reality, describing its role in marrying rapid innovation with proven naval and industrial expertise to accelerate an operational maritime capability.
The strategic subtext is European and it is industrial. By placing engineering leadership in the UK and stressing sovereign capability and skilled employment, Babcock is aligning this program with the post-2022 procurement mood: build within Europe, build in volume, and build in a way that can survive attrition and supply-chain shocks. If the container launcher matures into a tested, modular product, it could appeal not only to frontline combatants, but also to the auxiliaries, patrol vessels, and high-value support ships that are increasingly exposed to asymmetric drone threats yet rarely carry deep missile magazines.
What comes next will show whether this becomes a deployable capability or stays a concept. The key tests are straightforward: how many ready rounds the container carries, how fast it can be reloaded in austere ports, and how cleanly it can take sensor cueing in cluttered littorals where drones appear late and reaction time is measured in seconds. If Babcock and Frankenburg can prove safe shipboard integration, reliable hard-kill performance, and a resupply chain that can keep up with wave attacks, the container-launcher model could give navies and coastal sites affordable missile mass without redesigning their platforms.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.