British Forces Track Russian Ships Through Channel Corridor as Activity Around UK Waters Rises.

HMS Severn shadowed the Russian corvette Stoikiy and the oiler Yelnya as they moved through the Dover Strait into the English Channel, according to the UK Ministry of Defence. British officials say the incident fits a wider pattern of Russian naval pressure near UK and NATO infrastructure.

The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence and multiple British and international news outlets reported on 23 November 2025, that the Royal Navy offshore patrol vessel HMS Severn intercepted and shadowed the Russian guided missile corvette Stoikiy and the fleet oiler Yelnya as they transited the Dover Strait into the English Channel. The MoD described a round-the-clock shadowing operation and stressed that Russian naval activity near UK waters has increased by about 30% over the past two years. After tracking the pair westward, Severn handed close monitoring to a NATO ally off the Brittany coast while remaining on task at a distance in case of unexpected manoeuvres.
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HMS Severn shadows the Russian corvette and tanker Yelnya in the Dover Strait, underscoring rising Russian naval activity and UK efforts to protect vital maritime approaches (Picture source: UK MoD).

British officials deliberately tied the incident to a broader pattern of Russian behaviour at sea. In the same news cycle, Defence Secretary John Healey condemned the Russian spy ship Yantar for aiming military grade lasers at RAF Poseidon crews north of Scotland and warned that the UK has military options ready if Russian ships threaten British territory or infrastructure. Parliament has been told that rules of engagement have been adjusted so Royal Navy vessels can close to shorter distances and maintain tighter surveillance of suspect Russian hulls, a clear signal that London is hardening its stance in the North Atlantic and High North.

The technical characteristics of Stoikiy are central to understanding why this Channel transit matters. Stoikiy is a Project 20380 Steregushchiy class multi-role corvette of the Baltic Fleet, a compact surface combatant that NATO sometimes treats as a small frigate because of its displacement and weapons load. At around 2,200 tons full load and 104.5 metres in length, with a beam of about 11.6 metres and a draught of roughly 3.7 metres, it is larger and more heavily armed than most patrol ships that normally patrol European coastal waters. Diesel powerplants give it a top speed near 27 knots and a range of about 3,800 nautical miles at economical speed, with an endurance of up to two weeks without replenishment.

Its armament turns that hull into a versatile coastal and near-ocean combatant. Stoikiy carries a single A 190 100 mm dual-purpose gun forward, suitable for engaging surface targets and providing limited naval gunfire support ashore. Two AK 630M close-in weapon systems and pedestal machine guns give a dense short-range anti-missile and anti-small boat screen. Its primary anti-ship punch is delivered by two quad launchers for Kh 35 Uran sea-skimming missiles, giving eight ready-to-fire weapons that can threaten surface targets at ranges typically out to 130 kilometres, depending on variant. Above deck, a twelve-cell Redut vertical launch system based on S-400 family missiles provides local area air defence against aircraft and some inbound missiles. Below the waterline, Stoikiy fields two four-tube 330 mm launchers for Paket NK lightweight torpedoes, which can be configured for both anti-submarine and anti-torpedo roles, allowing it to hunt submarines in shallow seas and defend itself from incoming heavyweight torpedoes.

Sensors and aviation complete the picture: Steregushchiy class ships use a stealth-influenced hull and superstructure to reduce radar cross-section, coupled with a combined bridge and combat information centre that integrates navigation and weapons control. Stoikiy is equipped with surface search and air search radars, electronic support measures, and the TK 25E 5 electronic warfare suite plus PK 10 decoy launchers. It also has a full hangar and flight deck for a Ka 27 helicopter and can operate small unmanned aerial vehicles such as Orlan-10. Taken together, these systems give Stoikiy true multi-domain reach, a ship that can contribute to anti-submarine and anti-surface operations, provide point and local air defence, and act as an over-the-horizon sensor and shooter for Russian task groups operating in the Baltic, North Sea, and North Atlantic.

