Iran confirms Russian Su-35 fighter jets will arrive only after war with US and Israel as deliveries remain delayed.

Iranian Army spokesperson Brigadier General Mohammad Akraminia confirmed on October 31, 2026, that Iran completed contractual arrangements to acquire Russian Su-35 fighter jets, but acknowledged that deliveries have been delayed until after the current war with the United States and Israel. Speaking to Tabnak, Akraminia stated that pilot conversion training was finished in Russia, yet no operational Su-35 units entered service prior to the onset of military hostilities. The acquisition forms part of a long-term defense modernization strategy to replace Iran's aging pre-1979 American F-14A and F-4E interceptors across Isfahan and Hamadan airbases.

An Iranian military spokesperson confirmed that Russian Su-35 fighter jets would be delivered only after the war with the United States and Israel, despite earlier procurement agreements and production schedules. (Picture source: Vitaly Kuzmin)

On October 31, 2026, Iranian Army spokesperson Brigadier General Mohammad Akraminia confirmed that Iran had purchased Russian Su-35 fighters and completed preparations for pilot training, but acknowledged that the jets had not arrived before the war with the United States and Israel. Speaking to Tabnak, Akraminia said the contracts had been concluded several years earlier, and deliveries were expected after the war, without specifying a date. His statement followed General Ali Shadmani's January 27, 2025, confirmation of the purchase and contradicted earlier claims that two Su-35SE fighters were transferred to Iran on November 18, 2024. Iran initially sought 25 Su-35SE fighters, with subsequent arrangements indicating a possible expansion to 48 or 50 Su-35s, including a 16-aircraft production tranche scheduled between 2025 and 2027.

Although estimates placed 19 to 20 Iranian-associated fighters at Russian facilities by July 2026, their completion or their acceptance by Iran has been independently confirmed. The operational consequence is that Iran entered the conflict without an operational Su-35 unit, despite having pursued the acquisition for several years and having prepared personnel for the Su-35's introduction. Iran's Su-35 procurement follows nearly two decades of attempts to replace American fighters delivered before the 1979 revolution. Between 2007 and 2015, Tehran examined Su-30MK and Su-30SM acquisitions, including possible local assembly, but neither program was successful.

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The initial Su-35 requirement allocated 25 aircraft to replace F-14A interceptors at Isfahan, with another 25 potentially replacing F-4E fighters at Hamadan. Russian export contract R/1936411141768, associated with customer K10 and linked to Iran, covered 16 Su-35s scheduled for manufacture and delivery between 2025 and 2027 at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aviation Plant. Component procurement included K-36 ejection-seat equipment, BR-5 barometric relays, and pressure sensors, with advance payments dated March 7, July 22, and December 26, 2024. A separate October 2025 schedule concerned 48 Su-35 fighters, with €588.6 million for electronic warfare equipment and spare parts, as well as delivery intervals of 16-18 to 46-48 months after advance payment. However, the 16-aircraft order may form part of the larger arrangement, meaning that combining them into a 64-aircraft order would be unjustified.

What the Su-35 could bring to Iran's aging fighter fleet?

Manufacturing estimates indicated 16 completed aircraft in March 2026 and 19-20 by July, with 30 projected for early 2027, but completion does not mean Iranian acceptance, delivery, or combat readiness. The Su-35SE is a single-seat, twin-engine fighter measuring 21.9 m long, 15.3 m wide, and 5.9 m high, with an empty weight of 19,000 kg and maximum takeoff weight of 34,500 kg. Its two AL-41F1S engines produce 284-290 kN of combined afterburning thrust, 15.9-18.4% more than the original Su-27SK's 245 kN, while thrust-vectoring nozzles and digital flight controls support maneuvering up to 9 g. Maximum speed reaches Mach 2.25, or 2,400 km/h at altitude, with an 18,000 m ceiling and nominal climb rate of 280 m/s. Internal fuel capacity reaches 11,500 kg, 22.3% above the original Su-27's capacity, supporting a maximum flight range of 3,600 km, a ferry range of 4,500 km with external tanks, and a nominal combat radius of 1,600 km.

Actual patrol endurance would be lower after accounting for transit, interception maneuvers, and fuel reserves. Moreover, the Russian fighter carries 8,000 kg of weapons across 12 stations, including air-to-air missiles, guided bombs, and anti-radiation or anti-ship missiles, supplemented by a 30 mm GSh-30-1 cannon with approximately 150 rounds, although the operational benefit would depend on the weapons actually purchased and integrated by the Iranian Air Force. The Su-35's N035 Irbis-E radar would be central to its interception role, as it combines electronic scanning with mechanical antenna repositioning, produces a 20 kW peak transmitted power, tracks 30 airborne targets, and supports simultaneous engagements against eight. Its detection range, between 350 and 400 km, applies to favorable radar-reflective targets, not all aircraft.

Reducing a target's radar cross-section from 3 m² to 0.1 m² would theoretically reduce the detection distance to 42.7%, turning a 400 km reference into 171 km before electronic countermeasures, ground clutter, and unfavorable geometry are even considered. An OLS-35 infrared search-and-track system provides a separate passive detection capability, but its performance varies with target aspect and atmospheric conditions. When looking at the weaponry, the R-77 missile has a nominal range of 70 to 80 km, increasing to 110 km for the R-77-1 and a claimed 190 km for the dual-pulse R-77M, which also has a quoted maximum speed of 5,100 km/h and an interception ceiling of 30,000 m. Russian Su-35S fighters can additionally employ the R-37M, whose RVV-BD export version has a nominal 200 km range. These are maximum engagement envelopes, not guaranteed interception distances against maneuvering targets, and Iran has not confirmed acquiring the R-77M or R-37M, making its actual missile configuration a major uncertainty. 

