North Korea Builds New Facility at Hwasong-11 Missile Factory Supplying Russia.

North Korea has completed and then covered with earth a new structure inside the February 11 Factory in Hamhung, the country's main known production complex for Hwasong-11 short-range ballistic missiles. Pyongyang continues supplying Hwasong-11 missiles to Russia, suggesting efforts to better protect a critical part of the production chain supporting both its own arsenal and ongoing military cooperation with Moscow.

Recent satellite imagery shows construction work has been completed on a previously identified building within the February 11 Factory before the structure was buried beneath earth. While the imagery does not confirm that Hwasong-11 missile production has increased, the project points to efforts to improve the resilience, concealment and operational security of a sensitive stage in North Korea's ballistic missile industrial chain. The development is consistent with Pyongyang's broader strategy of protecting key defense facilities while sustaining missile production.

Related News: North Korea's Hwasong-11 Short-Range Ballistic Missile Factory Reveals Two Active Variants

Kim Jong Un inspects a hall at the February 11 Factory in Hamhung in June 2026. (Picture source: KCNA)

The development has direct relevance beyond the Korean Peninsula. Russia has employed North Korean short-range ballistic missiles against Ukraine since late 2023, while Pyongyang has gained an export outlet and the opportunity to collect operational feedback from a high-intensity war. Activity at Hamhung must therefore be considered in two contexts: North Korea’s effort to build a large inventory of conventional and dual-capable missiles, and a supply relationship that can supplement Russia’s stocks of ballistic strike weapons.

According to an NK Pro investigation published by Colin Zwirko on July 29, 2026, Planet Labs imagery shows that a building measuring approximately 65 by 35 metres and standing two or three storeys high was erected in a secluded northern valley of the February 11 Factory between late 2024 and February 2026. The structure was then covered with earth and incorporated into the adjacent slope between March and May. NK Pro assesses that its internal arrangement, with rooms around the perimeter and a large central area, resembles production or assembly facilities found at other North Korean weapons plants, although the imagery does not establish its precise function.

The work comes after North Korean state media announced in June 2026 that the country intended to increase ballistic and cruise missile production capacity by a factor of 2.5 over the following five years. Images released during the visit associated with that announcement showed several dozen KN-23-type airframes awaiting completion, according to an assessment by 38 North.

Covering the facility with earth can reduce its observable signatures, provide limited protection against fragments and blast effects, and help contain the consequences of an accidental explosion. This approach remains less resistant than a site excavated deep inside a mountain, particularly because entrances and ventilation systems remain exposed. With a footprint of 2,275 square metres and two or three levels, the structure could provide several thousand square metres of usable space for a manufacturing stage, component storage, inspection or final integration. The imagery does not identify which activity is involved among the processes required to produce a solid-propellant missile, from motor manufacture to the integration of guidance equipment and the warhead.

The general layout of the February 11 Factory supports this cautious interpretation. Photographs released during Kim Jong Un’s visits indicate that some assembly and inspection work is performed in above-ground halls, while tunnel entrances at the western end of the site are associated with protected production areas. Several existing facilities are surrounded by earth berms, a method commonly used to limit the spread of damage after an explosion. The new structure extends this protective arrangement by using the terrain, but it does not reveal whether North Korea has installed additional machinery, transferred an existing line or created protected reserve capacity.

The project forms part of an expansion that began several years earlier. Satellite images analysed in November 2024 by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and SI Analytics showed a second structure probably intended for final assembly, with an area estimated at 60 to 70 percent of the existing hall. Foundations for additional housing were also observed near the security perimeter, suggesting a planned increase in staffing rather than a limited renovation programme.

Official footage released after an August 2023 visit by Kim Jong Un had already shown work associated with the final integration of Hwasong-11 missiles, including the fitting of tail assemblies, nozzles and nose cones. The hall observed in 2024 was therefore consistent with an effort to raise the throughput of an established line. The earth-covered facility completed in 2026 appears to serve a complementary purpose by protecting or isolating a sensitive function, while the additional accommodation was intended to support the workforce. These successive phases indicate that the latest construction is part of an industrial programme visible since at least 2020.

