Analysis: China Adapts Russia-Ukraine War Lessons to Shape Taiwan Invasion Planning.

A December 2025 U.S. Department of War assessment concludes that China’s military now expects a prolonged, high-intensity conflict over Taiwan rather than a rapid invasion. The shift reflects lessons drawn from Russia’s struggles in Ukraine, reshaping PLA planning around joint operations, logistics, and urban warfare while seeking to delay U.S. intervention.

China has drawn key lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war that it now applies to a potential Taiwan conflict, according to a December 2025 report by the U.S. Department of War. After analyzing Russia’s failures in logistics, joint operations, and urban combat, the PLA has shifted from expecting a quick invasion to preparing for a prolonged, high-intensity campaign focused on sustained logistics, joint force integration, and information warfare. Based on this, Army Recognition assesses that a likely Chinese invasion would begin with cyber and missile strikes to paralyze Taiwan’s defenses, followed by amphibious and airborne assaults, and end with intense urban combat to seize key population centers.
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On November 14, 2025, China's first new-generation amphibious assault ship, the Sichuan (Hull 51), set sail from the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard in Shanghai, heading to designated sea areas to conduct its first navigation test mission. (Picture source: China MoD)

At the heart of China’s fixation on Taiwan lies a convergence of ideological, military, and geostrategic imperatives. Beijing’s leadership views the island not merely as a breakaway province, but as the unfinished business of China’s “national rejuvenation” and a core element of CCP legitimacy. Beijing sees Taiwan’s continued de facto independence as a symbol of national weakness and foreign interference, and as a threat to the Chinese Communist Party’s domestic narrative if left unresolved. This drives a sense of urgency within the PLA to develop credible warfighting options capable of securing control of the island if political efforts fail.

Militarily, Taiwan is a strategic keystone in the Western Pacific. Its position within the first island chain gives it outsized importance in controlling access to the East and South China Seas. If Beijing were to seize Taiwan, the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) would be able to displace U.S. influence deeper into the Pacific and threaten critical sea lines of communication linking North America to Southeast Asia. Taiwan’s airfields, ports, and undersea infrastructure would become forward platforms for China’s anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) networks, narrowing the tactical margin for U.S. and allied forces to project power. From this military perspective, the island is not merely symbolic but a pivotal terrain that could reshape regional balances.

Tactically, seizing Taiwan would require overcoming a heavily fortified defense posture, challenging geography, and a technologically sophisticated defender. Taiwan possesses advanced air defenses (including Patriot PAC-3 and indigenous systems), a modernized fighter fleet, and well-trained marine and special operations units capable of mobile defense and anti-ship missile deployments. Any amphibious assault would have to cross approximately 160 kilometers of open sea under surveillance by U.S. and allied satellites and sensors, suppress Taiwan’s anti-access systems, and secure key ports and landing zones under fire. It would be a complex and high-risk operation.

China has taken key tactical lessons from the Ukraine war. Russian failures to secure air superiority, underestimating resistance, and struggling with logistics in urban warfare have made clear to Beijing that a Taiwan operation will demand overwhelming joint coordination. The PLA is accelerating its ability to conduct complex amphibious operations supported by air, cyber, space, and electronic warfare forces. Tactical units are being trained to operate autonomously in contested environments, utilizing UAVs, loitering munitions, and hardened satellite communications to maintain operational tempo.

Urban warfare would likely dominate later phases of any campaign. PLA mechanized infantry units are increasingly trained for dense urban combat, drawing lessons from Russia’s costly battles in Ukrainian cities. Extensive drills have simulated block-by-block fighting, integrated drone reconnaissance, and real-time data fusion for close air support. These changes signal a doctrinal shift toward complex littoral campaigns.

Comparative Forces: China's Naval Forces Amphibious Capabilities vs. Taiwan’s Defenses

According to U.S. Department of War analysts, China has substantially expanded its amphibious assault capacity, though serious challenges remain. The PLA Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC) has grown significantly, with at least seven marine brigades capable of expeditionary operations. The PLAN supports these forces with over 60 amphibious warfare ships, including the modern Type 071 landing platform docks and large Type 075 amphibious assault ships that can launch helicopters and armored vehicles over the horizon. These vessels, combined with new amphibious barges designed to create floating piers and bypass heavily defended beaches, reflect China’s effort to enhance sea-to-shore mobility and operational reach.

