Breaking News
Chinese Ground Units Test ZRY222 Rocket-Armed Unmanned Ground Vehicle for Infantry Close Support.
Chinese ground units were shown integrating the ZRY222 tracked combat robot into infantry training during drills aired on state television on January 5, 2026. The footage suggests the People’s Liberation Army is pushing unmanned systems closer to the small-unit fight, where speed, coordination, and survivability matter most.
On January 5, 2026, new footage aired on Chinese state television showed ground units integrating the ZRY222 tracked combat robot into infantry training, marking a visible step from staged unveilings toward routine field use. As reported by CCTV, the robot was filmed maneuvering as part of a coordinated assault sequence. The images matter because they illustrate how the PLA is trying to push unmanned systems down to the small unit level, where seconds and meters often decide outcomes. They also hint at how Beijing wants future infantry formations to fight under a persistent drone threat and intense electronic warfare.
Chinese state television footage shows PLA ground units training with the ZRY222 rocket-armed combat robot, signaling China’s push to integrate unmanned systems directly alongside frontline infantry during realistic drills (Chinese Social Media / CCTV)
The broadcast sequence showed the ZRY222 operating as a close support asset rather than a standalone platform, moving in parallel with infantry and providing quick, localized firepower at the point of contact. The control concept appears centered on keeping soldiers under cover while projecting fire forward, with remote operators managing the robot from a nearby vehicle rather than from an exposed position on the line of advance. This is consistent with recent PLA experimentation aimed at distributing reconnaissance and fire support across more nodes, instead of relying exclusively on heavier armored vehicles or higher echelon artillery for every engagement.
From a capabilities perspective, the ZRY222 is a compact tracked unmanned ground vehicle designed to traverse broken terrain and rubble while carrying a weapon and sensor package optimized for short-range engagements. In the footage and imagery circulated around the system, the most distinctive feature is a small rocket launcher pod, apparently configured with four rounds, intended for rapid suppression rather than sustained bombardment. The platform is also associated with a sensor-driven approach to navigation and targeting, aligned with wider PLA moves to embed advanced sensing on ground vehicles to improve autonomy and situational awareness when GPS or communications are degraded.
The ZRY222’s public trajectory traces back to its appearance in Beijing during the September 2025 military parade, where it featured within a broader unmanned land combat formation that included multiple robotic and unmanned vehicle types. That parade framing highlighted a doctrinal message: unmanned systems are intended to support complex missions such as urban fighting and amphibious operations, where casualty sensitivity and restricted maneuver space magnify the value of remotely operated scouts and fire support carriers. Seen through that lens, the January training footage is less a standalone novelty than a continuation of a program already showcased as a future combined arms building block.
The ZRY222’s public trajectory traces back to its appearance in Beijing during the September 2025 military parade, where it featured within a broader unmanned land combat formation that included multiple robotic and unmanned vehicle types. Chinese reporting around that parade framed the land formation as a mixed set of wheeled, tracked, and quadruped systems intended to empower small units, and it emphasized that the same family of unmanned platforms can be configured with varied payloads, including optoelectronic sensors, machine guns, rocket launchers, smoke grenade launchers, and even small aerial drones. That parade framing highlighted a doctrinal message: unmanned systems are intended to support complex missions such as urban fighting and amphibious operations, where casualty sensitivity and restricted maneuver space magnify the value of remotely operated scouts and fire support carriers.
Seen through that lens, the January training footage is less a standalone novelty than a continuation of a program already showcased as a future combined arms building block. An external analytical monograph assessing the September 2025 parade has also linked the unmanned land combat team to the PLA Ground Force’s 71st Group Army and described the ZRY222 as having entered service in 2024, a claim that would imply the platform is moving beyond prototype status toward broader operational familiarization. If that assessment is accurate, the significance of the January footage is not only the presence of the robot itself, but the implication that units are building the control drills, deconfliction habits, and resupply routines needed to make manned-unmanned teaming functional at squad and platoon levels.
