Trump approves U.S. Navy Golden Fleet plan as Chinese Navy grows stronger.

The Trump administration has approved the Navy’s Golden Fleet plan, a shipbuilding direction that preserves current programs while increasing the number and mix of crewed and unmanned ships

As reported by Axios on December 7, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump has approved a Navy shipbuilding framework known as the “Golden Fleet,” according to remarks by Navy Secretary John Phelan. The concept preserves existing carrier, submarine, destroyer, and amphibious programs while prioritizing additional surface combatants, auxiliaries, and unmanned vessels, as China continues to expand its naval forces. It was discussed following a White House meeting with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and OMB Director Russell Vought.
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This shipbuilding push is presented against a yardstick in which U.S. shipbuilders produce less than 1% of China’s annual output by tonnage, a gap the administration is seeking to narrow through higher activity, new entrants, and accelerated programs. (Picture source: US Navy)

U.S. President Donald Trump has approved what U.S. Navy Secretary John Phelan has described as the “Golden Fleet,” a broad shipbuilding direction intended to preserve ongoing naval programs while adding new surface combatants, auxiliaries, and unmanned vessels to expand future operational options. The concept was outlined following a White House meeting involving Trump, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) director Russell Vought, and was later discussed by Phelan at the Reagan National Defense Forum in California. While the name echoes the administration’s “Golden Dome” missile defense branding, the Golden Fleet does not refer to a numbered or formally constituted fleet, but rather to a package of priorities covering crewed warships, logistics vessels, and unmanned platforms.

According to Phelan’s description, the Golden Fleet begins with maintaining the production of the Navy’s existing “cornerstone” platforms, including aircraft carriers, destroyers, amphibious ships, and submarines, which are treated as non-negotiable elements of force structure. At the same time, he has argued that this baseline alone is insufficient, and that additional “new” and “modern” ships are required to broaden available options in future conflicts. Within this framework, unmanned systems are positioned as a significant contributor rather than a marginal add-on, with the intent of increasing numbers and flexibility without relying exclusively on high-value manned hulls. Phelan has also linked this approach to the need to widen the shipbuilding ecosystem by involving non-traditional partners, particularly for unmanned vessels that could be designed and built more rapidly. The strategic logic behind emphasizes scale, production tempo, and adaptability rather than focusing only on individual platform sophistication.

A key element highlighted within the Golden Fleet is the pursuit of a new U.S.-designed frigate, possibly based on a Coast Guard cutter, following the termination of future contracts for the Constellation-class before Thanksgiving. The Constellation-class frigate was based on a design adopted by the French and Italian navies, and the decision to halt its expansion has opened space for an alternative approach. Phelan has stated that the Navy is seeking a frigate design that can be built on a faster timeline than the canceled trajectory, while offering flexible capability tailored to evolving requirements. The objective is not presented as eliminating the frigate role, but as redefining it in a way that better aligns with U.S. industrial realities and operational needs. In this framing, a new frigate would add surface combatant capacity at lower cost and higher production rates than larger ships, supporting escort, patrol, and sea-control missions alongside existing destroyers.

The Golden Fleet concept also places significant emphasis on auxiliary ships, which Phelan has described as a generational investment priority. Tankers, oilers, and logistics vessels are treated as essential enablers for sustained global operations, particularly as the Navy anticipates more dispersed forces operating over longer distances. These ships are presented not only as operational necessities but also as a means of generating steady industrial output that can stabilize shipyard workloads. In parallel, unmanned surface vessels are highlighted as a major growth area, with Phelan noting that “quite a bit” of the Golden Fleet’s added mass should come from unmanned technology. He referenced a $392 million deal involving Saronic, a vertically integrated drone-boat manufacturer linked to a shipyard in Louisiana, as an example of how new industrial players could contribute. The underlying premise is that auxiliaries and unmanned vessels together can increase fleet resilience and logistical depth while easing some pressure on traditional combatant production lines.

Another concept associated with the Golden Fleet is what Phelan has referred to as the “Big Beautiful Ship,” a large surface combatant discussed internally in the context of a displacement range of roughly 15,000 to 20,000 tonnes, approximately double that of an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. The rationale for such a ship centers on volume and payload rather than speed or stealth alone, particularly to accommodate longer-range weapons that require larger launch cells. In this context, the Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic missile system is cited as a driver, as its size exceeds that of missiles typically housed in current vertical launch systems. The envisioned operational model does not rely on the large ship acting alone, but on its integration with unmanned vessels that could accompany it and add distributed firepower. This approach reflects an emphasis on manned-unmanned teaming, with the large combatant serving as a command, sensing, and strike node within a broader surface group.

Industrial constraints are repeatedly identified as the limiting factor for the Golden Fleet’s ambitions, given the current state of U.S. shipbuilding. As of December 2025, thirty-seven of forty-five battle-force ships under construction were reported to be facing delays, underscoring systemic schedule challenges across programs. Additional pressure is illustrated by the Coast Guard’s Offshore Patrol Cutter, which is described as both over budget and nearly seven years late, highlighting broader acquisition and production difficulties. The Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program is also noted as running 17 months behind schedule, with its financial weight posing a significant constraint on overall naval procurement. Twelve Columbia-class submarines are estimated to cost $123 billion, requiring about $8.6 billion per year through 2036 and consuming roughly 29% of planned annual shipbuilding funding during that period. Alongside these pressures, the Navy has introduced “ShipOS” with Palantir to accelerate construction and sustainment processes, while recent operational demands such as extended air-defense missions at sea and exposure to proliferating anti-ship threats reinforce the urgency behind expanding and diversifying the fleet.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.