Russia plans tests of a new generation of nuclear ballistic missiles in 2026 to replace Topol-M.

Russia intends to conduct further tests of new solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles in 2026, including silo-based and road-mobile variants, as part of the planned replacement of the Topol-M.

According to a report from Izvestia on January 12, 2026, Russia intends to conduct further tests of new solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles in 2026, including silo-based and road-mobile variants, as part of the planned replacement of the Topol-M. The missiles may incorporate new guided hypersonic warheads, indicating concurrent modernization of both boosters and payloads within Russia’s land-based nuclear forces.
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The Topol-M, the first intercontinental ballistic missile developed by Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, entered service in December 2000 in the Strategic Rocket Forces and possesses an operational range of about 11,000 kilometers. (Picture source: Russian MoD)

According to Izvestia, Russia plans further test launches of new solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in 2026, with both silo-based and road-mobile versions expected to be evaluated. These unspecified missiles are intended to replace the Topol-M ICBMs that entered service in the late 1990s, as their replacement process was expected to start in 2026–2027. While no specific performance figures were released, the new missiles are said to use more advanced solid propellants compared with earlier generations. It was also indicated that these missiles could be equipped with guided hypersonic warheads rather than conventional ballistic reentry vehicles. These warheads would differ from the Avangard payload and would fall into a separate category. In this framework, they would be classified by Russia as second-generation hypersonic warheads for intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Several potential successors are commonly associated with the gradual replacement of the Topol-M, including the RS-24 Yars, the RS-26 Rubezh, and the prospective Kedr program. The RS-24 Yars is already deployed and represents a direct technological evolution from Topol-M through the introduction of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles while retaining both silo-based and road-mobile basing. For its part, the RS-26 Rubezh has been associated with a more compact solid-fuel missile concept with intercontinental characteristics, but its long-term force-wide role remains uncertain. The secretive Kedr program, by contrast, is linked to a future solid-fuel design intended for the longer term rather than immediate deployment.

Because the January 12, 2026, statement did not explicitly identify Yars or Rubezh, already known, the reference to new test launches remains compatible with a separate development track connected to Kedr or to another derivative system. Furthermore, the emphasis on guided hypersonic warheads highlights that payload evolution is a central element alongside booster replacement, which reinforces the suspicion that the new (and mysterious) solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles are distinct from the RS-24, RS-26, and Oreshnik. Moreover, in 2025, Russia’s nuclear forces were assessed as being in the late stages of a multi-decade modernization process aimed at replacing Soviet-era systems while maintaining overall strategic balance.

Estimates placed the total stockpile at about 4,309 nuclear warheads assigned to strategic and non-strategic forces, with additional retired warheads awaiting dismantlement. Of these, roughly 1,718 strategic warheads were assessed as deployed across land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and heavy bomber bases. The land-based component included several variants of silo-based and road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, among them 78 Topol-Ms (60 silo-based and 18 road-mobile) and 206 deployed units of RS-24 Yars. An estimated 330 nuclear-armed ICBMs were assessed as capable of carrying up to 1,254 warheads, reflecting the impact of multiple-warhead missiles on total loading. The ongoing replacement of single-warhead systems by MIRV-capable missiles explains why new solid-fuel missile tests are linked to both survivability and warhead allocation rather than only to aging airframes.

The Topol-M, also designated RT-2PM2, entered service in December 2000 and became one of the first Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles developed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Its development began in the late 1980s and was reworked in the early 1990s, building on experience gained from the earlier RT-2PM Topol. The Topol-M missile was developed by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology and manufactured at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, with production spanning from December 1994 to 2010. The first flight test took place on December 20, 1994, from Plesetsk, followed by a mixed test sequence that included both successful launches and a failure in October 1998. Initial silo-based missiles entered experimental duty in the late 1990s, and formal service entry for the silo version was approved in July 2000. The road-mobile variant entered operational duty later, with the first mobile systems assigned in December 2006.

The Topol-M is a three-stage, solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile capable of cold launch from silos or deployment on a road-mobile transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). It has a launch mass of about 47,200 kilograms, a length of 22.7 meters, and a diameter of 1.93 meters, with an operational range of about 11,000 kilometers. Guidance relies on an inertial system supported by GLONASS, and accuracy is cited at roughly 200 meters circular error probable. Maximum speed is reported at about 7,520 meters per second, corresponding to approximately Mach 22. The missile carries a single nuclear warhead, with yield figures cited between 800 kilotons and 1 megaton depending on configuration. The payload mass of about 1,200 kilograms could also define the baseline against which future hypersonic payload options are being considered for the new solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The operational deployment of Topol-Ms by Russia combined silo-based and road-mobile basing to improve survivability and complicate targeting. A total of 78 missiles were fielded, including 60 silo-based missiles with the 60th Missile Division at Tatishchevo and 18 road-mobile missiles with the 54th Guards Missile Division at Teykovo. The mobile version relies on the MZKT-79221 16-wheeled transporter-erector-launcher, allowing dispersal and movement across prepared routes. The missile was designed for long-term alert status and rapid launch following authorization, consistent with solid-fuel readiness characteristics. A service life of 15 to 20 years was specified, placing the remaining missiles squarely within the replacement window identified for 2026–2027. Procurement of additional Topol-M missiles ended around 2010 as production shifted toward newer systems.

The Topol-M also incorporated several measures intended to complicate missile defense interception, including a short boost phase that reduces detection time and a flatter ballistic trajectory than earlier designs. The missile can deploy countermeasures and decoys, and testing demonstrated the ability of the payload section to maneuver after separation, increasing uncertainty in reentry prediction. These features informed subsequent developments such as the RS-24 Yars, which retained the same technological foundation while introducing multiple reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

The transition from single-warhead Topol-M to MIRV-capable successors has direct implications for the number of warheads carried by the ICBM force. Within this context, the January 12, 2026, reference to guided hypersonic warheads classified as second-generation hypersonic equipment points to a further step in payload evolution. If integrated into new solid-fuel missiles replacing Topol-M from 2026–2027 onward, this would combine a new booster generation with maneuvering hypersonic reentry profiles, altering detection and interception dynamics while continuing the broader modernization of Russia’s land-based strategic forces.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.