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U.S. Marines Open First Counter-Drone Training Lanes to Shoot Down Drones With Rifles and Shotguns.


U.S. Marines are now training to shoot down small drones traveling at speeds exceeding 90 mph using M27 rifles, M1014 shotguns, and grenade launchers as part of the Marine Corps’ first dedicated counter-drone training lanes at Twentynine Palms, California. Marines engaged simulated hostile unmanned aerial systems at distances as short as 20 meters while also employing electronic warfare, creating a layered defense against the type of fast-moving first-person-view (FPV) drone threat reshaping modern ground combat.

The U.S. Marine Corps introduced the counter-small unmanned aerial system (C-sUAS) lanes during Service Level Training Exercise 4-26 on July 15, 2026, involving units from the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions. Announced by the service on August 11, the initiative integrates counter-drone warfare directly into routine maneuver training rather than leaving the mission solely to dedicated air-defense and electronic-warfare specialists.

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U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Jeremiah Smith fires an M27 Infantry Automatic Rifle during counter-drone training at Twentynine Palms, California, on July 17, 2026, as Marines practice engaging fast-moving small unmanned aerial systems at close range. (Picture source: U.S. Marine Corps)


The 20-meter engagement distance illustrates the severity of the threat. At more than 90 mph, a drone flying directly toward a Marine position can cover 20 meters in roughly half a second, leaving almost no margin for hesitation once it enters close-range weapon engagement distance.

That makes early detection and layered defense critical. The U.S. Marines participating in the exercise trained to identify and respond to unmanned aerial threats before employing kinetic or electronic countermeasures. Hostile drones were subsequently introduced throughout other exercise events, requiring units to maintain air awareness while continuing to perform their primary missions.

The kinetic weapons used during the new Marine Corps counter-drone training included the 5.56 mm M27 Infantry Automatic Rifle and the 12-gauge M1014 combat shotgun. Marines also fired M32A1 and M320 grenade launchers using low-velocity 40 mm ammunition against simulated small-UAS targets.

The choice of weapons is operationally significant because none is a conventional air-defense system. Instead, they are infantry weapons already available within Marine formations, allowing rifle squads to establish an emergency final layer of protection if an FPV drone penetrates electronic-warfare and dedicated counter-UAS defenses.

The M27 gives Marines an immediate response option using their standard 5.56 mm infantry weapon. Its effectiveness against drones, however, depends heavily on early detection, tracking, and marksmanship because a rifle projectile offers little margin for error against a small, rapidly maneuvering aerial target.

The M1014 addresses the same threat differently. Its 12-gauge ammunition disperses multiple projectiles in a widening shot pattern, potentially increasing the probability of striking vulnerable components of a small drone at short range compared with attempting to hit the target with a single rifle projectile.

This approach has direct parallels with battlefield adaptations observed during the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian personnel have developed close-range counter-FPV tactics using 12-gauge shotguns, including rapid target reacquisition, firing from trenches and other covered positions, and maintaining constant awareness of low-flying drones approaching infantry positions. Army Recognition has previously examined Ukrainian shotgun tactics used against Russian FPV drones.

Russian forces have also incorporated shotguns into infantry counter-drone defenses, reflecting similar tactical pressure from inexpensive FPV attack drones. The convergence is significant: battlefield experience has shown that sophisticated electronic warfare does not eliminate the need for soldiers to possess a physical means of destroying a drone once it reaches close range. Army Recognition has also reported on Russian infantry units receiving shotguns as an emergency response to drone attacks.

The emergence of fiber-optic FPV drones makes that requirement even more relevant. Unlike conventional radio-controlled drones, fiber-optic systems maintain their command link through a physical cable and therefore cannot be disrupted through conventional radio-frequency jamming in the same manner. This limitation can force defenders to rely more heavily on kinetic interception, concealment, and other physical countermeasures.


U.S. Marines from 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment neutralize a simulated enemy drone during counter-UAS training at Twentynine Palms, California, on July 17, 2026. (Picture source: U.S. Marine Corps)


The U.S. Marine Corps training at Twentynine Palms appears intended to build similar reflexes before U.S. forces encounter comparable conditions in combat. Counter-drone defense is being incorporated into other battlefield tasks, so Marines must keep maneuvering, communicating, and fighting while assuming hostile unmanned aircraft may be observing or attacking them.

