US reviews plan that could place Greenland defense under total American control.

The United States is examining whether a Compact of Free Association, a legal framework under which Washington assumes responsibility for a partner’s external defense, could apply to Greenland.

As reported by The Economist on January 5, 2025, the United States is considering a Compact of Free Association with Greenland, an arrangement that would leave Greenland self-governing internally while transferring the full responsibility for defense and security to Washington. The idea has intensified debate within NATO and Europe over sovereignty, Arctic security, and the limits of U.S. power within allied territory.
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If Greenland accepted a COFA arrangement, the country could not pursue independent defense arrangements, allow foreign military basing, or enter into defense treaties with third countries without U.S. consent. (Picture source: X/Katie Miller)

The United States is apparently examining a Compact of Free Association (COFA) with Greenland, at a moment of intensified pressure and explicit statements from Washington. On January 4, 2026, President Donald Trump stated that the United States needed Greenland from the standpoint of national security, and by January 6, 2026, the White House confirmed that a range of options was under consideration, including the potential use of military force, placing Greenland’s status at the center of a broader debate about U.S. power, sovereignty, and Arctic security. Greenland, with a population of about 56,000 to 57,000 people and extensive self-government since 1979, remains formally part of the Kingdom of Denmark, which retains responsibility for defense and foreign affairs.

For now, a Compact of Free Association (COFA) is an arrangement that establishes a close but asymmetric partnership between the United States and three Pacific states: Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau. Under this framework, the associated state remains internationally recognized and manages its internal political and economic affairs, while responsibility for external defense and security is transferred to Washington. The United States gains broad authority to operate its armed forces within the area and to administer defense matters on behalf of the partner. In exchange, the associated country receives economic support, financial assistance, and trade-related advantages such as duty-free access to U.S. markets. This model has historically been applied to small Pacific island states, making its possible application to an Arctic territory a notable departure.

In concrete terms, a COFA gives the United States full authority over military and security matters in the associated country. U.S. forces can deploy troops, operate military bases, and conduct military activities without repeated negotiations over access. The partner agrees not to allow foreign armed forces on its territory unless Washington approves, giving the U.S. effective control over who can operate there, effectively granting Washington a veto over any foreign military presence. In return, the United States commits to defending the partner against external threats. This goes far beyond a normal alliance and places the partner’s defense firmly in American hands, while limiting the partner’s freedom to pursue independent defense relationships.

For the associated country’s own force, the implications of a COFA are structural and long-term. Existing COFA arrangements show that associated states generally do not maintain national armed forces designed for external territorial defense. Instead, they rely on U.S. military protection while maintaining only limited capabilities focused on internal security, civil defense, policing, and maritime or air domain awareness. Citizens of associated states are typically eligible to volunteer for service in the U.S. Armed Forces, sometimes at high per capita rates, but there is no more independent national army, navy, or air force responsible for deterring or repelling external attack. In other words, political self-rule continues, but defense sovereignty is sharply reduced, or even ceases to exist.

This discussion takes place within a broader U.S. effort to radically change Greenland’s status, including repeated references to acquisition or annexation. President Trump revived ideas first floated during his earlier term and escalated them in early 2026 by tying Greenland directly to essential U.S. national security. Senior figures around him echoed the argument that American control of the island was necessary to secure the Arctic and protect NATO interests. These statements were accompanied by moves suggesting Washington’s willingness to treat Greenland as a separate political entity rather than exclusively through Denmark.

The pressure was not only rhetorical. The White House explicitly stated that military options were on the table, reinforcing the seriousness of the pressure and alarming European allies, who are already facing a renewed imperialist threat from Russia since the invasion of Ukraine. The White House stated that the president was considering a range of options and that the use of armed forces was always available to the commander in chief. This came shortly after a U.S. military operation in Venezuela that resulted in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro and his transfer to New York, an episode that showed Washington’s readiness to use force beyond traditional diplomatic channels. The timing reinforced fears that Greenland could face a similar fate and that Europe could face not one, but two potential imperialisms.

From a strategic point of view, Greenland matters for the U.S. because of where it sits on the map, occupying a central position in every Arctic and North Atlantic strategy. The island lies between North America and Europe and near the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap, a critical corridor for monitoring Russian submarine movements from the Arctic into the Atlantic. Greenland already hosts the U.S. Pituffik Space Force Base, which supports missile warning and space surveillance missions. U.S. officials argue that tighter control over Greenland would enhance early warning coverage, protect sea lines of communication, and strengthen deterrence in a region where Russian and Chinese activity is described as increasing. A COFA would lock in long-term U.S. freedom of action in this zone, at the possible cost of the alliance with some European countries...who could possibly retaliate by no longer supplying key subsystems for the F-35, for example.

Resources are another element repeatedly cited in U.S. statements about Greenland, even as officials emphasize security as the primary motive. Greenland possesses known reserves of 43 of the 50 minerals classified as critical by the United States, including rare earth elements essential for military systems and advanced technologies. Estimates have also pointed to large offshore oil and gas potential, although exploration was banned by Greenland’s government in 2021. As Arctic ice retreats, access to these resources is expected to become easier, increasing their strategic and economic value and reinforcing U.S. interest in shaping who controls their development and export.

U.S. rhetoric has also included claims that other powers are active around Greenland, with references to Russian and Chinese ships and influence efforts in the Arctic. These assertions are used to justify stronger American involvement and to frame Greenland as part of a wider competition with rival powers. Washington has argued that denying third countries military access to Greenland is essential for U.S. and allied security. Within a COFA framework, this would be achieved through U.S. consent requirements, preventing any foreign basing or defense partnerships without American approval...and yes, this could include Denmark, even if Greelander officials wanted to.

Responses from Greenland, Denmark, and European allies have been firm and coordinated in rejecting unilateral change or coercion. On January 5, 2026, Greenland’s prime minister, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, clearly stated that there should be no more pressure, no more innuendo, and no more fantasies about annexation. Denmark’s prime minister, Mette Frederiksen, urged the U.S. president to drop threats and emphasized that they should be taken seriously. Nordic and Baltic leaders, joined by Britain and France, publicly reaffirmed support for Greenlandic and Danish sovereignty and territorial integrity within existing international frameworks.

Within NATO, the issue has created unease and forced allies to think about difficult scenarios. European leaders stressed that Arctic security should be pursued collectively by NATO allies rather than through unilateral action. Germany’s foreign minister stated that Greenland would remain covered by NATO’s Article 5 security guarantee, highlighting the paradox of discussing defense against pressure from within the alliance itself. Although no public plans for military response were outlined, the alignment of European statements indicated preparation for diplomatic and political coordination in the event of further escalation.

More importantly, existing arrangements already grant the United States significant military latitude in Greenland without a COFA. Under current treaties with Denmark, there are no explicit limits on the number of U.S. troops that can be deployed to the island, even if any major increase or change in posture would likely require Danish consent in practice. This demonstrates that a COFA is not required for basic U.S. access, but would instead formalize U.S. control over Greenland, explaining both Washington’s interest and the strong resistance it has triggered.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.