Breaking News
North Korea Ramps Up Serial Production Of Bulsae-4 Long-Range Electro-Optical Anti-Tank Missiles.
North Korea says it has begun serial production of a new electro-optical guided anti-tank missile system, with frontline units set to receive deliveries starting in early 2026. The move signals a transition from limited fielding to industrial-scale output, potentially reshaping ground combat dynamics on the Korean Peninsula and beyond.
On January 4, 2026, North Korea’s state media announced the start of serial production of a new electro-optical guided anti-tank missile system, according to KCNA reports carried by international agencies. The weapon is billed as a major boost to frontline anti-armor firepower, with deliveries planned from the first half of 2026 and production capacity set to rise by about 2.5 times. For the Korean Peninsula and other theaters where similar systems have appeared, the shift from limited deployment to large-scale manufacture could alter tactical and operational balances.
North Korea says it has begun serial production of a new electro-optical guided, Bulsae-style long-range anti-tank missile complex for frontline deliveries starting in the first half of 2026, with factory output ordered to rise about 2.5 times (Picture Source: North Korean Press Agency)
Imagery from the inspected factory and from a recent defence exhibition in Pyongyang, shows a consistent missile and launcher architecture on several platforms. At that exhibition, a fiber-optic anti-tank guided missile system identified as Bulsae-4 was displayed not only on 6×6 armored vehicles but also on a pickup-based “tank destroyer” with a six-missile launcher in the cargo bed. When these images are compared with the production lines shown during Kim’s latest visit, there is a high probability that the missiles now entering serial production belong to the Bulsae family and can be launched both from heavier 6×6/8×8 carriers and from these lighter pickup-mounted six-cell launchers.
The factory photographs indicate that the missiles are already packed in sealed transport-launch containers sized to be bolted onto vehicle mounts rather than handled as loose rounds, which strongly suggests a containerized, vehicle-based system. In terms of overall layout, the canisters, launcher geometry and non-line-of-sight engagement concept bear a strong resemblance to the general configuration of the Israeli Spike NLOS family; it is therefore reasonable to describe this complex as a Spike NLOS-style system adapted to North Korean requirements.
Open information on North Korean anti-tank guided missiles points to a gradual evolution culminating in this new complex. The Bulsae series is described as a family of ATGMs, with early variants broadly comparable to older wire-guided systems and later versions moving toward more capable laser- or electro-optically guided designs. Bulsae-4, often associated with the M-2018 designation, is a long-range system using electro-optical guidance with a fiber-optic link, allowing the operator to steer the missile via a video feed and to attack targets beyond direct line of sight.
Vehicle configurations seen in parades and exhibitions include an M-2010 6×6 chassis with an eight-cell roof launcher in containerized tubes, as well as an 8×8 variant unveiled later as an apparent evolution of the same concept. Public descriptions assign Bulsae-4 an engagement envelope roughly in the 10–25 km range, with a top-attack profile designed to strike the thinner upper armor of tanks and self-propelled guns. The new factory images do not disclose exact specifications, but their close resemblance to these known Bulsae-4 installations supports the assessment that North Korea is now industrializing an updated Bulsae-type non-line-of-sight anti-tank system.
The system’s operational profile is no longer purely theoretical. Since 2024, vehicles interpreted as Bulsae-4 launchers have been reported in the war in Ukraine, where North Korean-origin systems are said to have been supplied to Russian forces. Available footage and photos show 6×6 armored carriers with eight containerized missiles and, more recently, adaptations on SUVs and pickup trucks carrying six missiles on a rear deck launcher, very similar to the configuration exhibited in Pyongyang.
According to Ukrainian statements and open battlefield reporting, these weapons have been used for stand-off attacks against artillery positions, armored vehicles and other high-value targets, exploiting their long range and the ability to fire from concealed positions. While many details cannot be independently verified, the pattern of images and claims suggests that combat experience in Ukraine is already feeding back into North Korea’s decisions on missile production, platform choice and potential improvements.
From a tactical perspective, the features visible on the Bulsae-type complex correspond to a significant enhancement of North Korea’s anti-armor and precision-strike toolkit. Containerized missiles on 6×6, 8×8 or pickup-based launchers allow crews to operate under armor or from behind cover, engaging targets at distances beyond most tank gun ranges and often beyond direct line of sight. The electro-optical and fiber-optic guidance arrangement, as described in open sources, enables the operator to observe the target area through the missile’s seeker and to adjust the flight path in real time, including for top-attack trajectories or engagements against stationary infrastructure such as command posts and hardened firing positions.
This configuration makes the system adaptable: although its primary role is clearly anti-tank, the same missile could, in principle, be used against lightly protected support vehicles, radars or even slow surface targets near the coast. The emphasis Kim placed on this “tactical guided weapon system” and his remark that it could ultimately replace some missions of multiple rocket launchers indicate a deliberate shift toward precision rather than purely volume-based firepower.
The January 2026 visit and the order to expand output by around 2.5 times must be understood within a broader trajectory of North Korean defence-industrial policy. In late 2025 and early 2026, Kim has repeatedly called for higher missile and ammunition production, the construction of new munitions factories and the modernization of existing plants, linking these goals to a multi-year plan that will be discussed at the forthcoming party congress. The decision to prioritize a Bulsae-type NLOS ATGM for serial production fits this pattern: equipping “major units” in an organized way, as described by KCNA, would significantly increase the density of long-range anti-armor coverage along likely axes of advance on the Korean Peninsula and complicate planning for armored manoeuvre, amphibious operations or concentration of high-value support assets.
At the same time, open reporting about transfers of North Korean artillery shells and missiles to Russia, combined with the reported presence of Bulsae-type launchers in Ukraine, suggests that this expansion in production is not only aimed at domestic requirements but may also support sustained exports to partners, with implications for sanctions regimes and regional security architectures well beyond Northeast Asia.
The new state-media announcements, the visible 2.5-fold production objective, the images of containerized missiles on assembly lines and the earlier exhibition of the same family of weapons on armored carriers and pickup-based six-missile launchers point to a high probability that North Korea is moving a Bulsae-family, Spike NLOS-style anti-tank complex into full-scale serial production for vehicle-mounted use. This evolution strengthens the country’s precision anti-armor posture, supports its broader shift toward guided tactical weaponry and, if external transfers continue, may further entrench Pyongyang’s role as a supplier of long-range guided missiles in conflicts far from its own borders.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.