Tactically, a rocket-armed UGV offers several advantages that are hard to replicate with man-portable weapons alone. It can move first into exposed lanes, draw fire, and help identify firing points while keeping riflemen a few steps further back and lower to the ground. Rockets add immediate shock effect against light cover, trench lines, and suspected firing positions, enabling a squad to force a defender to keep heads down long enough to reposition, breach, or disengage. At the same time, the observed loadout suggests a limited magazine, meaning the robot’s value depends on disciplined fire control, rapid resupply, and reliable communications, and it remains vulnerable to jamming, spoofing, or immobilization in close terrain if the enemy can get angles on it.
Public assessments of Russia’s Uran-9 experience in Syria have highlighted recurring remote-control and performance limitations, including link reliability issues that effectively forced operators closer to the vehicle than intended and reduced the expected standoff advantage of a “robot front line.” This history is useful as a baseline for interpreting what matters most in the ZRY222 concept: not just propulsion and armament, but the ability to maintain control and sensor feeds in cluttered terrain under active electronic attack, while preserving enough operator separation to actually reduce risk to the infantry it is meant to support.
It is also notable that recent combat trends are pushing unmanned designers to revisit how control links are built when jamming intensity rises. Ukraine, for example, has tested fiber-optic-controlled unmanned ground vehicles specifically to reduce vulnerability to electronic warfare, reflecting a broader wartime pattern in which physical tethering or alternative datalinks can trade some mobility and logistics complexity for more consistent control in contested spectrum conditions. Without assuming the PLA is taking the same approach, the benchmark is becoming clearer: small UGVs intended for “first risk” tasks will be judged less by their parade presentation than by whether they can stay controllable and useful when radio links are stressed.
At the geostrategic level, the most consequential signal is that PLA ground units appear to be normalizing manned-unmanned teaming for realistic training rather than keeping it confined to demonstrations. This matters in a region where planners increasingly assume dense ISR coverage, swarms of small drones, and heavy electronic attack, conditions that reward dispersed formations with organic sensors and firepower. Chinese reporting tied the unmanned land systems displayed in 2025 directly to difficult scenarios such as amphibious landing operations and urban combat, reinforcing the view that these platforms are being prepared for environments where line-of-sight is constrained and exposure is punishing. The same modernization push emphasizes sensor fusion and autonomy as a way to accelerate the detect to engage cycle, and widely observed adoption of advanced sensing across platforms suggests China is investing in the industrial depth needed to field these technologies at scale, not just in boutique units.
For potential opponents, the implication is a battlefield where small formations may generate their own suppressive fires while pushing expendable robotic systems forward to reduce risk to soldiers and complicate targeting. This direction is not unique to China, and it maps onto how other large forces describe robotic employment concepts. A U.S. Congressional Research Service brief on the Army’s Robotic Combat Vehicle program, for example, notes that the Army has envisioned robots as “scouts” and “escorts” for manned vehicles to deter ambushes and protect formation flanks, which is conceptually adjacent to the idea of delegating first contact and first exposure to machines. The PLA’s visible experimentation with a rocket-armed tracked UGV at the infantry level suggests a parallel emphasis on distributing risk and firepower downward, even if the precise doctrine and enabling networks differ.
The new CCTV footage underscores that the ZRY222 is moving from parade ground symbolism toward practical integration with infantry tactics, even if the system’s real combat resilience will depend on communications robustness, counter-EW measures, and logistics. What stands out is the concept, not just the platform: putting a small rocket capability on a tracked unmanned vehicle gives squads a fast, localized way to create shock and suppression while reducing exposure, and it fits a broader trend toward distributed, sensor-enabled combined arms at the lowest levels. For regional militaries watching PLA training patterns, the message is clear enough: China is preparing for high friction environments where machines take the first risk and soldiers exploit the opening.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.