Electronic warfare remains a central component of that defensive structure. According to the Marine Corps, trainees employed both physical methods of eliminating drones and non-kinetic electronic-warfare techniques, enabling units to target an unmanned aircraft through its communications or control links before resorting to direct fire.

This approach creates a layered engagement sequence. Electronic warfare may disrupt a conventional radio-controlled FPV drone at greater distances, while M27 rifles, M1014 shotguns, and grenade launchers provide progressively more immediate kinetic options if the aircraft continues toward the formation.

The method also acknowledges the limitations of electronic attack. Adversaries can change operating frequencies, strengthen communications links, increase autonomy, or use fiber-optic control. As a result, a counter-drone architecture based entirely on jamming risks becoming ineffective against portions of the threat.

At the infantry level, these defensive measures complement more capable systems such as the Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS). MADIS combines detection sensors, electronic warfare, and kinetic effectors to protect Marine maneuver units against unmanned aircraft and other low-altitude threats, providing a broader defensive envelope than rifles or shotguns can offer.

The distinction between MADIS and the new training lanes is important. MADIS is designed to detect and defeat aerial threats as part of a dedicated short-range air-defense architecture, whereas Marines armed with M27 rifles or M1014 shotguns represent a final protective layer when an enemy drone survives those outer defenses or appears in an area where specialized systems are unavailable.

Army Recognition has previously detailed MADIS's operational role in strengthening U.S. Marine Corps mobile counter-drone and short-range air-defense capabilities.

This capability becomes particularly important under the Marine Corps’ emphasis on dispersed operations. Small Marine units operating from temporary positions, coastal sites, or widely separated maneuver areas may not always have immediate access to a dedicated counter-UAS system, but they are likely to retain their rifles, shotguns, and other organic weapons.

The new training also reflects the economics of drone warfare. Small FPV drones can be fielded in large numbers and used against individual soldiers, vehicles, weapon crews, or command positions. Using expensive missile interceptors against every such threat would create an unfavorable cost exchange, reinforcing the need for lower-cost defensive options at the unit level.

Experience from Ukraine helps explain why the U.S. Marines are focusing on a combination of electronic warfare and comparatively inexpensive infantry weapons rather than relying on a single universal counter-drone solution. A layered defense gives a unit several opportunities to disrupt or destroy an incoming aircraft while reserving more sophisticated interceptors for threats that genuinely require them.

The U.S. Marine Corps also increased the realism of SLTE 4-26 by preparing Marines to operate drones as an opposing force. These operators created a more representative threat for units moving through the counter-UAS lanes and subsequent exercise events, requiring Marines to respond to maneuvering aerial targets rather than predictable range profiles.

That distinction matters most at speeds exceeding 90 mph. Hitting a drone flying along a known path on an isolated range is fundamentally different from detecting and engaging an FPV aircraft that appears while Marines are moving, communicating, treating casualties, or engaging ground targets.

The first counter-drone lanes therefore assess more than shooting ability. They train observation, identification, warning procedures, electronic-warfare employment, weapon selection, and immediate-reaction drills, while requiring Marines to preserve the squad's combat effectiveness.

The U.S. Marine Corps intends to continue incorporating small-UAS and counter-UAS scenarios into future Service Level Training Exercises at Twentynine Palms. Marines who complete the training are also expected to bring the resulting tactics, techniques, and procedures back to their home units, helping spread counter-drone proficiency across the force.

The broader operational change is that drone defense is becoming an increasingly important infantry responsibility. Battlefield experience has shown that FPV drones can force soldiers to monitor the air continuously, alter movement patterns, and use weapons suited to close-range aerial defense.

By training U.S. Marines to engage drones traveling at more than 90 mph at distances as short as 20 meters with M27 rifles and M1014 shotguns, while integrating electronic warfare and dedicated systems such as MADIS into the broader defensive structure, the U.S. Marine Corps is adapting its training to a battlefield where small unmanned aircraft can reach infantry formations with very little warning. The result is a layered counter-drone approach, from sensors and jammers to the individual Marine, who may have only seconds to respond before impact.

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Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.


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