Iran Says It Was Preparing to Strike Three Ukrainian Targets With Ballistic Missiles.

Iran completed preparations to strike three sites in Ukraine before suspending the operation, according to Mohsen Rezaei, a senior military adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The claim, if accurate, suggests Tehran considered expanding the geographic scope of its military posture beyond the Middle East, raising fresh concerns over the potential reach of Iran's long-range ballistic missile arsenal.

Speaking on August 4, 2026, Rezaei said Iran had prepared an operation targeting three locations in Ukraine but ultimately halted the planned strikes. He did not identify the intended targets or provide evidence supporting the claim. Several Iranian ballistic missiles possess sufficient range to reach southern, eastern, and parts of central Ukraine when launched from positions in northwestern Iran. However, possessing the necessary range does not mean three specific targets could be struck successfully. At maximum range, some missile variants may require a reduced payload, while actual accuracy and terminal effectiveness depend on the missile configuration, guidance performance, and warhead employed.

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The Sejjil missile during the “Great Prophet 17” (Picture source: Iranian MoD)

According to a Persian-language account of Rezaei's televised remarks, Tehran had prepared to strike three locations in Ukraine after the July 25 attack on the Iranian vessel Anna in the Caspian Sea. Rezaei said the response was suspended after Kyiv stated that the ship had been hit by mistake and that Iran was still examining this explanation. He did not identify the intended targets, selected weapons, launch areas or planned timing.

Rezaei did not name the three sites. The distances to Dnipro, Kharkiv, Kyiv and western Ukraine would require different missile systems. In April 2026, Iranian-linked networks circulated an artificial intelligence-generated propaganda video depicting fictitious attacks on Kyiv, Kharkiv and Dnipro. Nothing links those cities to the plan described by Rezaei, but their locations illustrate the range constraints. From Tabriz, used here only as a geographic reference and not as an identified launch site, Dnipro is approximately 1,470 km away, Kharkiv 1,550 km and Kyiv 1,855 km. From Tehran, the respective distances increase to about 1,950 km, 2,000 km and 2,340 km. Lviv is nearly 2,200 km from Tabriz and 2,700 km from Tehran. Moving launchers into northwestern Iran would therefore increase the portion of Ukrainian territory within range.

These figures are not fixed values independent of missile configuration. Maximum range is generally achieved with a lighter warhead. This allows the missile to travel farther but reduces its explosive effect on arrival. On systems relying primarily on inertial navigation, guidance errors may also accumulate during a longer flight. A missile rated for 2,000 km may therefore not retain at that distance the payload and accuracy associated with a launch well inside its maximum range.

The Ghadr and Emad, longer-range derivatives of the Shahab-3 architecture, present a plausible option. The Ghadr is estimated to have a range of 1,600 to 1,950 km, while the Emad is generally credited with about 1,700 km. From suitable positions in northwestern Iran, both systems could reach Dnipro or Kharkiv. Kyiv would be near the upper limit of the Ghadr's range and beyond the distance normally attributed to the Emad. A strike on the Ukrainian capital would therefore require either a launch position in Iran's far northwest or a lighter payload, with corresponding effects on terminal damage.

The Sejjil is the most consistent option for covering Dnipro, Kharkiv and Kyiv from northwestern Iran. This medium-range ballistic missile uses two solid-propellant stages and is carried on a road-mobile launcher. Its range is generally estimated at 2,000 km with a warhead of approximately 700 kg. Solid propellant shortens launch preparation compared with liquid-fueled missiles such as the Ghadr and Emad and reduces launcher exposure. The Sejjil's exact status was uncertain for years, but its reported use against Israel in March 2026 suggests that at least part of the system has reached operational service.

The Khorramshahr family could extend this reach into western Ukraine. Its different versions are reported to have ranges of between 2,000 and 3,000 km. The upper figure is based on a smaller and lighter reentry vehicle, which reduces the available payload. Khorramshahr remains less documented than Iran's other medium-range systems. Public information does not establish the number of missiles produced, launcher availability, or the actual performance of the longest-range versions.

The ability to reach a location does not establish the capacity to neutralize it. Among the systems with sufficient range, commonly cited circular error probable values are about 300 meters for the Ghadr and 500 meters for the Emad. Khorramshahr's accuracy could exceed one kilometer if it relies on an older inertial guidance system, while no sufficiently reliable public estimate is available for the Sejjil. These figures may also vary with missile version, distance, flight profile and the operation of any terminal guidance system. Under these conditions, firing one missile at each of the three sites would not guarantee their destruction. Command posts, radar installations, underground depots or individual buildings would probably require several missiles per target, together with accurate coordinates and functioning terminal guidance. An air base, industrial complex or energy facility would present a much larger target and would be easier to damage. If the three points mentioned by Rezaei referred to cities rather than installations, the accuracy requirement would be lower, but the danger to civilians would be considerably higher.

Iran's recent losses do not remove this capability. A March 2026 assessment by Iran Watch estimated that U.S. and Israeli strikes had substantially reduced the number of available launchers and disrupted missile production without exhausting the inventory. Iran might still have had between a few hundred and roughly two thousand ballistic missiles, although its launch rate had declined considerably. Fighting since that assessment prevents a precise inventory from being established for August. A strike on three targets would nevertheless require far fewer assets than a sustained regional campaign.

Ukrainian defenses would introduce another source of uncertainty. Patriot batteries have demonstrated an ability to intercept Russian ballistic missiles, but their number is insufficient to provide uniform protection across the country. On August 2, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said ballistic missiles remained difficult to counter and that Patriot effectiveness depended on interceptor availability, according to the Ukrainian presidency. An Iranian missile following a medium-range trajectory could arrive at high speed and leave a short engagement window. The outcome would depend on the missile type, salvo size, target location and whether the area was covered by a Patriot battery. The Caspian Sea incident provides the political context for the threat. According to Iran, the Anna was carrying rolled steel sheets when it was struck near the mouth of the Volga River. One sailor was killed, and several others were injured. Ukraine described its Caspian operation as an action against vessels involved in transporting military materiel between Iran and Russia. During a July 28 telephone call, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said Ukrainian actions targeted Russia's war effort rather than civilians or civilian vessels. His Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, said Tehran did not seek escalation but demanded compensation, according to an account of the exchange.

Tehran therefore has missiles capable of reaching parts of Ukraine from Iranian territory. Dnipro and Kharkiv fall within the envelope of several Iranian medium-range systems, while Kyiv would probably require a Sejjil or a Ghadr variant used near its maximum range. Striking western Ukraine would depend on Khorramshahr versions whose performance and availability remain less certain. An attack on three areas is technically possible. Destroying three specific targets would require more missiles, accurate targeting data, and the ability to penetrate Ukrainian defenses. Rezaei's statements describe a credible threat in terms of range, but they do not demonstrate that the preparations were real or establish how effective the operation would have been.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.

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