China Tests HJ-10 Anti-Tank Missile in Gobi Desert to Sharpen Mobile Anti-Armor Warfare.

China has conducted a new test of the HJ-10 anti-tank missile in the Gobi Desert, highlighting ongoing PLA efforts to strengthen mobile long-range firepower against armored threats. The exercise focused on the ability of missile detachments to rapidly maneuver across harsh terrain, coordinate target acquisition, and conduct precision engagements at extended distance under operational conditions representative of high-intensity combat.

The HJ-10 provides Chinese ground forces with a vehicle-mounted precision anti-armor capability reportedly capable of engaging targets at ranges of around 10 km. Operated from mobile platforms such as the AFT-10, the system reflects the PLA’s broader emphasis on survivable standoff strike capabilities intended to neutralize tanks and fortified positions before they can enter direct-fire range.

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China’s PLA used the HJ-10 anti-tank missile system in a Gobi Desert live-fire drill to improve long-range mobile anti-armor combat operations (Picture Source: China’s Ministry of National Defense)

On May 25, 2026, China’s Ministry of National Defense announced that an anti-tank missile detachment assigned to a brigade of the People’s Liberation Army 74th Group Army had carried out a long-range maneuver to the Gobi Desert for a live-fire drill, offering a rare official look at the operational use of the HJ-10 Anti-Tank Guided Missile system. The exercise was designed to test how quickly a missile unit can deploy over distance, coordinate with command elements, and deliver precision strikes in an austere battlefield environment. More than a standard firing sequence, the drill points to the PLA’s effort to refine mobile, standoff anti-armor operations in which speed, targeting, and survivability are becoming central to modern ground combat. 

The HJ-10, also referred to as Red Arrow-10, is a Chinese long-range anti-tank guided missile system designed to give ground formations a standoff precision-strike capability against armored vehicles, fortified positions, and other tactical battlefield targets. Unlike man-portable anti-tank missiles intended for shorter-range engagements by small infantry teams, the HJ-10 is primarily associated with vehicle-mounted launch platforms, most probably in this case the AFT-10 anti-tank missile carrier based on the ZBD-04A tracked infantry fighting vehicle chassis. This places the system closer to a mobile tank-destroyer or anti-armor fire-support platform than to a conventional infantry anti-tank weapon. Available technical data describes the missile as having a maximum range of about 10 km and the ability to engage targets with pre-launch or post-launch lock-on, enabling operators to attack threats beyond the reach of many direct-fire weapons while remaining outside immediate tank gun range.

The system’s operational value lies in its ability to extend the anti-armor engagement zone of a ground formation and to engage hostile armored forces before they enter close-combat range. Mounted on what appears most likely to be an AFT-10 launcher using a ZBD-04A-derived tracked chassis, the HJ-10 can be employed to establish an anti-tank screen, cover likely avenues of approach, reinforce blocking positions, or support maneuver units with standoff precision fires. Earlier Chinese military reporting described the HJ-10A as a heavy-duty fiber-optic guided anti-tank missile, with its launch vehicle fitted with an elevating mast-type electro-optical sighting system. Such a configuration can support target acquisition from covered or partially concealed positions, allowing the missile detachment to operate as part of a wider anti-armor fire network.

The decision to conduct the drill in the Gobi Desert is also militarily significant. Open and austere terrain allows the PLA to test long-distance movement, navigation, communications, vehicle endurance, target detection, and missile employment under conditions that place pressure on both personnel and equipment. Desert operations can affect logistics, optical sensors, mechanical reliability, and command-and-control links, particularly when units operate far from fixed support infrastructure. For an anti-tank missile detachment, success in this environment depends not only on missile accuracy, but also on the ability to preserve a functional sensor-to-shooter loop from detection to engagement under field conditions.

In essence, China appears to be testing the complete operational cycle of a mobile anti-tank missile unit rather than the HJ-10 missile alone. The drill likely assessed whether a detachment can deploy over distance, reach a designated firing area, establish temporary launch positions, acquire and classify targets, coordinate with brigade-level command elements, deliver accurate fires, and then reposition before being detected or engaged. This “shoot-and-scoot” cycle is central to the survivability of modern missile units, particularly on a battlefield where reconnaissance drones, artillery, loitering munitions, and electronic warfare can quickly expose and target static firing positions.

From a military perspective, the HJ-10 provides PLA ground units with a capability aligned with high-intensity combined-arms warfare, where anti-armor fires must be integrated with reconnaissance, maneuver, artillery, and command-and-control assets. A long-range anti-tank guided missile system can delay or disrupt mechanized formations, protect key terrain, cover exposed flanks, and contribute to layered defensive belts designed to break the momentum of an armored advance before it reaches direct engagement range. In offensive operations, the same system can support assault formations by neutralizing strongpoints, overwatching axes of advance, engaging counterattacking armor, and suppressing high-value targets that could threaten the main force. This places the HJ-10 beyond the traditional role of an anti-tank weapon and positions it as a tactical precision-fire asset within a broader combined-arms framework.

The exercise also reflects the PLA’s continuing emphasis on rapid response, dispersed deployment, and distributed firepower. Modern land forces increasingly need to operate in smaller, more mobile formations, reduce their electromagnetic and visual signature, and deliver precision effects without concentrating large numbers of vehicles in vulnerable assembly areas. In this context, a vehicle-mounted HJ-10 detachment can function as a mobile anti-armor node, able to deploy quickly, establish temporary firing positions, engage targets at standoff range, and relocate before enemy reconnaissance or counterfire can react. Its battlefield value is therefore not limited to missile range, penetration, or warhead performance, but depends on how effectively it is connected to reconnaissance assets, fire-control procedures, tactical communications, and command networks.

At the strategic and operational level, the drill suggests that China is preparing anti-tank missile units for scenarios in which mobility, precision, and coordination are decisive. The PLA appears to be testing whether these detachments can move rapidly across large operational spaces, operate in difficult terrain, maintain command links, and contribute to a layered defense against armored or mechanized threats. Such training is relevant for border defense, desert and plateau operations, coastal approaches, and any environment where mobile missile units may be required to slow, channel, or attrit an opposing force. The key point is that the HJ-10 is not being trained as an isolated weapons system, but as part of a wider kill chain designed to detect, fix, track, engage, and defeat targets at extended range.

The Gobi Desert live-fire drill shows that the HJ-10 is being integrated into China’s evolving approach to precision land warfare. By combining long-range maneuver, standoff anti-armor firepower, coordinated command procedures, and rapid displacement after firing, the PLA is preparing missile detachments for a battlefield where speed, concealment, sensor integration, and accurate fires can shape the outcome before armored forces reach close contact. The exercise also reflects a wider trend in modern ground combat: anti-tank missile systems are no longer only defensive weapons positioned to stop tanks at short notice, but mobile precision-strike assets able to influence the tempo, geometry, and structure of a land battle.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.