China supplies $10.3 billion in manufacturing parts for Russia’s Oreshnik ballistic missile.

China has supplied Russia with at least $10.3 billion in machine tools, microelectronics, and precision components since 2022, according to a Telegraph investigation, with equipment traced to production of the Oreshnik ballistic missile at the Votkinsk facility.

On January 28, 2026, The Telegraph reported that China supplied Russia with at least $10.3 billion in advanced machinery and electronics since 2022. The deliveries included CNC machine tools, microchips, and testing equipment identified at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, where the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile is produced. China denied providing military support, stating exports were civilian and commercial.
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The Oreshnik, also designated SS-X-31B or SS-X-34, is an intermediate-range, ground-launched ballistic missile developed by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, with ranges between 800 km and 5,000 km depending on payload mass and trajectory. (Picture source: Russian MoD)

In its article, The Telegraph reported that China has supplied Russia with at least $10.3 billion in advanced machinery and components since 2022, directly supporting the production of the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile at the sanctioned Votkinsk facility. The reported deliveries include about $3.1 billion in machine tools and about $4.9 billion in microchips and memory boards, alongside other precision components essential for modern weapons manufacturing. A specific Chinese-made CNC carousel lathe, used to turn and cut metal with high precision, has been identified at the strategic Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, where the Oreshnik is produced alongside Iskander-M ballistic missiles and Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Additional supplies include ball bearings, piezoelectric crystals used in radar and electronic warfare systems, optical equipment, measurement tools, testing instruments such as multimeters and oscilloscopes, and components linked to drone production. China already responded to the Telegraph investigation, rejecting the claim that it is supplying military support to Russia and maintaining that it only provides civilian or commercial supplies. These imports allow Russia’s defense production to continue despite sanctions because they precisely cover categories where Russia's own production capacity is insufficient, notably precision machine tools, microelectronics, and industrial testing equipment.

Operated by computer programs, CNC machine tools enable the machining of missile structures, propulsion components, and warhead assemblies that require tight tolerances and repeatable quality. Microchips and memory boards are necessary for guidance, control, and electronic subsystems used across missiles, aircraft, and drones, while testing instruments such as oscilloscopes and multimeters support calibration and acceptance checks during production. Ball bearings, piezoelectric crystals, and optical components are required for moving assemblies, radar, and electronic warfare systems, and cannot be easily substituted at scale. Drone production sites, including those linked to the Alabuga special economic zone, rely on the same categories of machinery and electronics.

By supplying these inputs since 2022, according to the Telegraph, China has helped Russia to maintain continuous output, expand manufacturing tempo, and reduce the impact of Western sanctions. China’s tolerance of this level of industrial linkage reflects strategic calculation rather than purely commercial exchange. A decisive Russian defeat would weaken a partner that absorbs Western attention and resources, potentially allowing greater focus on China in other regions. Maintaining Russia’s ability to sustain the war is therefore assessed as preferable to an outcome that would leave Moscow strategically diminished. At the same time, China limits exposure by avoiding overt transfers of finished weapons while continuing trade in goods classified as dual-use.

Financial and payment frictions, including the risk of secondary sanctions, shape how visible and direct these transactions become. The resulting posture preserves Russian industrial viability while staying below the threshold of explicit military intervention. This logic explains why machine tools, electronics, and testing equipment dominate the current trade profile between the two countries. Over nearly four years, this Chinese manufacturing output could have been proven vital for one of Russia’s most sensitive missile programs, the Oreshnik. This intermediate-range ballistic missile, which has been used twice in combat, could be armed with both conventional and nuclear warheads. The first confirmed use of the Oreshnik occurred on November 21, 2024, when a launch toward the Dnipro area followed a flight time of about 15 minutes, and Ukrainian authorities indicated the use of inert or dummy warheads.

A second use on January 8–9, 2026, happened near Lviv, close to Poland’s border, increasing the political significance by bringing strategic signaling closer to NATO borders. Russia has also showcased Oreshnik deployments in Belarus, with systems reported on combat duty by late December 2025. These episodes indicate a weapon that is operational enough for selective launches and forward basing but not yet employed at scale like the Iskander-M. The pattern reinforces the assessment of Oreshnik as a strategic signaling tool whose effectiveness depends heavily on an industrial supply chain vulnerable to precision manufacturing constraints. From an industrial standpoint, the Oreshnik’s production is based on a layered supply chain that combines domestic design and assembly with external enablers.

Design authority is linked to the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, launcher-related engineering to Titan-Barrikady, and electronics contributions to Concern Sozvezdie. Manufacturing is associated with the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, which has long experience with solid-fuel missile systems. Road mobility relies on heavy transporter-erector-launcher (TELs) vehicles widely based on the MZKT-79291 chassis produced in Belarus, and Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko previously confirmed that the country manufactured several launchers. However, the analysis of components recovered after the second Oreshnik strike pointed to damage or absence in parts associated with the guidance and orientation system, suggesting the missile may have operated in a partially blind configuration during its terminal phase. 

According to available information, the Oreshnik missile, also designated SS-X-31B or SS-X-34, was developed by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology. A decision to pursue a non-nuclear configuration based on the RS-26 Rubezh design lineage was taken in July 2023, with earlier theoretical work under the “Kedr” designation likely conducted from 2022 or before. The missile incorporates design solutions and technologies drawn from other solid-fuel systems developed by the same institute, including Yars and Bulava, possibly indicating continuity in propulsion, guidance architecture, and mobile basing concepts. Flight testing reportedly began at the Kapustin Yar range in October 2023 and continued in June 2024, marking the transition from development into an initial operational configuration.

By December 2025, Russian military authorities stated that the first brigade equipped with the Oreshnik system had been formed, and that elements of the system had entered combat duty, including on the territory of Belarus. From a technical perspective, the Oreshnik is assessed as a two-stage, solid-fuel intermediate ballistic missile equipped with a separating warhead section and a post-boost stage for payload deployment. Available data indicate a missile length of about 14–15 m, a launch mass between about 40 and 45 tonnes, and an estimated throw-weight ranging from at least 1,200 kg up to about 3,000 kg depending on configuration. The warhead section is reported to support a non-nuclear payload, including a multiple reentry vehicle arrangement with six groups of six submunitions, or alternatively a payload of heavy penetration aids or decoys.

Analysis of missile debris indicates the use of a conventional MIRV architecture with a centralized post-boost “bus” fitted with a gas-reactive orientation system, rather than independently powered maneuvering warheads. Reported maximum velocities reach about Mach 10 to Mach 11, equivalent to roughly 13,000 km/h, with estimated ranges spanning roughly 800 km to 5,000 km depending on payload mass and trajectory. The Oreshnik complex is structured as a mobile ground-based missile formation consistent with previous Russian road-mobile ballistic missile systems. The core element is the autonomous launcher vehicle carrying the missile in a sealed transport-launch container, assessed as being mounted on the MZKT-79291 heavy wheeled chassis, an eight-axle platform developed to support loads in excess of 80 tonnes.

This launcher is complemented by a command-and-control vehicle, possibly named 15V180, that functions as the mobile command post for the firing unit, and a communications vehicle, the 15V190, responsible for secure data links and connectivity with higher command echelons. The complex also includes a combat duty support vehicle named 15V240M, providing life support, power generation, and technical support for crews during prolonged deployments. Additional vehicles associated with the system are assessed to include an engineering and camouflage vehicle, the 15M69M, and a unified thermal vehicle named UTM-80M for environmental control and maintenance support, reflecting a vehicle mix comparable to other Russian missile formations such as Yars and Topol-M.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.