Argentina seeks a French-backed loan to acquire three Scorpène-class submarines.

Argentina’s plan to buy three French Scorpène submarines remains stalled because financing and loan guarantees from France remain unresolved.

In an interview with Infobae on November 27, 2025, Laurent Mourre, director of Sales for strategic countries at Naval Group, confirmed that Argentina’s negotiations for three Scorpène-class submarines remain stalled since a French-guaranteed financial loan has not yet been arranged, and no contract can be finalized until financing terms are agreed with lenders familiar with Argentina’s risk profile. The delay affects the Argentine government's desire to rebuild the country's submarine force, which has lacked operational units since the loss of ARA San Juan in 2017.
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Argentina's idea is to retain the Brazilian Riachuelo-class's general dimensions and hydrodynamic characteristics while incorporating lithium-ion batteries and systems from the Scorpène Evolved, for longer submerged endurance, faster charging, and simpler maintenance. (Picture source: Brazilian Navy)

President Javier Milei’s decision in November 2025 that his government would buy submarines from France prompted Argentina’s ambassador in Paris, Ian Sielecki, to urgently seek a meeting with Defense Minister Luis Petri because the subject was not initially on the political agenda. This choice followed a non-binding Letter of Intent signed in France in October 2024 by Defense Minister Luis Petri and Admiral Carlos Allievi to launch formal negotiations for three boats based on the Brazilian Riachuelo model. That Brazilian program, launched in 2008, covers four conventional Scorpène-class submarines and one nuclear-powered unit, and all four conventional boats have now been delivered, with the third, Tonelero, entering service and the fourth being launched from the Itaguaí naval shipyard.

Infobae notes that Scorpène prices in recent contracts are often above $700 million per unit, which matches estimates of about $2.3 billion for three boats when support and associated services are included. For its part, Argentina has already included a multi-year credit request of $2.31 billion under the heading “Submarine Capacity Recovery” in its proposed 2025 budget. Mourre declined to give a specific figure for the Argentine offer, arguing that before a contract and in a competitive environment, prices are confidential, and that the final value will depend heavily on the level of modification compared with a standard Scorpène, since custom engineering can lead to significant cost increases or remain limited.

He explained that the main obstacle at this stage is financial, since Argentina cannot pay the full amount immediately and must rely on external credit, while Naval Group itself does not provide sovereign loans. According to Mourre, export finance mechanisms are the usual mechanism in such cases, with banks providing loans that are often guaranteed by the French state, and conditions depending on interest rates, guarantees, and insurance. He emphasized that the French state can play a relevant role by backing financing, but that such guarantees are not automatic and come with conditions for both the buyer and the lenders. In practice, Naval Group tends to work with banks it already knows, ones that are familiar with the purchasing country and able to manage the associated risk, which would be an important factor for the initial down payment of roughly fifteen percent by Argentina, given its recent economic history and current focus on controlling public spending.

Therefore, any binding contract cannot be made until a state-backed loan from France is secured, which is a prerequisite for starting the submarine construction in French shipyards. Negotiators in Buenos Aires are seeking highly favorable payment terms, spread over six or seven years, which local media describe as unprecedented if they are obtained. Industrial options are another central axis of the discussion, since Naval Group has presented Argentina with alternatives that include building submarines locally or importing finished boats. Mourre highlighted that there is a large difference in cost depending on whether construction occurs in Argentina, Brazil, France or another location, and he identified this as a strategic choice that will shape the entire program. He stated that if Argentina wants to build submarines domestically, shipyards such as Tandanor would require major investments to reach the necessary infrastructure standards for submarine construction, repeating in some form the experience of Brazil, which created the Itaguaí Naval Complex and invested heavily in facilities, workforce training, and local supply chains to fabricate its Riachuelo class boats.

