U.S. Army Tests 40 Armed Drones From 19 Manufacturers Before Selecting Systems for Mass Production.

The U.S. Army and Navy tested about 40 armed Group 1 drones from 19 manufacturers during Gauntlet 2 and will now select systems for large-scale production. The competition could move tens of thousands of low-cost strike drones into U.S. service while expanding organic precision-fire options for contested and confined environments.

Conducted at Fort Carson under the Drone Dominance Program, the evaluation covered long-range strike systems able to engage targets at about 20 kilometers and tactical assault drones designed for operations within roughly two kilometers in buildings, tunnels, trenches, and bunkers. Testing also examined navigation and communications in degraded environments, obstacle avoidance, operator workload, and live-payload employment before the Army advances selected platforms toward production.

Related News: US Drone Dominance Program targets supply limits and Chinese supply chains to build 200,000 units by 2027

Screenshot from a U.S. Army video showing activities conducted during Gauntlet Phase I of the Drone Dominance Program at Fort Benning, Georgia. The first phase ran from February to July 2026 and preceded the subsequent Gauntlet II competition. (Picture source: US DoD)

Gauntlet 2 places small armed drones within an acquisition process based on competition, rapid testing, and industrial scaling. The Drone Dominance Program is structured as a two-year effort to procure low-cost lethal drones through successive selection phases rather than through a conventional development cycle extending over several years. Gauntlet I has already resulted in orders for 30,000 drones. For Gauntlet II, 19 companies were selected after a qualification phase held in June that involved 49 firms and around 79 different aircraft. Invited competitors were also required to demonstrate their ability to deliver 120 drones equipped with lethal payloads within approximately five weeks. The program plans to order 60,000 aircraft from the best-performing competitors at the end of this phase.

According to information published by the U.S. Department of War on September 11, 2026, the platforms evaluated at Fort Carson fall within the Pentagon’s Group 1 category, which generally covers unmanned systems weighing 20 pounds or less, or about 9 kg, normally operating below 1,200 feet above ground level and at speeds under 100 knots. These limits directly shape the technical trade-offs. Portability and a reduced logistical footprint come with strict constraints on battery capacity, payload weight, communications range and onboard processing. Gauntlet 2 therefore goes beyond flight-performance testing alone. AMCOM engineers examined aircraft behavior, payload integration and safeguards intended to prevent unintended weapon release or detonation.

Phase II requirements also clarify the operational envelope sought by the Pentagon. Long-range strike systems were expected to detect, locate and engage targets at approximately 20 kilometers in environments where communications and the Global Navigation Satellite System were degraded or unavailable. Tactical assault drones, by contrast, were intended for engagements within roughly two kilometers in urban or confined terrain, including buildings, trenches, bunkers and subterranean infrastructure. Common requirements included engaging moving and stationary targets, day and night operations, use in adverse weather and resilience in a congested electromagnetic environment. At Fort Carson, evaluators also assessed radio-frequency links, mission interfaces, obstacle avoidance, operator workload and video-feed reliability. The Kinetic Lane, conducted with live payloads, added evaluations of weapon preparation, installation, aircraft handling and measures designed to prevent accidental detonation or failed engagements.

The Army is seeking two complementary effects. The first is stand-off strike, using expendable drones to extend organic fire capabilities against vehicles, firing positions, command posts and other time-sensitive targets without committing manned aviation or relying systematically on more expensive precision-guided weapons. The second concerns close tactical assault in complex terrain. A compact armed drone able to move through a building, tunnel or restricted urban approach gives infantry units a means to search for, track and engage threats beyond direct line of sight. In both cases, effective combat range depends on more than endurance alone. Resistance to jamming, target identification, navigation under interference, and the ability to carry an effective payload within Group 1 weight limits all determine the system’s usefulness on a contested battlefield.

The first phase of the U.S. Drone Dominance Program runs from February to July 2026, combining competitive testing and procurement of low-cost lethal unmanned systems ahead of follow-on production decisions. (Picture source: US DoD)

Safety requirements are integrated into the acquisition decision rather than treated as a separate administrative process. AMCOM states that its engineers followed an iterative method, beginning with initial hazard assessments, identifying missing information, and refining evaluations as manufacturers provided additional data and systems were observed in operation. Once the candidates for production are selected, the joint Army-Navy safety team will continue collecting test data and prepare safety cases for review by joint authorities. This becomes increasingly important when thousands of armed drones are expected to enter operational units at pace. Scaling the fleet requires standardization not only of airframes and warheads, but also of arming procedures, operator interfaces and risk-control measures.

For the United States, Gauntlet 2 reflects a broader change in the way battlefield mass is generated. Recent conflicts have shown that relatively inexpensive drones can impose disproportionate costs, saturate defensive systems and shorten the sensor-to-shooter cycle. Washington is now seeking to translate those lessons into a domestic industrial base capable of delivering lethal drones in the tens of thousands rather than through programs limited to a few hundred systems. If the Fort Carson competition identifies reliable platforms that can be produced at scale, U.S. forces and potentially some allied militaries could gain access to a much larger pool of expendable strike assets. For potential adversaries, this development also increases pressure on counter-UAS defenses, electronic warfare capabilities and domestic drone production, contributing to a broader international shift in which expendable precision weapons are becoming a routine element of land warfare.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.