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U.S. Army Tests 12-Gauge Shotgun Ammunition to Help Infantry Shoot Down FPV Attack Drones.


The U.S. Army has tested four specialized 12-gauge shotgun ammunition loads against maneuvering drones at Fort Benning, Georgia. The live-fire trials evaluate whether infantry squads can rely on standard shotguns as a practical last-resort defense against fast-moving first-person-view (FPV) drones that penetrate electronic warfare and layered air defenses.


U.S. Marine Corps Master Sgt. Michael O’Brien, left, an operations chief with Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st Marine Logistics Group, fires an M1014 shotgun during counter-drone training at Exercise Steel Knight 25 at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California. (Picture source: U.S. Department of War/Defense)


The U.S. Army disclosed the September 21–22, 2026, live-fire assessment on November 20. The Maneuver Battle Lab worked with the Maneuver Future Capability Directorate’s Lethality Team and the Army’s small-caliber ammunition program office. Marksmanship instructors from Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment, served as the primary shooters and evaluators. They tested one government-issued target load and three commercially sourced loads against 3D-printed drones flying varied patterns.

Analysts recorded how long it took to hit a target, how many rounds were fired and the distance of each successful hit. The Army’s release did not publish hit rates or effective distances by ammunition type. In a separate August 18–19 trial, soldiers used M4 carbines to compare standard M855A1 Enhanced Performance Ball ammunition with an experimental 5.56 mm counter-drone round. The Army reported no comparative results from that trial.

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The shotgun and rifle trials address different equipment choices for an infantry squad. A shotshell disperses multiple pellets, but a hit alone does not establish that the aircraft was stopped in time to protect the squad. A shotgun also adds a weapon and a separate ammunition supply for units that do not already carry one. The experimental 5.56 mm round was fired from the M4 soldiers already use, making compatibility its clearest potential advantage. Its value still depends on whether it delivers a meaningful improvement over standard ammunition against a moving drone. The public release provides no basis for ranking the two approaches.

Dedicated counter-drone interceptors serve another layer of the defense. The U.S. Army’s Mobile Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat System pairs radar and a Coyote Block 2 interceptor with a separate electronic warfare vehicle. That equipment provides detection and tracking capabilities beyond what a soldier carrying a shotgun or carbine has on hand, but it requires dedicated vehicles, sensors, and launch equipment. Electronic warfare adds an option to disrupt susceptible drones without firing a projectile. The Fort Benning assessment focused on the narrower question of what a soldier can do once a drone is already close.

In my assessment for Army Recognition, the shotgun’s strongest case is as a last-resort option for an individual soldier facing an incoming one-way FPV attack. Its appeal is straightforward. It gives the soldier an immediate way to respond with a weapon that does not depend on a dedicated launcher or fire-control network. Its main limitation is equally important. The soldier still has to notice the drone and respond in the brief time available. Even if the shot damages the aircraft, a disabled drone and its payload may still reach the soldier’s position. A trial can therefore record a successful hit without showing that the same outcome would have prevented injury.

I would judge the shotgun’s efficiency by how often it prevents injury across repeated trials that account for surprise, competing duties and differences in shooter experience. Fort Benning used marksmanship instructors as its primary shooters, so the Army would need evidence from a broader group of soldiers to judge how widely the results apply. The equipment decision also depends on the size of the benefit. If the experimental 5.56 mm round ultimately offers comparable protection, using the carbine a soldier already carries would have a clear logistical advantage. A shotgun would make a stronger case for the extra weight and training if it demonstrated a meaningful improvement in protection. Dedicated interceptors and electronic warfare address a different part of the problem by giving the force options before the threat reaches an individual soldier.

The Maneuver Battle Lab plans to submit its findings to U.S. Army capability and ammunition officials by the end of 2026. As of the November 20, 2026, disclosure, the Army had neither selected nor fielded a new ammunition type as a result of the trials.


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Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group

Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.


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