Russia sends warship for the first time to escort sanctioned shadow fleet through English Channel.

As reported by The Insider on June 22, 2025, Russia has, for the first time, conducted a documented escort of sanctioned tankers belonging to its shadow fleet using a naval warship while transiting through the English Channel. According to maritime analyst Mark Douglas from Starboard Maritime Intelligence Ltd, AIS data from June 16, 2025, showed coordinated movement between the Steregushchiy-class corvette Boikiy and two tankers under sanctions: the Selva (also known as Nostos or Naxos), which is sanctioned by the UK, and the Sierra (Suvorovsky Prospekt), sanctioned by both the UK and the EU. The convoy headed toward Russian ports, reportedly to load oil. The Selva initially transmitted as a Panamanian vessel but was later confirmed to be operating under the flag of Palau, based on updated S&P data.
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The Boikiy corvette has previously shadowed NATO warships, taken part in major Baltic Fleet exercises, and participated in the Mediterranean “Syrian Express” logistics route supporting Russian forces in Syria. (Picture source: AirBase.ru/evgeniy 5110)

This operation follows increased pressure on Russia’s maritime logistics due to European inspections and EU enforcement of the oil price cap. Finland’s Defense Minister Antti Häkkänen described such armed naval escorts as unprecedented. Estonia also noted increased Russian patrols in the Gulf of Finland. Starboard Maritime and OSINT communities tracking the ships, including observers on Bluesky, interpreted this incident as a signal of Moscow’s willingness to use military force to protect tankers involved in sanction evasion, testing how Western states will respond to this new development. In this case, the Kremlin appears to have deliberately shifted from covert maritime logistics to overt military protection of sanctioned commerce, with this Channel passage testing Western resolve in sanction enforcement.

Russia’s shadow fleet, also referred to as a dark or grey fleet, consists of vessels used to circumvent international sanctions, particularly oil-related ones imposed following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. This fleet is estimated to number between 600 and 1,400 vessels, depending on the methodology used by different maritime intelligence sources. The majority of these tankers are 15 to 20 years old or older, operating well beyond typical scrapping age, and were purchased from Western companies since late 2022 using funds estimated to total approximately $10 billion. The ownership of these vessels is often concealed behind shell companies registered in jurisdictions such as the Seychelles, Marshall Islands, India, and the United Arab Emirates. The fleet relies on a combination of tactics, including disabling AIS trackers, broadcasting false location data, and frequently switching flags to avoid detection. Common flag states include Palau, Panama, Liberia, Gabon, and the Cook Islands. These vessels also tend to rely on insurance from providers not aligned with Western regulatory regimes or operate without valid insurance at all, making them difficult to regulate and high-risk for accidents.

The purpose of this fleet is to maintain the continuity of Russia’s oil exports by bypassing the G7-imposed $60-per-barrel price cap and associated insurance restrictions. Since the implementation of these restrictions, Russia has continued to export oil, mainly to buyers in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The shadow fleet supports this by enabling ship-to-ship transfers that obscure the cargo's origin and destination. Companies like Gatik Ship Management of India and entities such as 2Rivers or Coral, linked to Tahir Garayev, have reportedly controlled dozens to over a hundred ships involved in these operations. Sanctioned vessels have been linked to safety violations and environmental risks. The tanker Eagle S was suspected of dragging anchor across the Estlink-2 power cable in December 2024, and other vessels have been associated with subsea cable damage between Latvia and Sweden. Some tankers have also been suspected of having dual roles in intelligence gathering or covert logistics. The increase in such incidents has prompted further action by Western governments, with the EU, UK, US, and Australia targeting hundreds of vessels with sanctions and asset freezes.

The English Channel, a major international shipping lane, is covered by provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which allows warships of all states to exercise the right of innocent passage through territorial waters. However, this right is contingent on compliance with restrictions, such as avoiding military exercises, surveillance, or any behavior considered prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state. Russian naval vessels have passed through the Channel regularly since 2022, typically under surveillance by Royal Navy ships and NATO maritime patrol aircraft. Examples include deployments of Admiral Golovko, Kaliningrad, Korolyov, and the intelligence ship Yantar. The recent escort by Boikiy is the first confirmed instance in which a Russian Navy ship has been observed protecting vessels under Western sanctions during such a transit. Royal Navy frigates such as HMS Somerset and surveillance aircraft likely monitored the convoy. The presence of Boikiy accompanying sanctioned tankers suggests a deliberate attempt to deter Western interdiction and enforce Russia’s claim to protect maritime commerce it deems legitimate.

This development follows earlier incidents in the Baltic region, where Russian military assets have responded to increased enforcement activities by Finland and Estonia. In May 2025, Estonian authorities attempted to board the tanker Jaguar, which was sailing under the Gabon flag and suspected of sanctions violations. The boarding was prevented by evasive maneuvers, followed by the arrival of a Russian Su-35S fighter jet, which briefly violated NATO airspace. Estonia’s Defence Forces later noted Russia’s increased patrol activity but stated they had no confirmed evidence of direct escorts at that time. However, Finland’s Defense Minister confirmed the use of military escorts in the Gulf of Finland, describing them as a new phase of Russian operations. Russia’s Maritime Board, chaired by Nikolai Patrushev, subsequently announced plans to counter Western restrictions more aggressively, characterizing inspection attempts by NATO and EU states as violations of international law and describing them as piracy. Patrushev also stated that Russia would strengthen the protection of maritime infrastructure and logistics routes in the Baltic Sea, especially near Leningrad Region ports.

The Boikiy (displaying the hull number 532) is a Project 20380 Steregushchiy-class corvette built at Severnaya Verf, laid down in 2005, launched in 2011, and commissioned into the Baltic Fleet in 2013. It has a displacement of 2,100 tons at full load, a length of 104.5 meters, and a beam of 11.1 meters. Its propulsion consists of four 16D49 diesel engines generating 24,000 horsepower, giving it a top speed of 26 knots and a range of 4,000 nautical miles at 14 knots. The corvette carries a crew of 100 and has an endurance of 15 days. Its weapons systems include the A-190 100mm naval gun, two AK-630M close-in weapon systems, Redut vertical launch system supporting 9M96 and 9M100 surface-to-air missiles, eight Uran anti-ship missiles, and Paket-NK torpedo tubes for anti-submarine and anti-torpedo defense. Its radar and electronic systems include the Furke-E 3D air search radar, Monument targeting radar, TK-25E-5 electronic countermeasure suite, and four PK-10 decoy launchers. It is equipped with a helipad to support a Ka-27 naval helicopter and can accommodate UAVs such as the Orlan-10 in its hangar.

The Boikiy has been active in both regional patrols and international missions. Since commissioning, it has participated in exercises across the Baltic and North Atlantic, conducted drills in the Mediterranean, and supported logistical routes between Syria and Russia via Tartus. In March 2025, the vessel was tracked escorting the MV Baltic Leader, a Russian-flagged roll-on/roll-off cargo ship returning from Syria, during a three-day transit through the English Channel. The Royal Navy frigate HMS Somerset and NATO aircraft monitored this movement. Boikiy was later seen operating with elevated force protection measures, including visible armed personnel and manned stations, during its most recent escort mission in June 2025. Observers noted this posture as a deviation from previous Channel passages, suggesting heightened Russian readiness or a perception of risk. The use of the Boikiy for these missions aligns with Russia’s broader strategy of using multi-role corvettes for hybrid tasks, including the protection of logistics assets and signaling in contested maritime areas. This reinforces assessments that Russia is combining commercial evasion efforts with military deterrence in both symbolic and operational forms.