Canada chooses between German and South Korean submarines for future fleet as U.S. left out.

According to information published by CBC News, a Canadian public broadcaster, on August 25, 2025, the Canadian government has officially reduced its selection process for a future submarine fleet to two contenders, Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) and South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean Ltd. This decision concludes an extensive assessment phase and represents a decisive move toward replacing the Royal Canadian Navy’s Victoria-class submarines, which are increasingly regarded as obsolete and unreliable for sustained modern operations.
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Germany’s Type 212CD offers advanced stealth, air-independent propulsion, and Arctic adaptations, while South Korea’s larger KSS-III (pictured here) provides long-range endurance and cruise missile capability, reflecting Canada’s choice between covert patrol power and global strike reach. (Picture source: South Korean MoD).

During his state visit to Berlin, Prime Minister Mark Carney met with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and joined a defense-focused industrial roundtable before touring the TKMS shipyard. The visit highlighted Germany’s ongoing production of the Type 212CD, an advanced evolution of the Type 212A submarine co-developed with Norway. The Type 212CD integrates air-independent propulsion for extended submerged endurance, enhanced stealth signatures, and design adaptations for Arctic operations, a feature directly relevant to Canada’s strategic requirements. Six submarines are already on order, with two allocated to Germany and four to Norway, and first deliveries planned in 2028.

TKMS has presented Canada with a strategic proposal that includes creating a domestic submarine maintenance and sustainment hub, a move designed to strengthen Canadian sovereignty in fleet support while generating long-term industrial and employment benefits. Company officials noted that if Ottawa commits rapidly, Canada could potentially receive its first submarine by 2032 or 2033, either through prioritized production or by redirecting a vessel from the European build schedule.

South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean Ltd. remains firmly in the race after submitting a detailed unsolicited offer earlier in 2025. Prime Minister Carney is scheduled to visit South Korea later this year to review the company’s facilities and assess its shipbuilding capabilities. Hanwha is expected to highlight its recent experience delivering large-scale submarine programs to the Republic of Korea Navy, with potential transfer of expertise to Canadian industry as part of its pitch.

The German Type 212CD and the South Korean KSS-III Batch II represent two different design philosophies. The Type 212CD is a medium-displacement submarine optimized for stealth, with a displacement of around 2,500 tons and advanced hydrogen fuel-cell based air-independent propulsion that enables weeks of submerged endurance. Its compact size and specialized Arctic adaptations make it highly suitable for under-ice navigation and patrols in Canada’s northern waters. By contrast, Hanwha’s KSS-III Batch II, displacing over 3,600 tons, is a larger long-range submarine designed for blue-water operations, equipped with advanced lithium-ion batteries and vertical launch systems capable of firing cruise missiles. While more complex and offering a greater payload capacity, the KSS-III requires larger infrastructure but provides Canada with strategic reach across the Pacific and Atlantic.

Both submarines would give Canada significant operational advantages compared to its current fleet. The 212CD would allow highly covert Arctic patrols, intelligence gathering, and deterrence in contested northern passages, while its low acoustic signature makes it difficult to track for rival navies. The KSS-III, with its larger size and strike capabilities, would shift Canada toward a regional power projection role, allowing it to operate alongside allies in Indo-Pacific deployments while still maintaining an Arctic presence. The choice between them therefore reflects not only an industrial decision but a strategic orientation for Canada’s future naval doctrine.

The need for renewal is urgent. Canada’s current Victoria-class submarines, acquired second-hand from the United Kingdom in the late 1990s, suffer from age-related reliability issues, maintenance delays, and technological obsolescence. These diesel-electric boats lack modern air-independent propulsion, limiting their submerged endurance and exposing them during snorkeling operations. Their sensors, combat systems, and weapons are no longer competitive against the increasingly advanced submarine fleets fielded by Russia and China. The fleet’s low availability rates, often with only one submarine operational at a time, undermine Canada’s ability to credibly patrol its vast maritime approaches and exercise sovereignty in the Arctic.

Canada faces a strategic environment marked by Russia’s militarization of the Arctic, increased Chinese naval activity in the Pacific, and pressure from NATO allies to contribute more to collective maritime defense. Choosing a European or Asian supplier rather than the United States reflects both operational and political considerations. U.S. submarine offerings are nuclear-powered, which are unsuited to Canada’s policy of operating conventionally powered submarines and incompatible with Canada’s non-nuclear defense posture. Moreover, acquiring U.S. nuclear submarines would impose massive infrastructure costs and tie Canada’s operational sovereignty directly to Washington. By opting for either TKMS or Hanwha, Ottawa preserves strategic independence while reinforcing industrial cooperation with key allies outside North America.

Ottawa intends to acquire a fleet of 12 conventionally powered submarines capable of global deployment and Arctic patrols, with initial delivery projected by 2035. Federal officials are now weighing whether to issue a formal request for proposals or move directly into exclusive negotiations with a single partner. A final contract award is anticipated no later than 2027, a decision that will significantly shape Canada’s maritime posture, Arctic sovereignty, and defense industrial base for decades to come.