Establishing a similar framework in Argentina, involving Naval Group, the Navy, and other public entities, would require a multi-year program similar to PROSUB, with an estimated timeline of around ten years from launch to the delivery of a first submarine. The alternative is to have the submarines built entirely in France, as currently envisaged for three Scorpène Evolved units, and to focus Argentine participation on maintenance, training, and later mid-life overhauls. In this second case, Tandanor and other local actors would still regain technical competence by handling mid-life refits, while crews and technical personnel would train using simulators and integrated logistic support systems supplied by Naval Group. This approach reduces initial industrial ambition, shortens timelines, and lowers the upfront investment in shipyard modernization, but the current plan does not seem to include any Brazilian industrial participation.

The configuration envisaged for Argentina corresponds broadly to the Brazilian Riachuelo-class, a stretched derivative of the Scorpène adapted to long-range missions in the South Atlantic. Riachuelo-class submarines measure about 71.6 meters in length, with a beam of 6.2 meters and a draft of 5.8 meters, and their submerged displacement is approximately 1,870 tonnes. They use a diesel-electric propulsion unit to remain deployed for roughly 70 days during operations. Each unit carries four 533 mm torpedo tubes and can load up to 18 F21 heavyweight torpedoes or a mix of torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles, such as SM 39 Exocet or Harpoon, as well as mines in place of some torpedoes when needed.

For Argentina, the idea is to retain these general dimensions and hydrodynamic characteristics while incorporating lithium-ion batteries and systems from the Scorpène Evolved, for longer submerged endurance, faster charging, and simpler maintenance. Naval Group indicates that Scorpène Evolved submarines can achieve an underwater endurance exceeding 78 days, a range close to 8,000 nautical miles, and a yearly at sea availability of more than 240 days, figures that are used as reference for the performance targets of the future Argentine submarines. Naval Group complements this approach with the provision of training simulators intended to allow crews and support personnel to train from the earliest phases of the program and to rehearse missions and emergency procedures before full operational deployment.

At the same time, Argentina presents the submarine purchase as part of a wider effort to strengthen sea control in the South Atlantic, where foreign fishing fleets, illegal fishing, and the United Kingdom’s control around the Falkland or Malvinas area create recurring tensions, explaining why the plan is prioritized politically yet still awaits concrete financial closure. Argentina’s move occurred after the sinking of ARA San Juan in November 2017, an event that ended the operational career of the TR-1700 class, triggered the withdrawal of the country's submarine force from active duty, and led to the suspension and later cancellation of the modernization of ARA Santa Cruz. ARA Salta, a Type 209 boat, now serves only as a training platform that can sail on the surface but no longer provides full operational capability.

To preserve skills, Argentine crews have been sent to train on Peruvian Type 209 submarines, under an agreement intended to prevent the complete loss of expertise. Admiral Allievi has stated that recovering underwater capabilities is a priority and that technical, logistical, and financial studies were carried out, but Argentina's preference still needs to be translated into a detailed contract. In this context, Mourre stressed that the political decision for acquisitions of this scale must be taken at the highest level, and that an understanding between Javier Milei and Emmanuel Macron on strategic priorities and financing will be decisive for the fate of the program. Argentina’s negotiations with France also take shape in a global submarine market that has grown rapidly, as many states seek to expand or modernize their underwater fleets to protect exclusive economic zones, undersea cables, trade routes, and offshore resources.

The worldwide inventory of attack submarines, excluding ballistic missile submarines, is estimated at around 450 units, with four countries, North Korea, Russia, China, and the United States, holding more than half of that total. Between 2016 and 2023, shipyards delivered more than fifty conventional attack submarines worth roughly $25 billion and more than twenty nuclear-powered attack submarines worth about $30 billion, with China and the United States together accounting for a significant portion of these deliveries. In this environment, export-oriented shipbuilders such as Naval Group and TKMS face growing competition from Saab, Navantia, South Korean companies Hanwha and Hyundai, as well as Chinese and Japanese shipyards that increasingly target markets in Latin America, Asia, and Europe. The United States remains focused on nuclear-powered designs and is not a competitor in the conventional segment, which leaves European, Asian, and emerging industrial bases to compete for countries like Argentina.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.