Iran's Su-35 missile inventory could limit its air combat capability

The proposed missile inventory associated with Iran's Su-35 acquisition would impose measurable restrictions on sustained air-to-air operations if it represented the entire initial weapons allocation, as it reportedly totals 327 missiles: 123 R-73 short-range air-to-air missiles, 42 R-77 medium-range missiles, 120 Kh-38 air-to-surface missiles, and 42 Kh-31 missiles. Across a fleet of 48 fighters, this would represent 2.56 R-73s and only 0.875 R-77s per aircraft. Equipping every fighter with two R-73s would consume 96 missiles, leaving 27, while providing two R-77s each would require 96 weapons, exceeding the proposed stock by 54. A configuration carrying two missiles of each type would therefore be limited to 21 complete aircraft loads by the R-77 inventory. Arming one 12-aircraft squadron with two R-77s per fighter would consume 57.1% of that stock, while two squadrons would require six more missiles than allocated.

The 120 Kh-38s could provide 60 two-missile strike loads, compared with 21 for the Kh-31 inventory, whose anti-radiation and anti-ship variants serve different missions. These quantities have not been confirmed as delivered stocks, and additional orders could change the calculation. Nevertheless, a potential inventory of only 42 medium-range missiles would substantially restrict Iran's interception operations even if all 48 fighters entered service. The introduction of Su-35 fighters would also require the country to reorganize its fighter assignments, training, maintenance, and airbase infrastructure. Iran's initial basing concept assigned approximately 25 Su-35s to replace the F-14As at Isfahan, potentially including the 81st Tactical Fighter Squadron, and another 25 to replace the F-4Es at Shahid Nojeh Air Base near Hamadan, potentially including the 31st Tactical Fighter Squadron.

Iranian personnel began conversion preparations in Russia in 2022, while the first two Yak-130 advanced trainers arrived at Shahid Babaei Air Base on September 11, 2023; subsequent indications placed the trainer fleet at no fewer than eight aircraft. Three Su-35 simulators were also associated with the program, although the number of fully qualified Iranian pilots remains unknown. Hamadan underwent work involving enlarged hardened shelters and supporting infrastructure, but wartime damage now increased requirements for runway, taxiway, fuel-system, and maintenance repairs. Concentrating 25 fighters at one installation would also expose half the Su-35 fleet to surprise attacks. At an illustrative 70% mission-capable rate, fleets of 16, 30, and 48 fighters would only provide 11, 21, and 34 available Su-35s, respectively, before including operational and training assignments. 

Could Russian-made Su-35 fighters challenge U.S. and Israeli air superiority against Iran?

Moreover, the war against Iran demonstrated that American and Israeli air superiority depended on the coordinated employment of combat aircraft, surveillance assets, electronic warfare, precision-guided weapons, and attacks against Iranian air defense infrastructure, rather than on the performance of individual fighter types alone. Strikes against surveillance radars reduced warning time, attacks on engagement radars and missile batteries diminished firing opportunities, and disruption of command facilities complicated the coordination between surviving air defense units. Iran's F-14A and MiG-29 fighters could not replace those functions or sustain an effective opposition, while its F-5 and Su-24 aircraft were not suited to prolonged beyond-visual-range engagements against modern fighters.

US and Israeli forces also attacked airbases and supporting infrastructure, where damaged runways, blocked taxiways, interrupted fuel distribution, or disabled maintenance facilities could prevent sorties without destroying every fighter. This distinction matters because a Su-35's maximum speed, radar range, and missile performance become irrelevant when it cannot take off or receive reliable target information. Stealth aircraft, electronic attack, aerial refueling, and intelligence assets also enabled repeated offensive missions while limiting exposure to surviving Iranian defenses. The absence of Su-35s certainly removed a potential long-range interception capability, but the conflict's central finding was Iran's inability to preserve coordinated detection, command, and engagement functions under sustained attack, rather than a deficiency attributable to one missing fighter type.

Nevertheless, an operational Iranian Su-35 fleet could increase the cost and complexity of future U.S. and Israeli air operations, principally by contesting selected air corridors rather than establishing continuous national air superiority. The Irbis-E radar and R-77-1's range would improve interception opportunities against conventional aircraft, while possible R-77M or RVV-BD acquisitions could extend the threat to some supporting aircraft if Iran obtained accurate target information and suitable launch positions. However, the Su-35's non-stealth airframe and passive electronically scanned radar would remain key disadvantages against F-35 fighters. Fleet size and sortie generation would impose equally important restrictions.

With 48 fighters at an illustrative 70% mission-capable rate, 34 available aircraft would need to average 2.82 sorties daily to sustain four two-aircraft patrols with two-hour periods on station, an especially demanding requirement before accounting for transit, training, and reserve aircraft across Iran's entire territory. Its more realistic contribution would be temporary air denial near selected installations or approaches to the Persian Gulf, potentially requiring additional American and Israeli escort, electronic warfare, and suppression missions, but the Su-35 would not independently reverse the advantages demonstrated by the United States and Israel.

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Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.