Yelnya is widely assessed to be an Altay class replenishment oiler of Soviet Project 160, a medium seagoing tanker built in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Open source material places Altay-class ships around the seven-thousand-ton displacement mark, roughly one hundred metres in length, with a cruising speed near seventeen knots. Project 160 tankers can refuel one ship at a time, either from either beam or astern, and also carry lubricants, fresh water, and general stores. Yelnya has no organic aviation facilities and is lightly armed at most, but as a fleet oiler, it is indispensable to sustaining Russian deployments that would otherwise require frequent port calls or commercial bunkering.

In practice, the presence of Yelnya alongside Stoikiy tells British planners that this was not simply a short local sortie. Yelnya has been tracked in recent years supporting Russian task groups to the Mediterranean, North Atlantic, and West Africa. Pairing a modern multi-role corvette with a fleet oiler allows the Baltic Fleet to push a small but credible surface group far beyond home waters and to maintain it on station for extended periods. For this Channel transit, Russian authorities have not publicly explained the final destination of Stoikiy and Yelnya, and the UK MoD has likewise declined to specify the endpoint. It is plausible they were rotating between the Baltic and the Mediterranean or returning from a longer-range deployment, but in operational terms, what matters to London is that such a group can remain at sea for weeks, conduct realistic anti-submarine and anti-surface training, and collect intelligence as it passes through NATO-controlled choke points.

Facing this combination was HMS Severn, a Batch 1 River class offshore patrol vessel. Severn is 79.5 metres long, 13.5 metres abeam, and displaces around 1,700 tons. Built by Vosper Thornycroft and recommissioned in 2021 after an earlier retirement, it is designed for constabulary tasks in home waters, fisheries protection, border security, surveillance, and basic escort of visiting warships. Twin diesel engines give Severn a maximum speed of about twenty knots and a range of 5,500 nautical miles, with up to three weeks' endurance thanks to a watch rotation system that keeps it at sea for long periods. Its crew is typically about forty to forty-five.

In terms of firepower, Severn is intentionally modest. Following refits, the class mounts a single 30 mm DS30M Mark 2 automatic cannon forward, controlled from a remote weapons console, backed by miniguns and general-purpose machine guns to deliver warning shots or close-range defence against fast craft. It carries rigid inflatable boats for boarding and interdiction and a small flight deck that can host a Wildcat or light helicopter for short visits, or unmanned air systems, but it lacks a hangar and does not routinely deploy with an embarked aviation unit. Sensors focus on navigation and surface picture building rather than high-end air defence.

The raw tactical comparison is stark: Stoikiy has eight anti-ship missiles, twelve medium-range surface-to-air missiles, torpedoes, and a 100 mm gun. Severn has a single 30 mm cannon and small arms. Stoikiy can host a helicopter with dipping sonar and torpedoes, while Severn has only a helicopter-capable deck. Stoikiy’s sensors and electronic warfare suite are purpose-built for combat, while Severn’s fit is closer to a civilian patrol ship. In a shooting war, Severn would not be expected to duel a Steregushchiy-class unit. Its role is to put a British hull on scene, document everything the Russians do, and act as the visible tip of a much larger surveillance and response system that includes frigates, destroyers, submarines, and British and allied maritime patrol aircraft.

The intercept itself followed a familiar pattern refined over multiple similar encounters. As Stoikiy and Yelnya approached the Dover Strait, Severn was tasked to establish radar and visual contact and then take up a parallel course at a safe but assertive distance. Imagery released by the MoD shows the British ship abeam of Stoikiy, keeping clear of collision risk while making it obvious to the Russian bridge team that they were being closely watched. As traffic separation schemes forced the group to thread through dense commercial shipping, Severn maintained position and fed real-time tracks and observations back to UK Maritime Component Command and NATO maritime headquarters. Further west, near Brittany, a NATO ally, almost certainly a French patrol vessel, assumed the close escort role while Severn stayed on the periphery ready to respond if the Russians deviated from their declared route.

This is not the first time a River-class ship has been the face of UK deterrence in the Channel. In recent years, HMS Mersey and HMS Tyne have shadowed Russian warships and auxiliaries as they passed through the Strait, including the fleet oiler Akademik Pashin, Kilo-class submarines, and Steregushchiy-class corvettes. Royal Navy frigates and minehunters have also repeatedly followed the intelligence ship Yantar and other high-interest Russian units suspected of mapping undersea cables or rehearsing strikes on offshore energy infrastructure.

