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Russia may be building first Il-78MK-90A tanker aircraft for China to expand air operations over Pacific.


A photograph of a newly built Russian Il-78MK-90A aerial refueling tanker at the Aviastar-SP plant in Ulyanovsk bearing potentially Chinese Air Force markings has revived speculation over a potential 20-aircraft procurement contract valued between $2.2 billion and $2.6 billion. An acquisition of 20 Russian tankers could expand China's 43-aircraft heavy refueling fleet by 46.5% to 63 airframes, significantly increasing transferable fuel capacity for J-20 fighters and long-range bombers during operations across the Western Pacific. Supplementing domestic YY-20A and Y-20B production with Russian deliveries would allow Beijing to accelerate fleet expansion while reserving indigenous Y-20 airframes for strategic transport roles.

Potential clues include the newly manufactured Il-78's suspected Chinese PLAAF insignia on the rear fuselage, behind the engine, and the September 2023 inquiry for 20 Il-78MK-90A tankers under Customer 156, which could designate China. (Picture source: SDF/ACuriousPLAFan)

Potential clues include the newly manufactured Il-78's suspected Chinese PLAAF insignia on the rear fuselage, behind the engine, and the September 2023 inquiry for 20 Il-78MK-90A tankers under Customer 156, which could designate China. (Picture source: SDF/ACuriousPLAFan)


On October 26, 2026, ACuriousPLAFan shared a picture of a newly manufactured Russian Il-78 tanker at Aviastar-SP in Ulyanovsk, potentially linked to a possible Chinese acquisition of 20 Il-78MK-90A aerial refueling aircraft. The dark-grey aircraft carried a partially visible marking resembling the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) insignia and a Russian flag near its cockpit, although its customer and serial number remain unconfirmed. The possible purchase was leaked by a September 13, 2023 inquiry concerning 20 aircraft for "Customer 156," with potential deliveries in 2027-2028 and an estimated acquisition value of $2.2 to 2.6 billion. China currently operates an estimated 43 tanker-capable aircraft, comprising three older Il-78s, 30 YY-20As and 10 multi-role Y-20Bs.

Twenty additional Russian tankers would increase this inventory by 46.5% to 63 aircraft, theoretically adding 1,560 tonnes of transferable fuel per complete fleet sortie cycle at a distance of 1,000 km. Beijing could seek those additional dedicated tankers to accelerate fleet expansion, preserve domestic Y-20 production for transport and specialized variants, or exploit lower estimated Russian acquisition prices. The possible acquisition remains unconfirmed because the September 13, 2023 inquiry concerned component composition for 20 Il-78MK-90As without establishing a confirmed Chinese contract, advance payment, production allocation, or delivery schedule. The October aircraft's incomplete insignia does not establish PLAAF ownership, particularly after another export-configured Il-78, carrying the reported tail number 571, appeared in August 2026 with a possible Algerian connection.

Russia rolled out the Il-78M-90A prototype on November 29, 2017, conducted its first flight on January 25, 2018, and contracted 10 tankers for its armed forces on December 12, 2020, with serial production scheduled from 2021. Delivering 20 IL-78s to China between 2027 and 2028 would require 10 export deliveries annually, compared with a combined requirement of 30 aircraft when including Russia's existing order. Aviastar-SP must also manufacture Il-76MD-90A transports, which share the tanker's industrial base. Whether these assumptions materialize depends principally on Russia's ability to deliver aircraft faster or more economically than China can expand the production of the YY-20. The Il-78MK-90A derives from the Il-76MD-90A transport aircraft and uses four PS-90A-76 turbofans producing 157 kN each, or 628 kN combined, representing 25.6% more installed thrust than the IL-76's four D-30KP-2 engines.

The PS-90A-76 also offers a quoted 12-14% fuel consumption improvement over the older D-30KP generation, although mission offload also depends on distance, aircraft weight, and reserves. Three UPAZ-1M hose-and-drogue stations permit the simultaneous refueling of two fighters through underwing pods, with a rear-fuselage station for larger aircraft. At the quoted 2,500 to 3,000 litres-per-minute transfer rate, pumping 10,000 litres requires 3.3 to 4 minutes under ideal conditions. The Il-78MK-90A can reportedly deliver 78 tonnes of fuel at 1,000 km, compared with 74 tonnes for the Il-78M and 42 tonnes for the original Il-78. At 2,000 and 3,000 km, the older Il-78M transfers 56 and 40 tonnes, respectively, against 24 and 15 tonnes for the original Il-78. Removable fuel tanks and a retained cargo ramp also permit the conversion into a transport aircraft with a payload capacity of up to 60 tonnes, but every aircraft reassigned to cargo duties cannot simultaneously undertake refueling missions. 

