U.S. Army Tests M109A6 Paladin Howitzer Tactics Against Drone and Counter-Battery Threats.

The U.S. Army National Guard is testing M109A6 Paladin 155 mm self-propelled howitzers in Michigan to determine how quickly artillery crews can fire, disperse, and relocate before drones or counter-battery systems expose their positions. The drills at Northern Strike 26-2 address a central problem for U.S. artillery in high-intensity warfare: surviving long enough to keep delivering fires under near-continuous observation.

Crews from Alpha Battery, 1st Battalion, 201st Field Artillery Regiment, West Virginia Army National Guard, are repeatedly moving into firing positions, processing fire missions, engaging targets, and displacing before a simulated adversary can respond. Camp Grayling's nearly 147,000 acres allow the battery to spread its M109A6 howitzers across wider firing areas while testing communications, natural concealment, crew autonomy, and reactions to simulated drone threats.

Related News: U.S. Army Orders More M109A7 Paladin Howitzers in $535M Firepower Sustainment Deal

A U.S. Army National Guard M109A6 Paladin from C Battery, 1st Battalion, 201st Field Artillery Regiment, operates during Exercise Northern Strike 26-2 at the National All-Domain Warfighting Center in Grayling, Michigan, on August 6, 2026. (Picture source: US DoD)

The exercise was not limited to assessing the crews’ ability to deliver accurate fire. It also examined whether the battery could continue providing fire support in an environment where artillery positions may be detected within minutes, or even sooner, after firing. Crews were required to maintain communications, relocate frequently, make use of natural cover, and react to simulated drone threats while continuing to process fire missions. Camp Grayling, with nearly 147,000 acres of training space, allowed the battery to disperse its guns over much greater distances than would normally be possible during routine training.

According to information released by the Michigan National Guard on August 8, 2026, the training reflects broader changes in the battlefield environment and the growing vulnerability of stationary artillery. In March 2026, the U.S. Army said it had begun modifying doctrine across the force to incorporate lessons from the widespread use of unmanned aerial systems. The updated Field Manual 3-0 places particular emphasis on operating under persistent observation. The U.S. Army has also acknowledged that the Russia-Ukraine war has shown how drones, including small FPV systems, can accelerate the detection and engagement of units that in previous operational environments could remain in position for longer periods.

The M109A6 Paladin is suited to this type of employment. Introduced into U.S. Army service in the early 1990s, it is a later development of the M109 family, which dates back to the 1960s. It is armed with a 155 mm, 39-caliber M284 cannon mounted on an M182 gun mount. With conventional ammunition, its range is around 24 km and can reach approximately 30 km with assisted projectiles. The system can also fire M982 Excalibur guided ammunition, with ranges of about 40 km depending on configuration and firing conditions. The vehicle carries 39 projectiles.

One of the main changes introduced with the M109A6 compared with earlier M109 variants was the digitization of its fire-control architecture. The Paladin is equipped with an automated fire-control system, a ballistic computer, and integrated navigation and positioning equipment. A gun can therefore receive firing coordinates, calculate a firing solution, and engage a target with less external preparation than older artillery systems. This level of autonomy also allows individual guns within a battery to operate in a more dispersed formation, making them more difficult to locate and engage simultaneously with counter-battery fire.

Its tracked chassis provides the mobility required to operate alongside armored and mechanized formations. The M109A6 is powered by a 440 hp diesel engine and can reach about 60 km/h on roads, with a range of several hundred kilometers. This mobility is not used only to move with combat formations between operational sectors. It also contributes directly to survivability, as the Paladin was designed to leave a firing position rapidly after completing a mission.

The M109A6 used during Northern Strike should be distinguished from the M109A7 now being fielded across the U.S. Army and Army National Guard. The Paladin Integrated Management program, originally based on the M109A6, eventually led to the M109A7. The newer variant retains the M109A6 gun and much of its turret architecture but uses a new chassis with increased commonality with the Bradley family, as well as updated electrical and automotive systems. The U.S. Army plans to transition its Paladin units to this newer configuration over time.

Northern Strike is intended to adapt a capability already inherent to the M109A6 to the current requirements of high-intensity combat. The Paladin was designed from the outset to fire and then leave its position quickly, but the spread of drones, counter-battery radars, and persistent surveillance now requires those movements to be carried out more rapidly, more frequently, and from more dispersed positions. The exercise is therefore focused less on changing the M109A6 mission than on adapting its tactical employment to an environment in which remaining stationary after firing directly increases the risk of detection and destruction.

During U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, American forces generally operated with a high degree of air superiority and faced a comparatively limited counter-battery threat. Artillery systems could therefore sometimes remain in relatively stable positions for extended periods. In a high-intensity conflict against an adversary equipped with drones, counter-battery radars, electronic intelligence systems, and long-range artillery, that operating pattern would expose artillery units to greater risk.

The war in Ukraine has made this issue particularly visible. Drones can maintain surveillance over broad areas, track vehicle movements, and rapidly transmit targeting coordinates to artillery units or attack drones. The U.S. Army now refers directly to these lessons in its doctrinal work and in exercises focused on operating against unmanned systems.

Northern Strike is therefore intended to turn an existing technical capability into a routine tactical practice. Crews must be able to receive a mission while moving, occupy an unprepared firing position, establish firing data quickly, engage the target, and leave the area without breaking the command-and-control chain. Movement is no longer treated as a separate phase after the fire mission, but as a continuing part of the engagement cycle.

Dispersion is another central part of the training. A battery concentrated in a single position presents a comparatively accessible target for a drone or counter-battery radar. Guns operating several kilometers apart while receiving firing data over a network are more difficult to locate and less vulnerable to being neutralized by a single strike. This distributed arrangement, however, requires more reliable communications and a higher degree of crew autonomy, both of which are being tested during Northern Strike.

The exercise also gives commanders an opportunity to assess the logistical demands created by this type of artillery employment. A battery that relocates continuously consumes more fuel, places greater stress on tracks and mechanical components, and complicates ammunition resupply. Support vehicles and fire direction elements must also avoid becoming fixed points that can be detected and targeted. Survivability therefore depends not only on the self-propelled howitzer itself but on the ability of the entire artillery system to operate in a mobile and distributed manner.

Northern Strike 26-2 is thus not intended to identify a new role for the M109A6, but to adapt its established concept of employment to a changed operational environment. The Paladin already possesses the main characteristics required for shoot-and-scoot tactics, including digital fire control, tracked mobility, and the ability to operate from dispersed firing positions. The exercise is intended to determine whether crews, communications networks, and the command chain can use these capabilities at the speed and frequency required on a battlefield subject to near-continuous surveillance.

For the U.S. Army, the issue extends beyond the M109A6. The same operational logic also applies to the M109A7 that is progressively replacing it. The U.S. Army continues to procure systems from the Paladin family and awarded additional contracts in 2026 for M109A7 howitzers and M992A3 ammunition support vehicles. The continued fielding of tracked 155 mm artillery indicates that the U.S. Army still considers this type of system part of its armored brigade fire-support structure, but with increasing requirements for mobility, dispersion, and integration into tactical networks.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.