In parallel with the expansion of its amphibious forces, China has also developed a new class of amphibious assault ship, the Type 076, signaling a significant evolution in its sea-to-shore warfare capabilities. Unlike previous vessels, the Type 076 is designed to integrate next-generation technologies, including electromagnetic catapults and a flight deck optimized for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft. This ship class is intended to support drone swarm operations, rapid air assault, and electronic warfare missions. It gives the PLA Navy greater flexibility to launch precision strikes and establish air superiority during an amphibious invasion. The introduction of the Type 076 reflects China’s effort to blend traditional amphibious assault doctrine with modern technological dominance, aligning closely with the operational demands of a Taiwan conflict scenario.

Despite this expansion, current Chinese sealift capacity may only support initial landings of 30,000 to 40,000 troops and around 1,000 vehicles, which is far short of what would be needed for a swift and decisive victory. The PLA increasingly uses dual-use civilian roll-on/roll-off (RoRo) vessels and barges to augment lift capability, but these assets are slower and more vulnerable in contested environments.

Taiwan’s armed forces, while smaller in overall manpower, are well trained, highly motivated, and deeply integrated into defensive strategies that prioritize denial and attrition. Taipei fields roughly 170,000 active personnel and around 1.5 million reservists. It also maintains advanced aerial systems including F-16Vs and indigenous fighters, along with an asymmetric force structure featuring mobile coastal missile launchers, sea mines, fast attack craft, and dispersed marine units designed to stall and fragment any landing attempt. This defensive depth complicates any PLA timetable, and extended fighting increases the likelihood of U.S. and allied intervention.

Recent Chinese Navy Deployments and Amphibious Exercises

China has not only developed its amphibious forces conceptually but has also put them into practice through increasingly sophisticated deployments and exercises. In April 2025, the PLA completed the large-scale “Strait Thunder-2025A” exercise, a two-day series of maneuvers involving ground, naval, air, and rocket forces around the Taiwan Strait. These drills aimed to enhance integrated joint operations and test the command’s ability to synchronize across domains. The scenarios simulated blockades, precision strikes, and the control of critical maritime areas.

In May 2025, the PLA’s 73rd Group Army conducted a high-profile amphibious landing drill directly across the Taiwan Strait. Units practiced near-shore beach assaults using advanced Type 05 series amphibious vehicles off the coast of Fujian Province. The timing of this exercise, coinciding with the anniversary of Taiwan’s presidential inauguration, was widely interpreted as a message to both Taipei and Washington.

The PLA’s Eastern Theater Command’s 72nd Group Army also released footage of full-spectrum amphibious assault drills in the South China Sea. These exercises included coordinated ship-to-shore movements using air-cushion landing craft and live-fire wave assaults. They indicate that China is expanding the geographic scope of its operational readiness beyond the Taiwan Strait.

Additionally, PLAN surface and amphibious task groups have been deploying more frequently, including operations near Japan and deep into the Philippine Sea. These movements demonstrate the PLAN’s growing ability to project amphibious readiness far from home waters. Such deployments, often supported by joint combat readiness patrols and command-and-control drills, reflect a training tempo intended to reduce response time and normalize high-risk operational scenarios. Defense analysts see these exercises as both tactical rehearsals and strategic signaling designed to undermine Taiwan’s confidence and test U.S. and allied response capabilities.

Strategic Calculation and Narrative Control

On the cognitive battlefield, the PLA has drawn one of its most aggressive conclusions. China is rapidly expanding capabilities to dominate the information domain from the earliest phase of a potential conflict. The PLA’s Strategic Support Force has been tasked with controlling both domestic narratives and international perception. This effort is driven by lessons from Russia’s failure to shape global opinion or maintain internal cohesion during its campaign in Ukraine. Beijing’s military-civil fusion strategy is accelerating the development of mass influence operations, cyber-psychological warfare, and global media disruption. These tools are aimed at fracturing alliance unity and delaying political response in the early stages of a Taiwan conflict.

Despite increasing cooperation between China and Russia, the U.S. Department of War stresses that a formal defense alliance remains unlikely. Deep-seated distrust persists, particularly in areas like technology transfer and competition in Central Asia. China’s decision to avoid supplying Russia with lethal military aid is viewed as a calculated move to maintain access to global markets and avoid Western sanctions, while still benefiting from Russia’s battlefield experience.

In summary, China is not merely observing the war in Ukraine. It is learning from it, adapting quickly, and transforming its force posture in preparation for a potentially prolonged, high-intensity conflict over Taiwan. The December 2025 report by the U.S. Department of War confirms that Beijing no longer expects a short war. Instead, it is preparing for a complex, multi-domain contest that will test logistics, narrative control, joint command capability, and endurance. If war comes, it is unlikely to resemble the swift campaigns of the past. It will be a grinding test of strategy, resilience, and technological adaptation, one that China is actively preparing to fight and intends to win.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.