What has changed over the past year is the intensity and character of Russian maritime activity. British and allied officials now see a pattern that blends legal transit under international law, intelligence collection, and grey zone signalling. Russian task groups featuring corvettes, auxiliary tankers, landing ships, and special mission vessels like Yantar have been reported cruising near wind farms, gas pipelines, and cable routes in the North Sea and North Atlantic. UK government papers and independent analysis have warned that Britain’s status as a global data hub leaves it acutely vulnerable, with most global communications and financial transfers dependent on undersea cables that pass close to UK shores.

London has begun to respond with dedicated capabilities. The Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance Ship program has already produced the seabed warfare vessel RFA Proteus, a converted commercial ship equipped to deploy unmanned underwater vehicles and protect critical subsea infrastructure. A second such ship is planned, and parliamentary correspondence suggests that the MoD sees these platforms as central to a new undersea protection posture. Parallel to this, the government has contracted AI-enabled underwater drones and is investing in advanced sensors capable of building a continuous picture of activity around pipelines, interconnectors, and cable routes.

Beyond obvious military targets such as HM Naval Base Clyde at Faslane, the carrier base at Portsmouth, the submarine and surface fleet facilities at Devonport and Rosyth, and RAF Lossiemouth’s P-8A fleet, the UK must shield a dense lattice of energy and data infrastructure. This includes power interconnectors to France, Norway, and the Netherlands, gas pipelines, offshore wind farms in the North Sea, LNG import terminals, and clusters of fibre optic cables making landfall on the English and Scottish coasts. In the event of conflict, strikes against this network could cripple the UK economy and degrade NATO command and control.

Russian motivations for operating so close to these systems are layered. Geography is the baseline: any Russian Baltic Fleet unit heading for the Atlantic or Mediterranean must either use the shorter English Channel route or take the longer track around the north of Scotland and through the GIUK gap, a corridor NATO has monitored since the Cold War as the gateway for submarines heading into the Atlantic. Mixing routes complicates allied surveillance. Beyond that, Russian admirals have long used presence missions through Western choke points to demonstrate relevance, test NATO reactions, train crews under realistic conditions, and show domestic audiences that their navy can still deploy globally. In the case of Yantar and similar ships, intelligence gathering on seabed infrastructure is an explicit mission.

From the UK side, the Channel intercept is already being folded into defence policy debates. Ministers are using the incident alongside the Yantar laser episode to argue for sustained increases in defence spending and to justify investment in platforms such as Type 31 general-purpose frigates, which are expected to take on a share of high-tempo escort and presence missions, freeing high-end assets for carrier and anti-submarine operations. Uncrewed systems, new undersea surveillance assets, and emerging directed energy weapons are now being presented to Parliament as necessary responses to Russia’s evolving threat profile at sea.

As John Healey told MPs after the Yantar incident, Russia’s behaviour at sea is viewed in London as reckless and dangerous, language that goes beyond routine diplomatic protest. While officials remain cautious about revealing specific rules of engagement, the political messaging is clear. Royal Navy units will continue to intercept, shadow, and if necessary, confront Russian ships near UK waters. HMS Severn’s escort of Stoikiy and Yelnya is the latest in a growing list of such encounters, and it will not be the last. For now, the choreography remains professional and controlled, but as both sides increase their presence around heavily trafficked sea lanes and fragile undersea infrastructure, the margin for miscalculation narrows.

The lesson is that even a seemingly low-end patrol vessel like Severn plays a pivotal role in this evolving contest. It is the visible emissary of a layered NATO maritime architecture that includes frigates, destroyers, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, seabed surveillance ships, and autonomous systems. On the other side, a compact but heavily armed corvette like Stoikiy, supported by an unassuming oiler such as Yelnya, demonstrates that the Russian Navy still invests in endurance and reach. Their brief encounter in the grey waters of the Channel encapsulates a wider struggle that is shifting from open ocean blue water rivalry to a quieter, more ambiguous fight over data cables, energy lines, and strategic choke points that sit just beyond the UK’s territorial sea but well inside its vital national interests.