The February 11 Factory in Hamhung in North Korea  (Picture source: Planet Labs PBC/James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies)

A second project at the same factory provides a useful comparison. NK Pro identified a much larger structure, at least 330 metres long and 50 metres wide, whose construction began in August 2025 in front of the western tunnel entrances. Three earlier buildings were demolished, perimeter foundations were prepared, and small rooms were erected along parts of the northern and western sides. Work then appears to have stopped around November. With a footprint of at least 16,500 square metres, more than seven times that of the buried facility, the project would have greater industrial consequences if intended for serial assembly, inspection or storage. Its apparent suspension means there is not yet sufficient evidence that this part of the complex has produced a comparable increase in operational output.

Russian demand is a credible factor behind this sequence of work. When the first expansion was documented in 2024, Ukrainian officials estimated that Russia had already fired approximately 60 KN-23 missiles against Ukraine since the start of that year. This volume turned exports to Moscow into a sustained industrial requirement rather than a one-time delivery. The chronology is therefore consistent with an adjustment of capacity intended to replace exported missiles, continue shipments and preserve North Korea’s own inventories. It does not show that each facility serves Russian demand alone, since the same production base also supplies Pyongyang’s forces.

The Hwasong-11Ga, also known as the Hwasong-11A or KN-23, is a single-stage, solid-propellant short-range tactical ballistic missile. It measures approximately 7.3 metres in length and 0.9 metres in diameter, with an estimated launch weight of 3,415 kilograms. The missile carries a payload of about 500 kilograms and has a range of 450 to 600 kilometres depending on the version, potentially reaching 600 to 700 kilometres according to configuration and flight profile. Its inertial guidance, possibly supported by satellite navigation updates, is associated with an estimated circular error probable of 5 to 30 metres.

The missile is carried by an 8x8 transporter-erector-launcher weighing approximately 40 tonnes, operated by a three-person crew and transporting two rounds ready for launch. Solid propulsion reduces preparation time, while the system’s mobility and depressed or quasi-ballistic trajectory complicate detection and interception, particularly when it is used in an attack combining missiles and drones.

Battlefield evidence confirms that this is an active supply chain rather than a theoretical export capability. In May 2024, the US Defense Intelligence Agency assessed that debris recovered after the January 2, 2024 strike on Kharkiv almost certainly came from a North Korean short-range ballistic missile. Conflict Armament Research subsequently documented the use in Ukraine during 2024 of missiles produced in North Korea that same year. The short interval between manufacture and employment indicates that at least part of North Korean output was moving rapidly through production, transport, acceptance and launch channels.

For Russia, additional Hwasong-11 missiles add volume in a weapon category that is difficult to intercept and suitable for attacking targets several hundred kilometres behind the front. They can be incorporated into strikes combining Iskander-M missiles, cruise missiles and one-way attack drones, complicating Ukrainian air-defence planning. Even if a North Korean missile has lower reliability or accuracy than some Russian systems, it still requires the defender to detect, classify and decide whether to engage it. Imported rounds also allow Russia to reserve domestically produced weapons for missions requiring particular guidance, payload or performance characteristics.

In return, Pyongyang receives financial and energy resources that can support its military programmes, along with air-defence systems, electronic warfare equipment and Russian feedback on missile guidance, according to a Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team report published in May 2025. The exact terms of these exchanges remain opaque, but they provide North Korea with material resources and operational information that could accelerate improvements to its missiles and defensive systems.

For Russia, the new structure increases the resilience of a foreign supply chain that already provides ballistic missiles for use against targets several hundred kilometres behind the Ukrainian front. For Ukraine, the risk is that more regular deliveries could allow Moscow to conduct additional strikes, combine KN-23s with Iskander missiles, cruise missiles and drones, and place further demands on systems such as Patriot around cities, energy infrastructure and military sites. Although the 330-metre hall remains unfinished, the gradual protection of the Hamhung complex reduces the vulnerability of this source of supply and more firmly integrates North Korean industry into Russia’s war effort.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.