Taiwan to Deploy U.S. Harpoon Missile Batteries in 2026 to Deter Chinese Invasion.

Taiwan’s Navy says the first shipment of U.S.-supplied Harpoon Coastal Defense Systems will arrive around the turn of the year to give the new Littoral Combatant Command initial capability. The sale stems from a 2020 package of up to 100 launchers and 400 RGM-84L-4 Harpoon Block II missiles, a move that materially strengthens Taiwan’s ability to hold amphibious forces at risk in the strait.

Focus Taiwan (English version of the Central News Agency) displayed on October 20, 2025, that the Republic of China Navy confirmed its first shipment of U.S.-supplied Harpoon Coastal Defense Systems will arrive around the New Year, so as to give Taiwan’s planned Littoral Combatant Command the initial capability it needs at launch on January 1, 2026. Lawmakers were told five mobile launcher trucks and a radar vehicle are already in country for integration and training, underscoring that delivery is about to be settled. This delivery will strengthen the Taiwanese missile stockpiles, aimed at deterring a possible Chinese invasion in the coming years. U.S. defense companies remain the main suppliers of the Taiwanese defense forces.
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Harpoon Block II coastal strike missile is a sea-skimming flight, active radar terminal seeker, ~220 kg warhead and 120–140 km range; fitted to mobile launchers for dispersed sea denial (Picture source: U.S. DoW).

The package traces to a 2020 U.S. approval covering up to 100 mobile coastal launchers and as many as 400 RGM-84L-4 Harpoon Block II surface-launched missiles. Those export-grade rounds retain the classic Harpoon traits that matter in a crowded strait: low-level sea-skimming flight, an active radar seeker in the terminal phase, and a warhead in the roughly 220-kilogram class designed to neutralize ships. Range figures vary in open sources, but Block II’s unclassified reach sits near 120 to 140 kilometers, sufficient to hold amphibious groups at risk well before they close Taiwan’s beaches.

The Block II fuses an INS with GPS updates derived from SLAM-ER, giving the missile better route control and shoreline discrimination in cluttered littorals. The RGM-84’s Teledyne turbojet and solid-propellant booster push a high-subsonic profile; mission planners can command sea-skim or pop-up terminal modes to complicate shipboard defenses. The design’s autonomy and over-the-horizon reach make it equally suitable for coastal land-strike tasks against exposed port infrastructure or staging areas, a flexibility Boeing has long emphasized.

On land, the Harpoon Coastal Defense System turns those kinematics into persistent sea denial. Tractor-trailer canister launchers paired with a dedicated radar truck and off-board sensors form dispersed firing units that can shoot and scoot on Taiwan’s road network, establish overlapping kill zones along likely assault corridors, and cue against targets detected by maritime patrol aircraft, UAVs, or coastal surveillance radars. For a commander in the new Littoral Combatant Command, that means the ability to mass effects without massing vehicles, preserving combat power under PLA missile pressure and keeping launchers mobile between salvos.

Taipei’s Littoral Combatant Command is being built expressly to fight inside the 24-nautical-mile belt that frames the island’s territorial waters. Integrating Harpoon batteries with existing Hai Feng shore-based missile units and fast-attack craft gives the command a layered, attritional playbook: fix amphibious shipping in strait choke points, force PLAN escorts to screen wide, and then cut the connectors with salvos from concealed coastal sites. The command’s mission set aligns with what Taiwan’s parliament heard this week, signaling an institutional pivot toward sea denial over sea control.

For Taiwan’s wider defense, Harpoon is a deterrent that translates directly into operational dilemmas for Beijing. Amphibious lift is finite; losing even a handful of LSTs or roll-on/roll-off vessels early can unravel a landing timetable and strand follow-on echelons. The ability to engage at standoff distances complicates PLA mine-clearing and escort geometry, while mobile launchers force the PLAN and Rocket Force to burn reconnaissance and strike capacity chasing decoys and relocatable targets ashore. When paired with indigenous Hsiung Feng II/III missiles and new U.S. systems showcased in this year’s Han Kuang exercises, the Harpoon buy meaningfully sharpens Taiwan’s coastal anti-ship magazine.

Daily PLA air and naval pressure continues around the island, and Taiwan’s defense budget politics remain contentious, but the Harpoon timeline suggests hard capability is still moving forward. The coming months will show whether deliveries keep pace with the Littoral Combatant Command’s stand-up, yet even initial operating capacity changes the strategic calculus in the strait by making any cross-strait assault costlier on day one.

Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group.

Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.