China's existing aerial refueling force consists of several generations of aircraft with substantially different capacities. The country acquired three refurbished Il-78 tankers from Ukraine in 2011, receiving them between 2014 and 2016 to supplement its lower-capacity H-6U and HU-6 tankers. The introduction of the YY-20A subsequently expanded the heavy tanker fleet, with an estimated 30 aircraft in service by 2026, alongside 10 Y-20Bs capable of carrying modular refueling equipment. Acquiring 20 Il-78MK-90As would raise this figure to 63, increasing the Russian-designed Il-78 component from three to 23 units, or from 7% to 36.5% of the fleet. Conversely, the 30 YY-20As would account for 47.6% of the expanded inventory instead of 69.8%, assuming no further deliveries or retirements. However, tanker-capable inventory is not equivalent to operational availability because Y-20Bs also perform transport missions, while maintenance and training reduce aircraft available for refueling.

The Russian acquisition could therefore increase dedicated tanker capacity without diverting additional Y-20 airframes from strategic airlift, while potentially replacing older H-6-derived aircraft. China's YY-20A already performs many of the missions that could be envisaged for the Il-78MK-90A. Developed from the Y-20 transport, which first flew on January 26, 2013, and entered service on July 6, 2016, the tanker derivative was undergoing development by 2018. A YY-20 participated in a 27-aircraft formation southwest of Taiwan on November 28, 2021, while the PLAAF confirmed combat-readiness training on August 1, 2022, and demonstrated J-20 refueling in September 2022. Its designation was confirmed at the November 2022 Zhuhai Airshow. The YY-20A's fuel capacity is quoted at approximately 90 tonnes under one specification, while other figures indicate more than 100 tonnes of total fuel and more than 50 tonnes available for transfer.

It incorporates two underwing refueling pods and a higher-capacity fuselage station, supported by three panoramic camera displays covering approximately 180 degrees behind the aircraft. Redesigned landing-gear fairings reduce airflow disturbances during receiver approaches. A Russian purchase would therefore primarily increase the number of tankers available without expanding the YY-20A production at the same rate, rather than introduce a new refueling configuration. The Y-20B provides another possible explanation for Beijing's interest in dedicated Russian tankers. Powered by four Chinese WS-20 turbofans producing approximately 140 kN each, or 560 kN combined, it offers 12% more installed thrust than the older D-30KP-2 engines, although the Il-78MK-90A's PS-90A-76 engines provide 12.1% more thrust than the WS-20s.

The Y-20B measures approximately 47 m long, spans 50 m, and has a maximum takeoff weight of 220 tonnes, with a transport payload of 66 tonnes, a maximum speed of 926 km/h, and a service ceiling of 13,000 m. However, its quoted 7,800 km range concerns transport operations rather than a defined tanker offload. Unlike the dedicated YY-20A, the Y-20B can employ two underwing hose-and-drogue pods and modular fuel arrangements while retaining the ability to return to cargo missions. Its tanker configuration appeared in November 2023, and 10 Y-20Bs were observed at Kaifeng Air Base in June 2026. A Russian acquisition could therefore allow the PLAAF to preserve more Y-20Bs for strategic airlift while assigning Il-78MK-90As to refueling duties, avoiding competition between the two missions. 

The financial aspect of this unconfirmed acquisition depends on the difference between initial procurement expenditure and the cost of maintaining the aircraft throughout their service lives. The estimated Il-78MK-90A acquisition price of $110 to $130 million is lower than the $160 to $250 million required for the Y-20B. Twenty Russian tankers would therefore produce a potential initial saving of $0.6 to $2.8 billion compared with 20 Y-20Bs, although configurations and procurement packages are not established as equivalent. These figures also exclude Russian spare engines, UPAZ-1M equipment, maintenance, training and infrastructure, while the Y-20B benefits from domestically manufactured WS-20 engines. Production constraints could further affect the calculation: Aviastar-SP must accommodate Russia's 10-aircraft Il-78M-90A order, Il-76MD-90A manufacturing and potential Algerian export demand.

Delivering 20 aircraft to the Chineses at five annually would require four years, compared with two years at 10 annually or a decade at two annually. A lower Russian purchase price would therefore provide a meaningful economic advantage only if delivery schedules and long-term sustainment costs remained competitive with indigenous production. But what could be their operational value? Twenty Il-78MK-90As delivering 78 tonnes each at 1,000 km would provide a theoretical combined offload of 1,560 tonnes per complete fleet sortie cycle. At hypothetical availability rates of 50%, 60% and 70%, the PLAAF would have 10, 12 or 14 new tankers available, corresponding to 780, 936 or 1,092 tonnes of transferable fuel under the same conditions.

With two underwing fighter refueling positions per tanker, the complete fleet could simultaneously support 40 fighters and 20 larger aircraft, although actual throughput depends on receiver fuel requirements and connection times. Additional tankers could consequently increase refueling opportunities for J-20 and J-16 fighters, as well as H-6 bombers near Taiwan, over the South China Sea and across the western Pacific. However, tanker positioning remains a constraint: operating farther from contested airspace reduces exposure but increases receiver transit fuel consumption, while closer refueling locations require greater protection. The measurable advantage would therefore be additional fuel delivered to compatible aircraft, more available refueling positions and reduced competition for tanker sorties. Whether the acquisition delivers these benefits depends on Russian production, aircraft availability and integration with existing PLAAF operations.

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Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.


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